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Appendix A 
Assumptions 
Knowledge, Understanding, and Ontology, three words whose meaning seems 
clear. But beyond the obvious, lies a bedrock whose deeper understanding 
dissolves many potential mistakes. 
LOLITA's purpose is to process the knowledge texts express in various ways: sum-
marisation, translation, template analysis, determining contradictions, query an-
swering, searching for topics, planning, and so on. In order to perform such a wide 
spectrum of tasks, i t must be assumed that all these tasks involve shared processes. 
Indeed, if the tasks were completely independent, a small set of independent so-
lutions would be more appropriate. This assumption is based on the observation 
that all the tasks discussed are knowledge processing tasks. In particular, they are 
tasks involving mainly the processing of knowledge extracted from Natural Lan-
guage texts. Thus a two-part model emerges where on the one hand processing of 
Natural Language text results in some form of knowledge, and on the other hand, 
this knowledge is processed to fulf i l the tasks required of the system. This leads to 
three important questions: 
1. What is the knowledge discussed? 
2. What is knowledge processing? 
3. What is meant by "extraction of knowledge from a text"? 
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A . l Reasoning, and hence the symbolic paradigm 
The different forms of knowledge processing can be thought of as different forms 
of reasoning. For instance, summarisation involves deducing certain facts from a 
mass of data, by prioritising the importance of each. This issue is examined in 
greater depth, and then means by which reasoning can be achieved are discussed. 
A. 1.1 Why is reasoning important? 
The whole perspective of the LOLITA project is to a great extent determined by the 
requirement that the LOLITA tool should be able to reason with the knowledge 
provided by the texts i t processes. Why require the ability to reason? To an 
extent the question is answered by considering the ultimate fulfilment of A . I . : the 
reproduction of all successful human behaviour. However there is a more pragmatic 
reason for this requirement. The assumption is made in this thesis that the features 
required of a knowledge base for reasoning will be useful, if not fundamental, for 
other types of processing. 
I t is worth discussing the reasons for such an assumption. Many of these will appear 
clearer when the notions of interpreting a text are discussed later in this appendix. 
At this stage, i t is simply worth mentioning examples where the requirement pro-
vides benefits. 
Valid reasoning is the process of making explicit knowledge already implicit in the 
knowledge base. In this sense it does not add any information. Non-valid methods 
of reasoning make assumptions, and thus add a degree of uncertainty to their 
conclusions. I t is obviously possible to deduce a very precise fact from imprecise 
data, but with a very low degree of certainty. Since highly uncertain knowledge 
is pragmatically undesirable as it is of limited use, it is preferable for reasoning to 
deliver reasonably certain conclusions. This in turn results in a reduction of their 
precision. Thus each reasoning step can be seen as deteriorating the precision of the 
resulting knowledge. This means that for useful reasoning to be done, the initial 
information should be well defined and precise. Natural language tends however 
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to be ambiguous. For instance the word "star" may either mean an astronomical 
object, a celebrity or a particular type of participation in a play, film, etc. In order 
for reasoning to be successful, the notion referred to must be determined. However 
this also proves useful for translation. Indeed each of these possibilities corresponds 
to a different word or expression in French (une etoile, une star, etre la vedette) or 
German (eine Sterne, ein Star, die Hauptrolle spielen)^ 
Consider another type of tasks to be addressed: information extraction tasks such 
as contents scanning, or summarisation. Such processing requires the source infor-
mation to be classified into a set of themes. A knowledge base designed to allow 
reasoning at various levels of detail helps this process: if information is organised in 
the knowledge base by theme, i t can more easily be reasoned about at the subject 
level. Thus these benefits motivated by reasoning, also spill over to other tasks. 
The need for reasoning is however best illustrated by its need in Natural Language 
processing itself. In the following examples, reasoning is needed to determine what 
the situation described is: "John died. Bill pushed him". To determine that Bill 
pushed John before John died, causal reasoning is necessary. Similarly, quantifica-
tion resolution such as "John visited every house on a street", "John visited every 
house on a square", and "John visited every patient in a private room"^ can be 
argued to require reasoning. Similarly, in the single sentence "John talked while he 
ate" the only referent for "he" is John. The situation changes when the sentence 
"John was not hungry, so Peter started eating by himself" precedes it : now the 
most likely referent for "he" is Peter. Determining this requires a minimal degree 
of understanding, i.e. reasoning. 
A.1,2 Means of reasoning 
Having established that reasoning is desirable, the question of how reasoning can be 
achieved remains. Various alternatives exist: symbolic reasoning and probabilistic 
methods such as fuzzy logic, neural nets or Markov models. The choice for LOLITA 
"^ For further details see [Morgan et al. 94]. 
^Examples taken from [Alshawi 92] 
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is however clear: symbolic reasoning. 
A.1.2.1 The symbolic paradigm 
Reasoning and the language in which knowledge is expressed are strongly linked. 
Most knowledge is expressed in natural language. This relies on human under-
standing and presents many problems. Natural language is rarely unambiguous, 
that is to say that there is often more than one meaning associated with each 
word. This makes keeping track of precisely which meaning was meant difficult in 
complicated arguments. Moreover assumptions can easily slip into an argument 
undetected. 
Philosophers realized that these problems were due to the fact the whole reasoning 
process was being conducted at the conceptual level, and was thus to a large extent 
implicit. In search of even greater clarity and rigour with which their arguments 
could be established, they decided to bring the reasoning to the syntactic level 
where i t could be made explicit. This explicit method of reasoning is based on 
the use of symbols to represent concepts, and statements written as strings of 
these symbols. Proofs consist of explicit sequences of reasoning steps, taken from 
a limited set of legal steps. Thus a clear path is established from the premises to 
the result. Hence, no assumptions are unintentionally introduced into the proof. 
Because this explicit expression of reasoning is independent of the agent, it is of 
particular interest to the implementation of reasoning in LOLITA. 
A.1.2.2 Successes of the symbolic paradigm: Science and Mathematics 
Science distinguishes itself from other forms of knowledge by its methodology and 
evaluation criteria. Thus scientific models may be expressed in natural language 
as is the case for Biology. However, symbolic techniques are used when a model 
can be expressed precisely in order to gain in clarity and rigour. For instance 
in Chemistry reaction formula show what the reactants and the products of a 
given reaction are. These can be combined using the reactance of the various 
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reactions and information giving the experimental conditions to obtain an idea of 
the products. The science which is the most expressed in a symbolic language 
is physics. I t is expressed in mathematical language, which makes it completely 
agent-independent. Whatever the interpretation given to the Schrodinger equation 
in Quantum mechanics, over which a considerable debate still rages, its ability to 
make accurate predictions within the range of its application remains undisputed. 
Its success is obvious, as many of this century's major technical innovations such as 
micro-electronics, telecommunications, and the computer, are direct applications 
of i t . This success associated with symbolic reasoning, in particular mathematics, 
warrants investigation as a possible basis for the reasoning to be implemented as 
part of the LOLITA tool. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the discussion of mathematics will obviously be 
vastly simplified. However, certain aspects of i t are extremely relevant. At its 
most surface level, mathematics can be considered as the manipulation of state-
ments through substitution: expressions are replaced by others that are believed 
equivalent. Through this process, complex statements can be built from a small set 
of initial statements - the axioms. Inversely, complex statements can be decom-
posed into the axioms to prove whether they are based on the axioms, or not. Since 
the axioms are believed to be true, statements based on the axioms are believed 
to be true. Similarly those statements that contradict the axioms are considered 
false. This viewpoint is similar to that of the strict formalist in that no additional 
agent dependent faculties such as intuition are assumed. ^ 
The problem of intuition usually arises when it comes to elaborate a proof: for ev-
ery step in the proof, there are many possible substitutions to choose from. Most 
of these do not lead to the desired solution. However, this is rarely a problem 
for standard applications of mathematics, such as physics, where standard rea-
soning techniques usually lead directly to the answer. I t is more a problem for 
^This position has been dealt a blow by Godel's theorem which showed that some statements 
may seem intuitively true within the framework of the axioms, yet not be provably either true or 
false. However Godel's theorem is more of mathematical interest than of scientific since it does 
not appear in physics, or in any other science. Similarly such a special case is unlikely to emerge 
in a NLP system. Even if it were to, it would simply maintain its status as a proposition the 
system cannot prove or disprove. 
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the formulation of new problems, and new proofs, and thus more of concern to 
mathematicians. Thus, even limited to standard reasoning techniques, which can 
be automated, mathematical language can provide great power of precision and 
rigour with a wide variety of reasoning methods. 
Mathematical language can therefore be seen for our purposes as statements manip-
ulated by substitution rules. The statements themselves are composed of a string 
of symbols. Substitution can be thought of as pattern matching against strings of 
symbols and substitution therein. Thus mathematical reasoning can be thought of 
as symbolic reasoning within a substitution paradigm. However this view is slightly 
restricted: i t might seem that all we are dealing with is various jumbled permu-
tations of symbols. Although the reasoning process may function by substitution, 
in order for the process to be useful, various symbols must be given a meaning. 
Some symbols such as operators are given a meaning within the set of axioms and 
determine which substitution patterns are believed. Others such as variables must 
be assigned a meaning, stating what they are representing. A third category, such 
as numbers, must be partially assigned a meaning, such as the measurement unit 
they are expressed in. So a particular symbol, or class of symbols, is bound to a 
particular concept: the symbol is said to represent the concept. This process occurs 
outside of the substitution framework, or at the meta-level. Thus the mathematics 
and the substitution paradigm is free of the particulars of any concepts. I t is an 
abstraction where relations between concepts such as their mutual behaviour or 
dependency can be specified. However if the substitution paradigm is useful for 
reasoning, it is only useful because of the conclusions i t obtains within the concep-
tual framework considered. Hence the fink between the symbols and the concepts 
they represent is essential. This assignment of concepts to symbols, and meaning 
to statements including them is called interpretation. I t is essential yet lies outside 
of the symbolic reasoning paradigm. 
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A.1.2.3 Lack of equally successful alternatives 
Reasoning symbolically thus allows conjectures to be proved formally. The develop-
ment of mathematics over more than 2500 years provides a veist resource of varied 
explicit reasoning methods, and standard techniques. Although recent work has 
investigated other non-symbohc forms of reasoning, such as fuzzy logic or neural 
nets, none of these have attained the degree of sophistication that symbolic meth-
ods have. Indeed, the unique success of symbolic reasoning has been demonstrated 
by the importance and unique role of the scientific paradigm this century. No 
other method of reasoning has attained such heights. Thus, although other forms 
of reasoning are interesting possibilities in themselves, symbohc methods have the 
decisive advantage. 
A.2 Symbolic, and other forms of Knowledge 
Attempts at defining knowledge often reduce to tautologies. Rather than defining 
knowledge itself, emphasis will be laid on desired behaviour. By considering the 
effect on behaviour that is expected of knowledge, the nature of the type of knowl-
edge considered is clarified. It will be helpful to consider widely accepted forms 
of knowledge and the behaviour which is expected after acquiring such knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge is of particular interest since the behaviour in which it results 
is expected to be identical whatever the agent which acquires it . That is to say, 
for instance, everyone solving a physics problem should obtain the same result, 
if they have all been trained in physics. In this sense, scientific knowledge can 
be taken as fully defined and independent from any knowledge that might vary 
from agent to agent. Thus by considering scientific knowledge, no particular agent 
need be considered either in the description of the knowledge, or in the resulting 
behaviour. 
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A.2.1 Scientific Knowledge 
Scientific knowledge consists of a set of models which are intended to reflect the 
behaviour of the world. These models postulate a set of primitive entities and 
relations which hold between them. The purpose of the knowledge thus set forth 
is to allow events in the world to be predicted. Thus the usefulness of the model 
depends on its ability to predict outcomes correctly. Hence, within the limits estab-
lished for the model, the relations should allow the model to reflect any sequence 
of behaviour observed in the world. Similarly the model should allow no sequence 
of behaviour which does not occur in the world. I f these conditions are observed, 
the relations are said to "hold in the world". Thus i f the model holds, i t specifies 
sequences of behaviour possible in the world. 
The type of event which can be predicted by the model will determine its usefulness. 
Indeed, a model specifying that something will happen is not very useful. Thus the 
precision of the model's prediction is relevant. However, the amount of information 
the model requires to make a prediction is also important: i f more information is 
required than is usually available, the model will be of little use. Conversely, 
if little information is required in order to make a precise prediction, the model 
is very valuable. Taken to the extreme, a model requiring no information and 
predicting without failure the winning numbers of the national lottery would be of 
tremendous value! The value of a model therefore depends on the gain in knowledge 
it provides. I t is a trade-off between the amount of information put in, and the 
amount obtained. 
The usefulness of the model also increases with the range of phenomena of which i t 
successfully captures the behaviour: the more a model can be used, the more useful 
it is, since effort is required to master i t . Similarly, the usefulness of the model 
increases with its simplicity, since the effort involved in mastering it and its asso-
ciated paradigm decreases. This stems from the fact that models and information 
in general only exist because agents created them to use them. Thus their value to 
their creators must be taken into account. For the type of agents considered here, 
remembering a fact incurs a cost. Thus remembering a large collection of facts is 
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more expensive than remembering a smaller such collection. Hence if a set of facts 
is smaller than another and allows as much or more information to be derived, then 
it may be the more cost effective. Determining this smaller set of facts and then 
the process of deriving information from this set both also involve a computational 
cost ^. Thus i t is the total combination of these costs which will determine the 
cheapest form in which the model can be used and remembered. 
The observations just made lead to some interesting consequences. The first is 
that the number of entities considered should be minimised, or as Ockham said, 
do not multiply entities without necessity: postulating the existence of an entity 
is a fact, and involves a cost. Only those mental entities, or concepts which can 
sustain the cost of existence are sustainable. These include such abstract concepts 
as gravity or the curvature of space.^  Another consequence is that a model may 
include tautologies: facts which could be derived from the rest of the model, but 
which are used so often that it costs more to derive them than to remember them. 
Examples include the Compton equation that is an application of the special the-
ory of relativity, or remembering one's multiplication tables when i t is possible to 
calculate them by addition. 
From the discussion, i t may seem natural to assume that a general model of ev-
erything based on a minimal set of primitives should be the beisis of the agent's 
knowledge. However no such general theory of everything exists as yet, omitting 
for this discussion the question of whether such a theory is possible. Scientific 
knowledge therefore consists of a set of models. The question arises under what 
conditions all these models can be combined into a generalised model covering the 
whole range of phenomena that all the models cover separately. For any model 
to be scientific, i.e. for i t to predict anything which will hold, i t must be self-
consistent: any prediction based on any part of i t should be the same as any other 
based on any other part of i t , assuming an identical situation is considered in all 
cases. This is also true of general models built from many other models. I t is an 
^It should be noted that here the meaning of computation refers to the general notion of 
reasoning, reckoning 
^It should of course be noted cost expenditure depends on one's purpose. The scientific purpose 
is prediction. Other purposes can include the creation of a secure feeling about life and death. 
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obvious necessity for theories covering the same range of phenomena, and which 
are submitted to the necessity of holding in the world. Newton's theory, Quantum 
mechanics and Relativity conform to this rule, by converging in each other's limits. 
Mutual self-consistency between models incorporated within a general model is en-
couraged further, when one considers Ockham's razor applied to the whole general 
model. General models which postulate fewer additional concepts may be advan-
taged, since they will have a lower memory cost. Thus general models composed 
of models sharing concepts may be preferred. This sharing of concepts improves 
the integration of smaller models into the general one. Hence, an entity E which 
may be considered primitive in one model (.4), may be derived from another [B). 
In the general model {Q), E could then be considered non primitive. However, 
this depends on the way it is to be used: when the general model is to be used to 
solve a problem easiest solved by model A, then it may well be worth using E as 
a primitive. This is similar to the issue of maintaining tautologies, such as Bayes 
theorem, in the model i f they reduce the computational cost of deriving desired 
information. The issue here is one of granularity: Instead of considering any par-
ticular level of the model as more "primitive" than any other, the question is how 
to use the system of relations provided by the model to derive with the least effort, 
desired information. Although science itself does not provide the answer here, this 
is an implicit part of a scientist's training: how best to apply the model. 
There is a final aspect that has not been covered. For a model to be used to make a 
prediction, the details of the initial situation, or initial conditions, must be known. 
These facts are expressed in a form where they can be used by the model. Often 
they are chosen, rather than others, because they are usable by the model. Thus 
the concepts of the model are used in order to establish and express facts. Hence 
from a system of thought, a complete model of the world and means of expressing 
facts about i t emerges. 
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A.2.2 Scientific knowledge: Too limitative? Alternatives? 
The notion of knowledge indicated by science is one where prediction is the key 
feature. However not all forms of knowledge need stress this aspect. Indeed, a 
large number of phenomena are not predictable. Art falls in this category, where 
knowledge allows one to appreciate a work, but not to predict its form. The 
question therefore arises of whether the view of knowledge given by science is not 
too restricted. 
Again, the question is partially solved by recalling the purpose of the LOLITA 
project. The problem is to produce a tool capable of identifying information and 
reasoning about i t . For instance, template analysis, query answering and topic 
searching can all be roughly approximated to identifying information. Determin-
ing contradictions, summarisation and planning all involve some form of reason-
ing. Such reasoning often involves predicting outcomes. Hence at least some of 
LOLITA's knowledge must allow prediction. 
Consider again the phenomena that do not allow predictions. For instance, prac-
tical skills such as knowing how to ride a horse are gained by practical experience. 
They are not something one can learn from another person by only following in-
structions. Instead direct experience, perception from one's senses is involved. 
Similarly, artistic knowledge is not readily expressible in human language. Where 
words are used, i t is often to hint at shared direct experiences. This is not the 
type of knowledge that is readily used for the tasks LOLITA is to be assigned. 
Templates, queries and topic searching all involve factual knowledge. This is the 
type of information expressed by scientific knowledge. 
Although science has been very successful at allowing predictions to be made, other 
forms of knowledge can be used in this way: History is an important example. I t 
can be seen as an enormous case-study of human behaviour. But it is the agent-
independence of science that distinguishes it from other forms of knowledge: the 
predictions each agent obtains will be the same. History, on the other hand, relies 
on the historian's common sense. Hence different historians can see the same facts 
in a difi^erent light. Since LOLITA requires an explicit expression of much of the 
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knowledge of this assumed common sense, history-like knowledge is not a good 
basis from which to build a knowledge base. LOLITA's knowledge base cannot 
assume any already existing knowledge, but must be self-sufficient. 
Hence, science distinguishes itself as an agent independent form of knowledge, 
which is self-sufficient. I t provides in its model of the world, a set of facts and a 
means of prediction. These features are those required of the knowledge of a fact 
processing tool such as LOLITA. Hence, i t is attractive as a model on which to base 
such a system. However, this knowledge should also be amenable to an explicitly 
defined form of reasoning, if i t is to be implemented in a tool. 
A.2.3 Limitations of the Scientific model of Knowledge 
A.2.3.1 Belief 
The discussion of knowledge has been limited to scientific models, which are con-
sidered true in the sense that they hold in the world. This assumption may not 
necessarily be frui t ful for the knowledge bases of agents. I t implies that all the 
knowledge in the knowledge base is correct. Hence no knowledge may be added to 
the knowledge base if i t contradicts the knowledge already present, so as to preserve 
the consistency of the general model. This is very inflexible, and leads to practical 
difficulties i f the agent is to perform tasks such as translation for texts with which 
he does not necessarily agree. Consider an example. The agent is told "Jane lives 
on the moon". He does not agree with this statement, so the interpretation phase 
which is responsible for maintaining the consistency of the knowledge base fails, 
and the agent fails to produce any translation. 
Since one of the purposes of the LOLITA tool is to provide translations, such a 
scenario is tantamount to failure. The only other possibility within the paradigm 
that all knowledge in the knowledge base is equally true, is to accept all statements 
as being true. This violates the notion of consistency, and allows both a statement 
and its opposite to be true simultaneously. This will lead to inconsistent behaviour, 
for instance of a planning component, where contradictory courses of action are 
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suggested. Again, such behaviour is unacceptable. The problem lies with the 
paradigm: not all knowledge in the knowledge base need be true. 
The problem is therefore of allowing statements to be represented in the knowledge 
base without assuming them to be true. The question of whether to accept a 
statement as true, as expressing something holding in the world, is the question 
of belief. I f the agent does not consider the statement to hold, there is no reason 
for him to act upon i t . However he is still able to access the statement within his 
knowledge base, and to process it in some way such as translation. I f on the other 
hand, he believes i t , he is both able to translate i t and finds it useful for planing. 
This resolves the problem, but raises some interesting consequences. 
The first consequence is that the degree to which the agent believes in each state-
ment must be added to the knowledge base. This in turn means that the knowledge 
base is not some abstract knowledge available to all, such as science, absolute in 
a sense, but is the belief of the agent himself: i t is what the agent believes the 
world to be like. Since a degree of belief must be assigned to each sta,tement, one 
might wonder what degree should be given to statements which are "known". For 
instance, one might say that the agent "knows" that apples taste sweet. Semanti-
cally the verb "to know" is a little tricky. For instance, one does not say one knows 
that God exists, rather that one believes in Him. In this sense, "to know" is an 
issue of direct experience. Similarly, one could not say that a person without any 
sense of smell knows that a rose smells sweet, only that he believes so. However, 
one can say that one knows that Bil l Clinton is the president of the United States, 
without having actually experienced i t . The first meaning of the verb could not be 
applied to LOLITA's knowledge, since she lacks any external senses. However, the 
second implying common knowledge, facts for which there is agreement of the ma-
jority of people in one's peer group and to which one subscribes, could be applied 
to LOLITA. This is however rather complicated to deal with. Thus, for the sake of 
simplicity, LOLITA will treat knowing something as assigning i t the highest degree 
of belief. 
The second consequence lies in statements the agent does not believe. There is 
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an infinite number of potential statements that the agent need not believe. The 
question therefore is which statements the agent does not believe, yet provide some 
information worth the cost of remembering them. The first such type of information 
is suggested by the example of translation: information stated by another agent. 
Although one may not agree with the statement itself, one can believe that i t has 
been stated. Similarly, one may believe that the agent believes something, without 
believing i t oneself.^ Another example is i f one believes something would cause 
something else to happen, without for that matter believing that the first thing 
actually has happened. For instance, one may believe that i f global warming were to 
occur, London would be flooded; yet one may also not believe that global warming 
has occurred so far. Al l these cases share a common feature: they depend on 
something believed. In this way they still constitute part of the agent's knowledge: 
they correspond to something the agent believes holds in the world. Without this 
dependency, they would not constitute part of the agent's model of the world, and 
hence would not be part of his knowledge. Such vacuous statements would provide 
no information, yet exact a cost to be remembered.^ Thus they should be purged 
from the knowledge base. 
A.2.3.2 Inconsistencies 
So far, within the framework of the knowledge base similar to scientific models, i t 
has been stated that inconsistencies should not occur. However, exhaustive testing 
for inconsistencies during the interpretation phase would incur an exorbitant com-
putational cost: every new statement would need to be tested not only against all 
the statements in the knowledge base, but also against all their consequences. This 
is clearly infeasible for any large scale knowledge base. The question therefore arises 
of the extent to which inconsistent information may be allowed in the knowledge 
base. Again, i t is a matter of cost benefit analysis. As discussed in A.2 (p. A-7), 
^The means of deriving the other's belief is irrelevant, it could be because the other told one, 
or a deduction from his behaviour. The point is that this information must be representable in 
the knowledge base. 
'''Indeed, they also increase the search space considered when reasoning, hence also increase 
the cost of reasoning. 
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every inconsistency leads to a possibly incorrect prediction: the full knowledge base 
implying both a conclusion and its negation, but the reasoning process considering 
perhaps only one of these conclusions. Thus the question becomes dependent on 
the extent the inconsistency can affect the predictions important to the agent, and 
which will determine its success at its tasks. For important tasks, a higher cost 
will be payed in order to avoid inconsistencies, whereas virtually no checks will 
be performed for the unimportant ones. Another question is raised: whether the 
agent has any important tasks, and if so, what they are. This question will be 
considered later. 
I t should be appreciated that even information already within the knowledge base 
may be inconsistent. Indeed, in any real situation, the range of application of some 
of the partial models may intersect, yet provide contradictory conclusions. For 
instance, one may both believe in the weather forecasts and in traditional rythmes 
such as "Sky at night, shepherd's delight". Yet in certain circumstances, they may 
contradict each other, so one must choose which to believe. In this case, one may 
choose the latter, i f one finds i t makes correct predictions most of the time. This 
is a matter of belief: one believes more in one model than in another. Thus behef 
may provide a means of quick resolution of inconsistencies. 
A.2.3.3 Certainty 
Both the notions of scientific truth and consistency of the knowledge base have 
been shown naive or insufiicient within the context of modeUing the knowledge 
of an agent. Instead, the notions of behef and consistency-checking incurring a 
cost have been introduced. This leads to the idea of two measures of belief: belief 
and certainty. Belief itself states the amount the agent beheves a fact, whereas 
certainty expresses the amount of effort spent on checking it . This is best illustrated 
by an example: One may believe that one has locked the front door, yet not be 
willing to bet one's life on i t . Certainty is used in the process of recovering from 
an inconsistency when contradictory conclusions hold similar degrees of belief: it 
indicates for which further checks may be required. 
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A.2.4 Common Sense Symbolic Models 
Despite the advantages of symbolic methods, a certain amount of cynicism per-
vades the N.L.P. field about the application of symbolic methods to common sense 
reasoning: "We've tried, and failed. Even such a large project as CYC tried, and 
failed"^ seemed to be a wide-spread attitude at the recent COLING 96 conference. 
This section investigates the difficulties involved in the building of a Common Sense 
Knowledge Base (C.S.K.B.), and the requirements i t must satisfy. A case study of 
CYC, the best known attempt at building such a C.S.K.B, follows. 
A.2.4.1 Common Sense Knowledge Base: Difficulties and Requirements 
Rather than being just a "data warehouse", a C.S.K.B. will be assumed to be 
associated with advanced reasoning capabilities, to allow it to solve previously 
unencountered problems. 
A.2.4.2 Mutual Dependencies 
Some of the difficulties facing C.S.K.B.s are described in 2.2 (p. 11): A C.S.K.B. 
is more than a collection of expert systems. Just as different scientific models must 
be consistent and not contradict each other to form a general model, a C.S.K.B.'s 
knowledge about various fields must not produce contradictions. This would be 
a simple matter if they were completely independent, but they are not. Indeed, 
when relevant, this mutual dependency between fields is the source of the depth an 
agglomeration of expert systems lacks. For instance, the meaning of death within 
the medical field is quite different to that within a military, judicial or emotional 
field. For a C.S.K.B. to understand why John attacked the drunk doctor who told 
him his mother had died, i t must incorporate knowledge from more than just the 
medical field. I t is the ability to reason at many levels of granularity, and in many 
different models that gives a deep understanding to a system, in the sense discussed 
in A.3.1 (p. A-28). 
^Personal Communication, Pierre Isabelle (a developer of METEO) in 1996 
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Although mutual dependency between knowledge of different fields is important 
for deep understanding to be displayed, i t is also the cause of many problems to 
developers, if ignored. I t means that adding new knowledge has a non-local effect 
to the knowledge base. Thus, reasoning which previously worked, may now fail. To 
appreciate how important this is, consider the simplest model of dependency, where 
a rule depending on another has a detrimental effect on reasoning. I f the K.B. con-
tains n assertions, there are "•*^ '^ '^ ^^  such possible dependencies^. Some of these will 
be wanted, but most will not. Thus, as the size n of the knowledge base increases, 
the scope for error increases as n^. Furthermore, most dependencies will not be 
so obvious, but will be made through many statements. Each dependency taken 
alone may seem reasonable, but overall they lead to fallacious reasoning. Means of 
keeping these dependencies explicit and under control are therefore essential. 
A consequence of mutual dependency is that the quality of the models input into 
the K.B. is of greater importance than the quantity. Adding kludges to make 
things work will only achieve fleeting success and long-term failure. Each kludge 
adds to the size of the knowledge base, increasing the risk of errors in the rest of 
the knowledge base. 
A.2.4.3 New common sense models 
For common sense reasoning to be possible, many models of common-sense happen-
ings must be built. These models capture the relations between different concepts, 
which are used in reasoning. Unlike a collection of simple facts, they provide a 
generic framework for all reasoning in a particular field. Indeed, they can be seen 
to define the concepts in terms of which facts will be expressed (see A.2 (p. A-7)). 
Thus i t is the organisation of knowledge which they provide, which enables the full 
set of implications of any fact to be grasped. 
Most of these models must be created, since they are not available in books, or the 
other usual sources of knowledge. They will determine the concepts the C.S.K.B. 
can represent and reason about. Thus if a model is incomplete, whole classes of 
^Each new rule can interact with the n previously existing rules. 
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concepts may not be expressible to the C.S.K.B. in a manner that i t can reason 
about them. Creating these models, just as creating scientific models, requires 
much experimentation to determine what is inferred wrongly or approximately, 
and what still needs to be covered. This might seem easy: most people have 
common sense knowledge. However first impressions are deceptive: Making implicit 
knowledge explicit is very difficult, as the example of linguists demonstrates: they 
too, have the task of making explicit the implicit knowledge of the rules people use 
in language. 
A.2.4.4 Implicit and Explicit Models: Important differences 
In theory an implicit model is equivalent to determining many of the consequences 
of an explicit model. I f all of these consequences are present, the assertions stated 
by either model are equivalent. However there are important differences: 
An explicit model is clear, maintainable, relatively small, flexible and internally 
well structured. I t is however diflScult to build, as the general rules that form i t 
can easily encompass too wide a scope, leading to incorrect predictions. However, 
the concepts it uses are clearly defined, so that the statements made are clear. 
The internal structure is a boon to reasoning algorithms which can use it to limit 
the search space they must consider when determining new facts. Furthermore, as 
explained in A.2 (p. A-7), there is no efficiency penalty, since often used combina-
tions of rules can be expressed explicitly, allowing reasoning at a lower granularity. 
Finally, general rules are more fiexible since they allow new concepts to be added 
to the knowledge base, and will apply to them too. 
An implicit model has little internal structure, is hard to maintain, and sprawls. 
As a result it may prove difficult to build as i t does not provide clear definitions of 
concepts, lacking some model in which to describe them. The lack of clarity can 
result in terms being used for similar but different concepts resulting in lack of reso-
lution, and thus reasoning power^°. However, implicit models have the advantage of 
'^ *'For instance, at one point CYC's K.B. contained in 2 million facts, but this decreased to 
400,000 after work to generalise axioms. The extent of this decrease could be understood to 
reflect a naive bottom up approach to building knowledge, due to the implicit model. 
Chapter A: Assumptions A-19 
reducing the chance of over-generalised claims by rules. They are also less difficult 
to build and require less qualified knowledge enterers. Efficiency-wise, common-
sense knowledge tends to be more local to the concepts i t describes, and the lack 
of deep models decreases the search space. But this is accompanied by a decrease 
in flexibility, in particular with respect to new information, since knowledge is not 
encompassed in "first-principle" models. 
Thus a C.S.K.B. should use explicit models. 
A.2.4.5 Example 
An example gives a flavour of the type of C.S.K.B. satisfying the above require-
ments, and of the difficulties in writing it . 
Suppose that one wished the C.S.K.B. to know that hand-gliding is a dangerous 
activity. One could write this explicitly in the C.S.K.B.: hand-gliding is a specific 
activity, so there is little chance that making this statement could lead to incorrect 
reasoning. On the other hand, being a safe bet, it says very little. What about 
other similar activities, such as racing cars? Are they dangerous? One might 
deduce that a better rule would be "all sports are dangerous". However this rule 
would lead to the incorrect conclusions that chess and snooker are dangerous, as 
they are sometimes classified as sports. Thus neither rule is satisfactory: the first 
is over-specific, the second is over-general. 
Instead, one could build an explicit model from which hand-gliding and touching 
toxic substances could be derived to be dangerous. One means of achieving this is 
to consider the human and in particular his body as a system of interdependent 
phenomena working within certain normal ranges. Examples of such phenomena 
are the heart rate, bodily strength, speed of reflexes, amount of time concentra-
tion can be maintained, amount of pressure that can be withstood, stress levels, 
minimum food consumption and so on. What characterises physical sports is that 
they involve using various of these phenomena outside their normal ranges and 
close to their limits. But these limits are precisely the point where the system 
collapses, breaks down. For the human body, such a breakdown is called death. 
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I f danger is defined as increasing the potential of destruction, sport's usage of the 
phenomena constitutes a danger to the human body. This allows a much more 
general understanding of danger. Not only are physical activities involving such 
high tolerance levels dangerous such as car-racing, but also are excesses such eating 
too much (binging) or eating too little (starving), eating too much of a particular 
thing, taking too much of some drug (although this has not a minimal level)... I t 
also provides clearer definitions of notions such as food: food is anything that feeds 
a human, i.e. increases his food level without incurring too much damage to his 
body. Thus the explicit model results in far more power. 
Consider the systems model further: i t accounts for many other phenomena. The 
fact that the parts of the system are interlinked allows some of them to adapt in 
response to the needs of others. Thus when making a physical eflfort, more oxygen 
is needed by the muscles. I.e., the heart-rate increases, and one pants. Similarly if 
one breathes at high altitude without being used to i t , one pants until one's body 
has increased the number of red blood cells in one's blood. Not only human bodies 
are such systems. So are animals, and indeed many vehicles like cars or tools. From 
this one can deduce, horses can be damaged if ridden too hard, car engines can be 
burnt out, nuclear stations can suffer meltdown, and employees can suffer burn out 
after too much stress. 
The systems model also provides a basis for interpretation of analogies and metaphors: 
I t is because a car is a system, that one can say that i t drinks, or or that i t died. 
One can talk of torturing a machine, because torturing involves taking constituent 
parts of a system over their safe limits or damaging them resulting in "pain". In-
deed, any arduous activity, like sports, can be called torture. Pain itself can be 
defined as a warning signal from a particular part of one's body that the safe limits 
have been transgressed, resulting in the understanding that painful things should 
be avoided. 
Hopefully this example conveys the power that a good explicit model can express. 
However, building this model requires a deep understanding of how a computer 
reasons. Determining causal models for simple phenomena requires the ability to 
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generalise facts in a coherent way, so that phenomena which have similar abstract 
behaviours are modelled as instantiations of the same abstract behaviour. Far from 
being a job for underpaid knowledge enterers, who simply flesh out the ontology 
A . I . researchers devised, this is research task in itself. 
A.2.4.6 Requirements particular to L O L I T A 
For LOLITA to communicate with people, her concepts must attain a certain degree 
of commonality with theirs. Since she communicates via language, language will be 
the basis from which the set of her concepts will be determined. Most words used 
in natural language are associated with at least one concept. Those that are not 
perform some structural role building the sentence. For instance "the" which has 
no independent meaning. Thus any dictionary might be thought to provide a list of 
concepts to use. Similarly, more recent developments such as Wordnet [Miller 90], 
provide a set of concepts associated with each word. However, the problem of 
which concepts to choose is not simply a matter of adopting somebody's ontology. 
Some ontologies may distinguish finely between many nuances of meaning. These 
differences may require a lot of effort to disambiguate, yet return little benefit to 
later processing. Other ontologies may prove too coarse, leading to mistakes in later 
processing, for example translation. Therefore, the value of such an ontology will 
be measured purely in terms of how effectively it helps in processing and reasoning 
tasks, and in the general working of LOLITA^^ 
Since LOLITA is to communicate with human agents in a successful manner, she 
must be able to draw inferences normally expected of a normal person: As dis-
cussed in A.3.2 (p. A-32), communication involves predicting what to say for one's 
interlocutor to understand what is meant. This only can work if all people share 
some degree of commonality, not only in their concepts but also in their knowledge 
and ability to reason. I f LOLITA is unable to make the inferences expected of 
her by her interlocutor, either he will have to adapt his expression to her or he 
^^ Notice that as the disambiguation and reasoning abilities of LOLITA grow, so can her ontol-
ogy. It is therefore useful to start with a smaller ontology than expected later 
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may find her useless for his purposes. Either way, her behaviour cannot be deemed 
successful. Determining the expected inferences is not easy. 
A.2.5 C Y C : a case study 
CYC started in 1984 at MCC, the U.S.A.'s oldest think-tank [Stipp 95]. I t was to be 
a 10-year 25-million-dollar project and was initially funded by the U.S. department 
of defence. Its brief: build a knowledge base and its associated reasoning tools 
which can capture the common sense knowledge people share. For instance it 
should know that "people stay dead once they've died", and most other such well-
known facts. This type of knowledge cannot be acquired automatically, as i t is too 
obvious to be explicitly stated in books. The final goal was to produce tools that 
display "common sense", such as giving (credible) reasons for John's sadness on 
the death of his dog. Twelve years later, the project is still "in business", but is 
developed by a private venture called Cycorp. 
Despite the vast amount of money put into i t , totalling over 25-million dollars, 
the CYC project has not been a resounding success. This section discusses its 
current status, and examines the CYC methodology in light of the requirements 
for a C.S.K.B. 
A.2.5.1 C Y C ' s functionality 
Little information is publicly available about CYC's current functionality. However 
the little available does not prove impressive. Vaughan Pratt of Stanford University 
attended a demonstration in 1994. He wrote and distributed a report of his visit, 
Whitten 95], which gives the impression of a bugged implementation, and a very 
unstructured method of building CYC's knowledge. For example, CYC knew that 
hand-gliding and touching toxic substances had as consequences death, and i t knew 
about food, but i t did not know that people need food in order not to die. 
Dr. V. Pratt was shown two demonstrations of commercial applications of CYC 
commissioned by corporate sponsors. The first demonstration involved CYC de-
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tecting errors in multiple relational databases for the U.S. Department of Defence. 
This was less a demonstration of CYC's abilities, than proof that CYC can be 
used for tasks of practical use. Although expert systems could perform this task, 
the demonstration indicates that CYC contains knowledge that no one might have 
thought relevant when building a dedicated expert system. The second demonstra-
tion involved finding pictures in an database of 20 pictures using queries in Natural 
Language. Each picture had been previously described by CycL assertions. This 
appeared to work for simple sentences, using common sense reasoning. For instance 
asking who would be at risk from skin cancer found pictures of 3 surfers and a girl 
on the beach. Although a commercial demonstration, CYC was unable to find a 
picture of a Christmas tree given the word "tree", apparently a bug. I t was very 
clear from the descriptions of the demonstrations that they were not intended for 
an academic audience, but for a commercial audience interested in applications. 
Dr Pratt was also able to test CYC's abilities outside the framework of any com-
mercial demonstration. He reports that Guha and he found i t difficult to find their 
way around half a million axioms, and even to find the area of where the infor-
mation they were looking for might be found. For instance, CYC did not know 
the term earth, but the term PlanetEarth. This was compounded by the strange 
choices of CYC's information about concepts. For instance, CYC knew the current 
prices of cars, but did not know their number of wheels, or their maximum velocity. 
Choosing to inform CYC of car prices seems strange, since a car's price is volatile, 
but its functionality or its number of wheels rarely vary and are more relevant to 
common-sense reasoning. 
Later, Ramanathan Guha, the co-leader of the CYC project until 1994, told 
Stipp 95] that "We were killing ourselves trying to create a pale shadow of what 
had been promised". He thinks that CYC may prove useful in commercial appli-
cations such as data-mining, but that "the goal of creating a system that would 
exhibit real common sense failed." This disillusionment might reflect real failures 
in the basic approach, or naivety in its implementation. 
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• C Y C ' s Projected size 
In [Guha et al. 90b], an order of a hundred million (10^) assertions was claimed to 
be the amount needed to represent most common sense knowledge. In [Lenat et al. 90], 
the figure was slightly lower at ten million (10''). The justification for this figure 
is Marvin Minsky's statement that a child of eight would have acquired this many 
facts i f one assumed that he learnt a new fact every 10 seconds of his life. After ten 
years, CYC actually contains only four hundred thousand (4.10^) facts, although 
the number initially increased to two million. However, after removing redundant 
facts, the number slumped to its present figure. 
However, the figure of 10^ needs further justification. Assuming a K.B. of 50000 
concepts, and 100 facts per concept, the number of five million facts appears ad-
equate. Although the figure of 100 facts per concept might seem small, it should 
be noticed that there are many words in English that are rarely used, and that 
2000 basic highly ambiguous words are sufficient for basic language abilities. As-
suming 10 concepts per word still undershoots the number of concepts assumed. 
Thus the approach of encoding "common sense" symbolically need not be assumed 
infeasible. 
• C Y C ' s Current size 
CYC's current size of 4.10^ could be naively interpreted, as stating that i f CYC 
had on average 10 employees for 10 years, each employee added about 16 assertions 
a day, for 250 working days a year, which would make each statement worth 62.5 
dollars a statement. This is quite cheap per possible dependency: ^lllf^ = 1.5625* 
10~^ dollars. But i f CYC reached its projected size of 10^ facts, the price becomes 
one and a half thousand billion dollars (1.5 * 10^^)^ .^ 
A.2.5.2 C Y C ' s knowledge 
Paradoxically, although the purpose of the project was to enter common sense 
knowledge, i t seems that most attention was payed to the size of the project. 
i^ only one thousand times more that the 6.25 billion dollars required for 10** facts at 62.5 
dollars each 
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efficient algoritlims, or a general ontology. 
• Anecdotal evidence 
Anecdotal evidence of this view comes from the examples given in papers and 
from Dr Pratt's report. For instance, Dr Pratt reports that CYC knew hand-
gliding and touching toxic substances could have as consequences death, and i t 
knew about food, but i t did not know that people need food in order not to die. I t 
knew the current prices of cars, but did not know the number of their wheels, or 
their maximum velocity. [Guha et al. 90b] provides similar examples, where CYC 
knows that seeing a movie at a cinema costs approximately five dollars in 1990. 
Although this information is common-sense, its choice reveals an apparent lack of 
understanding of the way the reasoning mechanisms of the K.B. can exploit the 
data. 
Some examples are over-specialised: "hand-gliding causes death". Some are of little 
relevance: the current price of cars varies, but the number and function of their 
wheels or a car's average speed is criticaP^ Similarly, knowing that seeing a film 
at a cinema costs five dollars is of less use than knowing that many people go to 
entertainment-centres^^ explains why a fire at these venues is very important to the 
fire-service, or why i t is easy to lose someone there. To reiterate, the problem is that 
each of these pieces of data entered into the K.B. allows little further reasoning. 
Although the dangers of over-general or over-specific facts were referred to in 
Lenat et al. 90], the examples given were again quite superficial: "One should 
not say 'People are younger than their parents', but 'things are younger than the 
things that brought them into existence'". For simplicity we shall refer by progeny to 
the former, and by progenitors to the latter^^. The problem is that this statement 
should be inferred from the meaning of "to bring into existence". I f a progenitor 
^^The average velocity of cars Ccin be used to estimate the average length of a journey for 
instance to determine the time someone left home, or to work out that driving to Vladivostok 
from Lisbon would take a few weeks. The fact a car has wheels, which work by friction, plays a 
role in determining that cars, as well as sledges, slip on ice or oil. Many of these features can be 
inherited from a general class of wheeled vehicles, which includes trains, lorries, cars and bicycles, 
^^such as cinemas, theatres, circuses, zoos, sports stadia, concert-halls, perhaps even museums 
^^The general statement is not strictly true, as it assumes that progenitors still exist. But this 
discussion puts this objection to one side. 
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did something to cause a progeny to exist, then what it did occurred before the 
progeny existed. Since the progenitor performed the event, i t existed before the 
latter did. Age states how long something existed, so if the progenitors still exist, 
they are older than the progeny. 
The information entered into the K.B. appears therefore not so much to be common 
sense models, but simply facts that happen to be true: i t appears to be an implicit 
rather an explicit model. 
• C Y C methodology 
CYC's methodology is presented in [Lenat et al. 86]. A l l quotations in this section 
are taken from i t , unless otherwise stated. The project's ten year span is divided 
into two stages. 
The first stage involves a small group of A I researchers who must "carefully rep-
resent 400 articles (about 1000 paragraphs worth oj material) from a one-volume 
desk encyclopedia. These are chosen to span the encyclopedia and he as mutually 
distinct types of articles as possible". The content of each article must not only 
be encoded, but so must the implicit knowledge it referred to: the common-sense 
knowledge. I f required, the knowledge representation is expanded to "handle new 
information to be represented". Similarly, i f knowledge previously encoded at a 
specific level turns out to be true at a more general level it is moved appropri-
ately: for example, much of the information originally stated at irrigating's level 
was also true for transporting, so i t was moved to transporting and inherited to 
irrigating. An additional task is to formulate a set of questions the system should 
be able to answer given the information it has been given. This is used to test the 
reasoning algorithms. The three principal results of this first stage are a relatively 
stable representation and ontology able to represent most statements that will be 
required in the ful l K.B.; a wide range of examples (400) of articles on most types of 
topic in the encyclopedia; and approximately 50% of the common-sense knowledge 
encoded. 
The second stage involves "a large cadre of lightly trained knowledge enterers, work-
ing together on a common, consistent version of the system. Each enterer will take 
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a article, locate the already-represented similar article(s), and perform a machine-
assisted 'copy & edit' procedure to produce a machine-understandable version of 
the new article." This will result in "enforced semantics", so that different knowl-
edge enterers mean the same thing when using some statement of the language by 
"copy{ing) existing structures rather than try{mg)to come up with ways to organise 
things on their own". 
• Discussion 
Al l the evidence from papers, demonstrations, and the methodology presented in 
Guha et al. 90b] differ quite radically from the requirements for C.S.K.B.s. 
Instead of models to be used by reasoning the idea appears to be to enter many 
commonly known facts, and hope that the resulting knowledge is sufficient for 
reasoning algorithms to provide common sense behaviour: to build an implicit 
model. 
Virtually no work appears to have been invested into the critical issue of mutual 
dependencies. Indeed, the quality of the common sense information seems belittled: 
"a large cadre of lightly trained knowledge enterers" who "copy existing structures 
rather than try{mg)to come up with ways to organise things on their own". Indeed, 
that the knowledge enterers did not participate in the writing of CYC's publications 
not only indicates their low status, but also demonstrates that the common sense 
models are not considered a research worthy subject. 
A.2.6 Conclusion 
Symbolic knowledge, in particular as given by the example of physics provides an 
attractive model for the knowledge base of a tool such as LOLITA. The knowledge 
is self-sufficient and provides means for it to be used for reasoning tasks such as 
prediction, which are required for the tool. Moreover its development over many 
centuries provides a great wealth of reasoning methods, and solutions to problems 
that may arise during development of the system. Finally, the symbolic paradigm 
itself has been the subject of much analysis. Thus using this paradigm has the 
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advantage that the reasoning methods implemented may themselves be subjected 
to mathematical analysis, allowing possible flaws to be detected. Thus, all the 
arguments militate for using a symbolic paradigm as the basis of LOLITA. 
A.3 Information extraction? 
A two-part model for LOLITA was envisaged in A (p. A-1) where on the one 
hand processing of Natural Language text results in some form of knowledge, and 
on the other hand, this knowledge is processed to fulf i l the tasks required of the 
system. This lead to two questions, the first of which has been discussed above. 
The second, which was what is meant by "extraction of knowledge from a text", 
will be discussed in this section. 
"Extraction of knowledge from a text" has a mechanistic overtone, as i f knowledge 
can be extracted simply by applying some simple transformations to the text. But 
this displays a lack of understanding of the nature of knowledge and what texts 
actually express. This section studies this issue, first by enquiring what we mean by 
"understanding a text", and then by discussing the interpretative process involved 
in text understanding. 
A.3.1 Understanding 
Considering the range of behaviours expected of someone who understood a text 
sheds light on what understanding a text involves. This is best illustrated through 
a thought experiment: Imagine that one has just explained something to someone. 
How would one test whether he had understood i t or not? 
The first step, would be to check i f he recognised an instance of what was being 
explained. For instance, after having explained words expressing family relation-
ships, such as mother, aunt, nephew, father-in-law, one could expect the person 
to recognise that his father-in-law and the father of his wife are the same person. 
However, in less trivial situations, this recognition is not enough to use the infor-
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mation usefully: one might recognise that U.R'^ is a number multiplied by another 
number squared, or that i t is the "formula for the surface of a disk", without for 
that matter knowing how to use i t . 
A task similar to recognition is determining knowledge the subject knew previously 
which is similar to what has just been learnt. For instance one might show someone 
how something heavier than air such as paper can fly. Then one could ask him what 
i t reminded him of, and expect as answer something like a seagull, or a plane. This 
appears to be one of the most fundamental aspects of understanding: if someone 
thinks a cat is more similar to a shopping mall than to a dog, one would not expect 
him to have understood what a cat is. 
The next step of understanding would be to ask the person to reason with the 
newly acquired knowledge. His ability at this will depend on the application of 
various steps. Consider these in turn. The first is the ability to recognise the type 
of the problem being dealt with. This is indissociable from the ability to recognise 
which knowledge to apply to it . For instance, when confronted with an equation, he 
must detect its type (polynomial of what degree? differential equation? equation 
involving matrices ?), and then determine what method should be used to solve 
it . The second step is to be able to apply the knowledge, or to reason with i t . In 
the case of the equations, this means being able to apply the method. To test this 
understanding one could give him an exercise to solve. At this simple stage, either 
he is able to solve it , or he is not. 
Non trivial examples involve the judicious use of many different forms of reasoning, 
such as causal, temporal, or spatial reasoning. When this point is reached, the 
complexity of reasoning is such, that further knowledge is needed to determine 
the best reasoning path to choose. Such decisions demonstrate yet another level 
of understanding: an ability to link situations with the knowledge and reasoning 
method that should be used, at a much finer level of granularity. This kind of 
understanding can be tested for by more complicated exercises, which pay as much 
attention to how the problem was solved as to whether i t was solved. 
Finally, once an agent is capable of reasoning with the material, he can be asked 
Chapter A: Assumptions A-30 
why he reasons in the way he does: what he does, what he assumes. This final 
type of understanding considered here involves the ability to reason about new 
knowledge, and what assumptions i t makes. This type of understanding helps de-
termine whether a piece of knowledge can be used in some situation. For instance, 
i f one has to decide whether to apply quantum, classical or relativistic mechanics 
to tiny fast objects, i t is important to understand the underlying assumptions of 
each. Understanding these assumptions also helps determine which factors play 
a determining role in the solution, and which can be approximated or simphfied, 
simplifying the problem to solve. For instance, understanding the nature of the 
Ptolemaic model of the solar system allowed Copernicus to replace i t by the helio-
centric model, greatly simplifying calculations. This type of understanding can also 
be tested for by setting exercises requiring approximations which must be justified. 
These types of understanding have been placed in an order as understanding of 
each one usually requires a minimal understanding of the preceding one: 
• what does the knowledge apply to, or recognition. 
• how to use the knowledge requires recognition of the knowledge to use 
• why the knowledge is so, is linked to understanding how it is used, and thus 
what i t entails and does not entail. 
However, this order is only useful at the earlier stages of understanding. Later 
the three types are more and more linked complementing each other. This second 
dimension of understanding is not linked to the type of knowledge, but to the 
degree of control it g ives .Thus understanding emerges as the ability to use the 
information, and to increase the degree of control one can exercise. 
In order to see that the three types of knowledge complement each other, consider 
the following examples. The first type of knowledge, recognition of instances of the 
situation considered by the knowledge is linked to the second type, when dealing 
•^'Note however that this is assuming the knowledge holds in the world. Otherwise, the degree of 
understanding depends on the extent to which correct predictions with respect to the knowledge 
can be made. What constitutes such a prediction is however outside the scope of this thesis. 
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with complex reasoning. For instance, recognising a particular configuration in a 
chess game evokes a lot of knowledge in a chess player, such as the possible and 
useful moves from this point. This type of understanding is tested exclusively 
in speed chess, but in games involving more time, it plays an important role in 
determining the strategy to be used. Similarly the third kind of knowledge can 
play an important role in determining the kinds of assumptions that can be made 
and which will simplify the problem, or why a particular type of reasoning need 
not be considered as a possibility to help in solving the problem. Again the first 
and third types of knowledge are closely linked since the first includes implicitly 
the assumptions underlying the model. 
I f this behaviour is considered more deeply, the degree to which the new knowledge 
is linked to the old emerges as a determining factor: recognition uses these links, 
since to be recognised an instantiation of some knowledge, the problem must be 
associated with the knowledge. Reasoning involves these links since knowledge 
associated with some problem is usually useful in solving it: I f one knows that one 
has a nail in one's hand, and someone tells one that nails are sharp, one should 
be able to link the two facts in order to avoid puncturing oneself. Similarly, the 
quality of these links is important. In order to solve a problem it is preferable to 
use knowledge associated with the problem than any knowledge at all: the price of 
banana futures is irrelevant to working out how to catch a stray goat. Finally, the 
third type of knowledge involves an explicit discussion of these links. 
Thus the links between the various parts of the agent's knowledge are a determining 
factor as to how the knowledge can be used for various tasks. These links are specif-
ically tested for by the questions involving similarity, and the meta-level questions. 
Moreover, they are used for determining the path to follow in complex problems: 
the relevant knowledge. Finally they determine which forms of reasoning should 
be used. Thus they are fundamental to the processes tested by understanding, and 
should be considered in their own right. 
To conclude, the important point is that the standard processes for testing un-
derstanding involve many different forms of knowledge processing. These different 
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types of processing test in different ways how the new knowledge was related to the 
old. Moreover, they all participate in more complex tasks such as reasoning about 
a complex situation. Thus at the end of the day, the degree to which something 
has been understood depends on the power conferred to the agent on that thing. 
However, a deeper inquiry into the underlying processes involved show the impor-
tance of the linkage between the new and old knowledge. Thus, understanding can 
be tested in a weaker way by investigating these links. 
A.3.2 Interpretation 
Now that the nature of the agent's knowledge and understanding has been dis-
cussed, the notion of extracting information from a text will be reconsidered. As 
discussed previously, the agent's knowledge is assumed to be a symbolic model. 
Any new information will be added to this model, and should preserve its qualities 
of conciseness and consistency: if the model expands, i t has a higher memory cost; 
if i t becomes inconsistent, the predictions i t will make cannot hold, i.e. cannot be 
useful. Hence, information obtained from a text will be expressed in terms of the 
agent's existing concepts, and not in terms of any universal concepts understood 
by all. Hence "extracting information from a text" hides a more active process, in 
which new concepts, probably different from those the text's author had in mind, 
are created^''. Processing of text is strictly speaking an interpretative process. 
Such a non-absolute viewpoint may seem shocking. Indeed, without the notion 
of absolute concepts shared by everybody, one could conclude that no one can 
understand anyone else. Daily experience shows that people, do in the whole, 
understand each other. So does the fact that humans evolved language despite 
the considerable expenditure of energy it requires to to learn and use: i t must 
be worthwhile. However this does not mean that everybody must share a set 
of concepts they all understand in exactly the same way. Instead it implies that 
there is a sufficient degree of commonality between their concepts, and indeed their 
models of the world, for each to predict what the understanding of any statement 
"^ •^ This sheds further light on this thesis' treatment of hidden assumptions 
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they make will have on the other. 
The lack of absolute concepts can be illustrated by an example. Consider for 
instance, the difference between someone who is an expert at hand-gliding and 
someone who isn't. The first will know much more about hand-gliders and so have 
a more precise idea of them than the second. This means that their concepts of 
hand-gliders differ. However, this does not stop them communicating. One can 
ask the other to carry the hand-glider. 
This notion that expressing a statement also involves predicting what the behaviour 
of the other will be sheds an interesting light on the notion of understanding. 
Since prediction is to a varying degree an uncertain process, depending on what 
the agent knows, rather than on some absolute understanding, it may fail. In this 
case, the agent may mispredict the effect of his statement on the other. Hence, 
communication is often a two-way process where the hearer makes i t clear to the 
speaker that his understanding of what the speaker said still makes sense - i.e. is 
consistent with his knowledge, and can be formulated with respect to his existing 
concepts. The processes of testing the other's understanding is an extension of 
this process: it ensures that the other's understanding in terms of his concepts 
leads to the behaviour the speaker expects, in a given circumstance. This not only 
tests the hearer's formulation of the information in terms of his own concepts, but 
tests the whole of the hearer's knowledge, with respect to the circumstance. Hence, 
i t is possible for agents to change the meaning of their concepts for them to accord 
with those of others. This allows a general convergence of concepts between various 
people, and in turn communication. Note however, that effort is required for this 
convergence. This means that convergence will only happen as long as it is useful. 
This includes successful communication, and successful practical application of the 
knowledge, such as correct predictions. 
Just as i t is unnecessary to assume absolute concepts, so is i t unnecessary to assume 
an identical interpretative process among all agents. Al l that is required is that 
the desired behaviour is obtained. Again, the testing of the other's understanding 
^^For instance, the lack of such a response often gives people a disagreeable feeling of uncer-
tainty... as when giving a lecture, or when talking to an answering machine 
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will play this role. If behaviour inconsistent with what has been said is detected, 
the statement may be reformulated: the hearer may not understand a particular 
formulation the way the speaker does. Reformulating the statement in another way 
exploits the possibility that the hearer may understand the statement in a different 
form. 
Since neither absolute concepts nor identical interpretative processes are assumed, 
there are no constraints on the implementation of LOLITA. For instance, there 
is no need to understand the way in which people understand language before 
implementing the system. Thus there is no obligation to use psychology in the 
development of the tool. The only requirement is that the program's behaviour is 
consistent with what people would expect for a particular task. 
Appendix B 
Basic Representation: Detailed 
Issues 
Sorts and quantification are argued to be intrinsic properties of the relations 
between concepts, rather than intrinsic properties of concepts themselves. 
This leads to them being represented on the arcs. A richness argument moti-
vates the choice of multilevel quantification, and efficiency concerns determine 
how the representation should be implemented. 
B . l Quantification 
The final quantification scheme presented in 5.3.2 (p. 127) is reached through a 
richness argument: Alternatives of increasing richness are proposed, each to be 
shown insufficient until the final quantification scheme is reached. 
B.1.1 Attempt 1: Quantification on the node ? 
Quantification on the node was discussed in the evaluation of LOLITA 92. The 
conclusions were that i t led to weak cohesion (predicates on sets behave differently 
to predicates on sets' elements), and insufficient richness (problems with existentials 
(cannot express "every mother has a child, and each of these children loves a toy") 
and quantification of events (cannot express "every day I water an apple tree")). 
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Overall, quantification was shown to be intrinsic to relations and not to concepts. 
B.l.2 Attempt 2: Simplified Quantification on the arc 
The evaluation of LOLITA 92 uncovered various problems with expressing quan-
tification on the nodes. The first was that quantification is a means of expressing 
how a relation applies to a concept. Thus the same concept may be involved in 
relations which apply to i t differently by using different quantification schemes. 
The second point was that this fact not only applies to entities, but also to events 
for a representation that allows events to be the arguments of other events. 
If a quantification is a means of expressing how a relation applies to a concept, 
i t qualifies the relation more than the concept. This suggests the quantification 
should be placed on the arc rather than on the event. In this way the same concept 
may be involved in relations that apply to i t differently because of the different 
quantification they carry. 
Similarly, 4.9.6.1 (p. 107) showed that the choice of object- of an event need not 
only depend on the event's subject-, but can also depend on the choice of event 
instance. This can be fully accounted for i f each arc is associated with a complete 
quantification scheme: a quantification states how the arc applies to its source and 
another states how it applies to its target. The arc therefore has "a quantification 
at each end". Quantificational dependency is restricted to the two quantifications 
of every arc. 
B.l .2.1 Three basic quantifications 
Three basic quantifications are assumed by this scheme: Individual, Universal and 
Existential quantification. These follow the definitions expressed when discussing 
quantification on the nodes, subject to the modifications below: 
• Individual quantification 
Individual quantification is used for events attached to instances of sets as before. 
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However i t can also be used to attach events to sets. In particular this allows 
predicates on sets to be expressed in a manner which shows that they treat sets as 
constants. I t avoids the additional rules required for quantification on the node, 
and does not break distributedness. However it also allows sets to participate as 
individuals in normal events, such as "to own". In this case, the set corresponds to 
the group of its elements, and i t is the group as a whole which participates in the 
event rather than any particular element of i t . For instance, a community of priests 
can be modelled as a set of priests. An event stating that "the community owns 
the monastery" would have a subject- arc to the set of priests with individual 
quantification: 
EQ : {/-subject--J: [community]; /-action--/: [own]; /-object--/: [monastery]} 
• Existential quantification 
The main difference with existential quantification as done in LOLITA 92, is that 
existential quantification corresponds to unique existentials in TOC. Thus an arc 
with quantification V — 3! states that every element I of the left node C is bound 
to one and only one corresponding element r of the right node by the arc^. This 
means there is one r for each I, but there may be more than one / connected to 
each r. 
EQ : {V-subject--/: [John]; V-action--/: [kick]; V-object--3!: [ball]} 
Practically this allows statements such as "John kicked every ball at least once". 
Each event only has one element of the set of balls as object-. This means that 
John kicked only kicked one ball at a time. There may however be different restric-
tions on the set of events, which distinguish two events with the same subject-
and object- Such a restriction could be a time event, allowing John to kick the 
same ball at different times. 
However, the lack of an existential quantifier in the !FOC sense, makes i t impossible 
in the simplified scheme to represent statements such as "Every farmer owns one 
or more donkeys". Here an TOC existential is used to refer to the donkeys each 
farmer owns. Unique existentials only allow "every farmer owns a (one) donkey" 
(p. B-18) provides 3!'s definition, and an illustration of its usage in TOC. 
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to be expressed. 
Note that as with LOLITA 92, a relation referring to a node by an existential 
quantification refers to all the elements of the set represented by the node: 
(Vx eABlyeB. r(x, y)) A{\fy^B3x^A. r{x, y)) 
B.1.2.2 Common element rule 
Because quantification is expressed on the arc, a new question arises: if two events 
refer to elements of a node they qualify, then are the instantiations to which they 
refer related in any way? The common element rule (6.1.1 (p. 156)) states that 
the two events will always select the same instantiation. 
B.l .2 .3 Shorthand quantifications 
Two other quantifications prove useful as shorthands. 
• Framed Universal 
Framed universal, F , is used to state that the relation expressed by an arc behaves 
like a bijective function. In other words for every element x of the arc's source set 
S, there is one and only one element y of the arc's target set T bound to x by the 
arc, and for every element y of T there is one and only one element a; of <S such 
that X is bound to y by the arc. The arc corresponds to a one-to-one mapping. 
Since framed universal describes the behaviour of the whole arc, i t makes no sense 
to have a framed universal at one end of an arc, and some other quantification at 
the other. Therefore the only variety of arcs involving framed universals have one 
on each end. 
EQ: { F-subject--F: [Mano]; V-action_-/: [love]; V-object--3!: [Motheri] } 
Ei: { V-subject--3!: [Motheri]; V-action--/: [mothers]; F-object--F: [Mano] } 
This example corresponds to "every man loves his mother": There are as many 
lov ing {Eo) and mothering (Ei) events as there are men: each man is loved and 
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cared for separately, but each mother may have more than one son: hence the 
(V-object--3!: [Motheri]) and (V-subject_-3!: [Motherj]) arcs. 
B.2 (p. B-17) shows that an arc of label / with framed universal quantification 
from s to d, corresponds to two arcs of label I from s to d, one with quantification 
V — 3! and the other with 3! — V. Framed universals are therefore a shorthand 
for something that can be represented with the 3 basic quantifications. Using a 
shorthand proves very useful as framed universals are used very often, and testing 
for the existence of two arcs linking the same two nodes involves a search which 
albeit small, adds up if it must be done every time an arc of the network is traversed. 
Other pairs of arcs involving the same nodes but with different quantifications exist, 
but they do not contribute together in restricting the relation between the nodes. 
Consider the pair V - / and / - / , where the lefthand node is the set of people in a 
company, the righthand node is an event, and the arcs are subject- arcs. For this 
example, i t will be assumed that the set of people in a company is the company 
itself. The first arc states that each person participates as the subject of the event. 
The second arc states that the company also participates in the event. Such a 
situation could occur in a sentence such as "The employees of the company, and 
the company itself would like to thank you for the long years of service you have 
given it." This is an example where each arc contributes an additional subject, 
but does not combine with the others to restrict the relation. Such arcs are called 
partial arcs since they contribute part of the set of and event's subjects or objects. 
Other pairs of arcs are contradictory, such as the pair V —V and V — 3!, and should 
never occur. 
There are over 81 such possible pairs^, so they will not all enumerated in this thesis. 
• Arbitrary quantification 
Arbitrary quantification. A, is used to refer to an instance of a set without building 
one explicitly. Unlike the other quantifications, for which all arcs refer to the same 
9^ possible arcs involving single quantification: 3 possible quantifications at each end, and two 
ends = 3*3 
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element of a set once i t has been chosen, arcs involving an arbitrary quantification 
are independent from all others. This means that i t is impossible to describe an 
instance of a set by two events using arbitrary quantification: an explicit instance 
node must be built for this purpose. 
Arbitrary quantification proves useful as a compression device to avoid building a 
very large semantic network. Many events need to refer to an instance of a set, but 
this instance never becomes qualified by more than one event. This happens often 
in statements that use the values representation introduced in section 7.1 (p. 247). 
But even sentences such as "A dog howled", in the middle of a narrative can benefit 
from i t . In this case the howling event's subject has arbitrary quantification with 
respect to its subject: the set of all dogs. 
I t might appear that arbitrary quantification would lead to an increase in the 
complexity of algorithms dealing with quantification. But i t should be noticed 
that i t can be hidden inside the abstract data type interface to the semantic net. 
To the rest of the system only explicit instances need exist, but to the semantic 
net access routines some of these are real in the sense they are explicitly written 
in the semantic net, and some are virtual in the sense that they are simulated and 
correspond to arbitrary quantification. 
B . 1.2.4 The use of quantification on the arcs 
Extending the meaning of individual quantification and allowing different quantifi-
cation for both the source and the target of the subject,, object-, and action-
arcs allows many more forms of event to be expressed than allowed by the quantifi-
cation on the node scheme. Indeed, quantification at both ends of the arcs changes 
the behaviour of the arcs with respect to the event they belong to: now they behave 
similarly to events describing some node. This section discusses this change. 
• Quantification at both ends 
Quantification on both ends of the arc results in a different view of subject-, 
object- and action- arcs. For instance. 
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Eo'. {V-subject_-/: Jeine; V-action_-/: buy; F-object_-F: c lothes i} 
states that Eo is a set of events, each having as subject- Jane and as action-
buy. Every element of clothesi is an object- of one such event. This means that 
Jane bought all the clothes of clothesi separately. 
In !FOJC, the event could be written: 
(VeG£'o subject-(Jane,e)Aaction-(buy, e) A 3!cGclothesi object_(c, e)) 
A (VcGclothesi 3!ee£^o object-(c,e)) 
which is little different from the way an event behaves with respect to a node. For 
instance, if the "object-" arc were expressed as 
Ei: {F-subject_-F: EQ ; V-action--/: obj ; F-object--F: c lothesi} 
the dependency between EQ and clothesi would be written in J^OC as: 
[yeeEo 3!ceclothesi obj(c,e)) 
A (VcGclothesi 3leeEo obj(c,e)) 
since the choices of c and e are mutually dependent in both cases, even if in the 
second case they are only dependent because they are mutually dependent on the 
choice of element of Ei. 
• Individual quantification 
Individual quantification on the arc introduced the notion of groups, where a set is 
referred to individually to refer to it as a group. There is a difference between all 
members of a group participating in an event, and the group itself participating. 
When the group participates, not all its members have to participate. This is 
illustrated by a football team being said to have won the UEFA cup. Not every 
member of the team need have directly participated in the game. For instance 
replacement players, the trainer and injured players were not on the football field 
during the various matches. Similarly, in a war one side wins, yet not all the people 
of that side need have fought. 
To illustrate these subtle differences consider the three events: 
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• £"0 states that John squashed a group of ants. Not all the ants of the group 
need have been squashed and there is only one event, so this could be inter-
preted as accidental or as a half-hearted attempt. 
£•0: {/-subject--/: [John]; / -act ion.- / : [squash]; /-object--/: [ants]} 
• El states that John squashed every ant in the group of ants. None of the ants 
of the group survived i t . Moreover there is one event per ant, so he squashed 
them each individually. This can only be interpreted as deliberate. 
El'. {V-subject_-/: [John]; V-action_-/: [squash]; F-object_-F: [ants]} 
• E2 states that John squashed all the ants in one go. None escaped. There 
is only one event but it has all the ants as object. This could be either an 
unfortunate accident, or a deft deliberate action. 
E2: {/-subject--/: [John]; / -act ion.- / : [squash]; /-object_-V: [ants]} 
This event has the same meaning as an event which has as objects a set of 
partial arcs connected to each of the explicit instances of a set. For example 
if the group of ants had three members, Samantha, Sharon and Katherin, an 
event with subject- John ac t ion , squash, and three / —/ quantified partial 
object- arcs to Samantha, Sharon and Katherin would be equivalent to £'2-
A similar example is "The children buried all their toys in one go". Here all 
the toys are buried by the same event, for instance i f one hole was dug, all 
the toys were placed in i t , and then the hole was filled up. 
Groups may have some of the properties of their members, but they need not 
have all of them, nor are they restricted to properties that their members can 
have individually. For instance, every person of a group may have a mother but 
the group itself cannot: mothering is a relation defined only for people. However 
people and groups of people may own an object, since owning is defined for both. 
Finally only groups may perform certain actions. For instance i t is impossible to 
play a symphony solo, it must be done by a group of people, such as an orchestra. 
Groups occur often in natural language, as illustrated by words expressing groups 
of objects: school of fish, a herd of cattle, pack of wolves, crowd of people. However 
not all references to groups need be so explicit. For instance, the sentence "The 
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children washed the cars" may not imply either that every child participated in the 
washing, nor that every car was washed. 
• Partial arcs 
Two ended arc quantification also plays a role for partial arcs. For instance, "The 
shareholders own the company": 
EQ: {7-subject--V: shareholdersi; / -act ion--/ : own; /-object--/ : companyi} 
Here the individual quantification for the event EQ and the universal quantification 
for shareholdersi imply that EQ takes as partial subject-S all the elements of 
shareholdersi. This idea is also used in: 
El. {/-subject--V: peoplei; / -ac t ion. - / : bu i ld ; /-object--V: t h i n g i } 
which states that a group of people peoplei built t h i n g i . 
Note that partial arcs are not restricted in that they must have different targets. 
For instance, the © operator^ which states that the sum of its partial subject-S is 
its object-, may take three identical subject_s: 
£•0: {/-subject--/: [ l , 1, l ] ; / -act ion--/ : ©; / -object . - / : 3} 
B.1.2.5 Problems 
Despite being a substantial improvement, two problems remain. The first was the 
lack of an existential quantifier in the TOC sense: This makes i t impossible in the 
simplified scheme to represent statements such as "Every farmer owns one or more 
donkeys ". 
The second problem comes from the inability to quantify over groups themselves. 
Thus i t is possible, for instance, to state that a group of people built some things: 
El. {/-subject--V: peoplei; / -action--/ : bu i ld ; /-object--V: t h i n g i } 
But i t is not possible to state "Groups of people build things". This statement says 
that there are many events, each of which involve a group of people building a set 
^For further information on this, see D.1.1.2 (p. D-5) 
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O subject A ^ i company ^ 
A object A „ A subject A^i 
3 
- > 
^ " b j e c t O 
employs works at 
(Notice that the employees are grouped by factory) 
Figure B . l : A company employs employees at different factories 
of things. Thus what is needed is some form of higher level quantification, where a 
concept can represent a set of sets of things: a set of groups of events. This is not 
possible within the representational framework defined so far. 
B.l .3 Final Quantification Scheme 
The ful l scheme extends on the idea of group introduced in the second attempt. In 
the second attempt i t was possible to refer to a set by an individual quantification 
thus treating i t as a group. However, there was no means of expressing statements 
about groups of groups. In other words the grouping was limited to depth 1 . In 
practice however i t is useful to be able to make statements about groups of groups. 
For instance, one may wish to group a company's workforce into groups working 
at each of its factories. In order to do this, one needs to be able to refer to a group 
(the workforce) of groups (the employees of each factory). Furthermore, one needs 
to be able to refer to each group of employees and to the employees themselves in 
order to partition them in this way:'^  figure B . l (p. B-10). 
Similarly, i f one wishes to be able to express for a group of children, all the modal-
ities that one was able to for John squashing ants, one needs to be able to use 
quantification to refer to each group of ants being squashed, and the ants of each 
such group: "Every child squashed a group of ants" (£o), "Every child squashed 
every one ofhis^ ants individually" {Ei) and "Every child squashed all of his ants" 
{E2): 
^ since the representation of location has not been described, the example is simplified to use 
a works_at action. In the network this would however be expressed using the representation of 
location. 
^his refers to the ants of the group he squashed 
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EQ: {F-subject_-F: [ch i ld i ] ; V-action--/: [squash]; F-object--/^: [ant-groupi]} 
£"1: {FV-subject--F: [ch i ld i ] ; W-act ion-- / : [squash]; 
FF-objec t - -FF: [ant_groupi]} 
E2: {F-s\itject--F: [ ch i ld i ] ; V-action--/: [squash]; F-object-- /^ : [ant-groupi]} 
In order to express these statements a many levelled quantification is introduced. 
This can not only refer to the elements of sets, but also the elements of sets of sets, 
the elements of sets of sets of sets, and beyond. This is achieved by extending the 
quantification to a string of quantification symbols S1S2 • • • Sj, where the j t h symbol 
Sj refers to the jth. level of elements of the set referred to. The first such level of a 
set S is its elements, the second is the elements of its elements and so on. Because 
the choice of each symbol is free between V, 3!, / and the shorthands F and A, 
complex relations can be built. Each end of each arc is associated with the string 
of symbols expressing the way in which the arc relates to the node it is connected 
to at that end. In all other respects the scheme is the same as the second attempt. 
Although in theory an infinite number of quantification levels can be built, in 
practice only three appear to be needed to express most statements in natural 
language, discounting artificially contrived examples. A maximal number of five 
appears necessary to express the most complex of template events. 
B.1.3.1 Quantification Dependencies 
A problem with the new scheme is quantificational dependencies between the V and 
3! quantifications. For instance, can the choice of an element at one level of a set S 
be determined by that of another at another level of 5 ? This situation corresponds 
to dependencies between quantifications of a same string. Such dependencies are 
of little use since they do not express dependency of elements on other sets. Thus 
quantification dependency is only allowed between symbols on either end of an arc. 
Usually quantification dependencies occur at the same level: if an arc links two 
sets C and Tl, dependencies will be between the xth level of set C and that of set 
Tl for any x. For instance, "every child squashed every one of his group of ants 
individually" can be expressed as the event EQ: 
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EQ: {FV-subject-F: children; W-act ion- / : squash; 
EF-ohject-FF: ant-group} 
Here Eo is a set of set of events. Each instance E'Q of EQ is a set of events which 
has as subject- a particular child of the chi ldren set. Because of the F — F 
quantification, there is one such set per child. Because the event end of the quan-
tification is FV, each instance of E'Q is connected to the subject- arc, rather than 
the group of events E'Q being connected itself. The quantification dependency is 
therefore limited to the 1st level of the sets EQ and children. In TOVC, this 
could be expressed as: 
VeeFo 3!cGchildren Ve'ee . subject-(c,e') 
A Vcechi ldren 3!eeFo Ve'€e . subject-(c, e') 
Similarly, the act ion- is connected to every instance of E'^ in light of the W 
quantification. Finally, the object- arc states that there is a group of ants for 
every instance E'Q of E^. I t also states that there is an ant for every event of every 
such set E'Q which is its object. There are therefore two quantification dependencies 
between EQ and ant-group, one at level 1 and the other at level 2. In TOVL, this 
could be expressed as: 
(VeeFo 3!aeant-group) (Ve'ee B.'a'ea) . object-(a',e') 
A (VaGant-group 3!ee£o) (Va'Ga 3!e'Ge) . object-(a',e') 
where the e and a are quantificationally dependent, as are e' and a'. This situation 
where quantificational dependencies are restricted to the same levels is referred to 
by the expression "independent levels of quantification". I t allows different levels 
of quantification to be treated independently and is of particular importance in the 
treatment of inheritance over inst_ events (see 6.4 (p. 16^Jf 
Sometimes however, i t is useful to represent quantificational dependencies between 
levels. In many cases, such as VF — F or V — V3!, the dependency is unambiguous 
and shall therefore not be expressed explicitly. In other cases however, such as 
W — 3! i t is unclear: does the 3! depend on the first, the second, or both Vs? In 
such cases, the dependency is expressed explicitly as follows: | v | V - | 3! |, V| V | - | 3! 
and [ w ] - [ 3 ! ] , respectively. In figures, they are expressed by arrows.^ 
^The fact that JsiS2 • • • Sj = siS2 • • • Sj is used extensively 
'''Of course, in the computer implementation, the dependency is always expressed explicitly. 
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B.1.3.2 Sets of sets of ... 
With the ful l quantification scheme, sets of sets, sets of sets of sets, and so on have 
been introduced. These sets must be built by powerset relations from other sets 
consisting of single instantiations of concepts. Such a set would be the set of dogs, 
containing only dogs as instantiations, and no groupings of dogs. Section 5.4 (p. 
135) discusses how such simple sets are built. 
Sets of sets can be built using the powerset- or the i n f inite-powerset events^. 
The powerset- event states that its object- is a powerset of its subject.. This 
means that the object- set contains subsets of the subject- set. The object- of 
an inf in i te -powerse t event includes not only subsets of its subject-, but also 
sets of sets of the elements of the subject-, sets of sets of sets of and even sets 
including elements of the subject-and sets of elements of the subject-, and so on 
to any depth. 
B.1.3.3 Quantification and Intensionality 
The interaction of quantification and empty sets raises some questions about the 
nature of quantification. Indeed, i f a set is empty, how can one make statements 
about its contents? The problems stem from the extensional viewpoint: that the 
set is equivalent to its elements. An alternative viewpoint is intensional: the set is 
equivalent to its definition: see 5.4 (p. 135). Whether or not the set happens to 
have any elements, one can talk about the elements i t does or would have. Thus 
equality in SemNet is intensional. 
From the intensional viewpoint, quantification does not state that there are ele-
ments which are taken from the quantified-over set, but that i f there were elements 
in that set, they would be chosen in the manner stated by the quantification. Thus, 
one can state "Every flying pig owns a German": 
SThese are defined in D.6.3.4 (p. D-81) 
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EQ: { F-subject--F: [ f l y i n g - p i g j ; V-action--/: [own]; F-object--F: [Germani] } 
El. { /-subject--/: [ f ly ing_pig] ; / -action--/ : [size.]; /-object--/ : [0] } 
where Germani is the set of Germans owned by flying pigs. 
One problem remains: What happens if one has a set of sets, where all the inner 
sets are empty? This might occur, for instance, if one defined the dispossessed as 
the set of people who own nothing: 
Fo- { F-subject_-F: [Dispossessed]; V-action--/: [own]; 
F-object--FV: [Dispossessed-Possessions] } 
El. { F-subject_-F: [Dispossessed-Possessions]; V-action--/: [size-]; 
V-object--/: [O] } 
In set theory, there is only one empty set, so all elements of Dispossessed-Possessions 
would be the same empty set. This implies that there is only one element of 
Dispossessed-Possessions, hence only one element in Fo, and hence only one 
Dispossessed. Furthermore, it assumes that a set can have 0 as a element. 
From the intensional viewpoint, all of John's possessions is a different concept to 
all of Jack's, even i f both turn out to own nothing. Rather than being considered 
an intrinsic feature of sets, cardinality is is considered incidental: a property like 
any other. Because equality is intensional, two concepts are only equal in SemNet 
if they have the same definition. I.e. SemNet does not have the rule that any two 
empty sets are equivalent: a concept can be a set of many 'empty groups', where 
each such 'empty group' has a type given by its definition (in particular, the type 
of the arguments of the events defining it and their quantification). In practice this 
means that FQ and Ei do not imply that there is only one dispossessed. 
B.1.3.4 Logical existential quantification 
Previously, i t was stated that existential quantification in the representation was 
equivalent to unique existential (3!) quantification in logic. Until now there was 
no way of expressing quantification corresponding to existential (3) quantification 
in logic: one or more. This can be achieved in the ful l quantification scheme by 
using 3!V quantification. Thus a V — 3!V arc states that for every instance / on its 
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John squashed all the ants 
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squashed 
John squashed every ant (individually) 
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F F ^ F F 
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John kicked every ball (at least once) 
squashed 
Every child squashed a group of ants 
F FV 
children O ^"bject A ^ 
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A object O 
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Every child squashed every one of his 
ants individually 
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Every child squashed all of his ants 
Figure B.2: Quantification Examples 
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I I V 
children 
O subject A A object O 
cars 
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The (team of) children washed all the cars 
painters p F 31 
O subject A 
M 
OJ 
A object O walls 
paint 
Every painter paints a wall, but the same 
wall can be painted by more than one of them. 
V 3! F 
, O subject A^i 
people <\ ^ O theatres 
own 
All the people who own, individually or as a 
group, one theatre. 
3! V ^ F 
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OJ 
^ O theatres 
own 
Every theatre is owned by a person, and each 
person can own more than one theatre. 
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own 
Every person owns a watch, and each watch 
is owned by a person. 
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nibbles 
Every ant nibbles one or more pieces of cake, 
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people O ^"^^J"'^' ^ "^j"'^^ ° watches 
own 
number F F ^ F FV 
O object A 
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OJ 
AsubjectO ^^j^f 
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Every person owns every watch, and each 
watch is owned by every person. 
Every set of numbers has a unique sum. 
Figure B.3: Quantification Examples 
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left, there is one set r on its right, such that it relates I to all the elements of r. In 
this manner, statements such as "every farmer owns at least one donkey" can be 
expressed: 
Fq: {FV-subject--F: feiriners; W-act ion-- / : own; 
FF-objec t - -FF: donkeys} 
F i : { F-subject--F: donkeys; V-action--/: size-; V-object--3!: onejnore'}^ 
This states that for every farmer there is a (non-empty) set of donkeys that he owns. 
The V - 3! is hidden in the subject-'s FV - F quantification. 
B.2 Proof that F-F events are bijective 
First recall the ful l form of the F-F quantification for an event r, where the subject-
is the set X and the object- is the set y. 
{\fxeX 3\yey r{x,y)) A {yyey3xeX : r{x,y))]A 
[C^yeySlxeX r{x,y)) A {\/xeX3yey : r(x,y))] 
This can be simplified to 4^ A 5 where: 
A := yxeXBlyey : r{x,y) 
B := \^yey3\xeX : r{x,y) 
Recall the requirements for a relation r between the elements of two sets X and y 
to be bijective: 
Bij{r) := Func{r) A Surj{r) A Inj{r) (B.l) 
Func{r) := [\fxeX \/y,y'ey : r{x,y) Ar{x,y') =^ y = y'] A 
yxEX 3yey : r{x,y) 
Surj{r) := ^yey^xeX : r{x,y) 
''onejEore' is a subset of the set of all numbers equal to one or more: not all numbers greater 
or equal to one are the number of donkeys someone owns as the 3! would imply. 
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Inj{r) := ^x^x'eX yy,y'E y : r{x,y) Ar{x',y') Ax x' ^ y y' 
Recall the definition of 3!: 
3\xeX : P{x) := 3xeX [ P{x) e X : P{x') ^ x = x'] (B.2) 
Consider A: 
WxeXBlyey : r{x,y) (A) 
<^ yxeX3yey[r{x,y)A{yy'ey:r{x,y')^y = y')] (using (B.2)) 
<^ \/xeX [ Byey : r{x,y) 
A(V?/,y '6>' : r{x,y) A r{x,y') ^ y = y') 
44> Func{r) 
A is therefore equivalent to the requirement for r to be a function. 
Consider B: 
'iyey^lxeX : r{x,y) [B] 
<^ \/yey : [ 3xeX : r{x,y)] A 
Va;, x'eX : r(x, y) A r{x', y) =^ x = x'] using (B.2) 
^ ^y.y'^y • [3xeX : r{x,y)]A 
yx,x'EX : r{x,y) Ar{x',y') Ay = y ' x = x'] 
4^ [VyeyBxeX : r{x,y)] A by reordering and 
yy,y'ey\fx,x'eX : r{x,y) Ar{x',y') Ax ^ x ' y ^ y'] (a=>6 = -^aV6) 
<^ Surj{r) A Inj{r) 
B is therefore equivalent to the requirement for r to be surjective and injective. 
By (B. l ) , AAB'IS bijective, so r is bijective. 
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B.3 Implementation of the basic representation 
Other sections detail how the representation works in theory. In practice i t must 
also be efficient for search. This section outlines some features of an efficient 
implementation. 
B.3.1 Events 
In a semantic network, search proceeds through the links. As described in 3.4.1.2 
(p. 37), determinism of search is a critical factor. Many forms of search involve 
finding a particular type of event connected to a node. For instance, searching up 
the inheritance hierarchy involves finding any i n s t - or spec, event connected to 
the particular node. However, every node is connected to a myriad of events. Since 
the type of an event is given by the target of its action-, for each event connected 
to a node, the search must proceed through two arcs to find its type. For n events 
connected to a node, 2n arcs must be traversed. This is inefficient, since only the 
events searched for need be accessed: in a real system, the large network means 
that large parts of i t will be paged out of memory. Each traversal of an arc is 
associated with a likelihood of time consuming swapping. Clever organisation of 
the network in memory cannot avoid this, since locality in a graph is impossible 
to map perfectly in the general case to locality in a linear memory scheme such as 
computer memory. 
The solution lies in grouping subject-of and object-Of arcs of each node by the 
type of event that they lead to^°. Al l the arcs connected to a node are expressed 
on the node, so such a change requires grouping the arcs by the action of the event 
they are connected to for the subject-of and object_of arcs. For the other four 
basic arcs, subject- , action-, object- and action-of this is not necessary since 
it is only the events nodes are connected to that are of import to search. A naive 
implementation illustrates: 
^°a little like frames are associated with slots on them 
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> data NodeArcs 
> = NodeArcs [Arc] [Arc] [Arc] — Subject, Action, Object arcs 
> [(Node,[Arc])] ~ Subject.of arc 
> [Arc] — Action_of arc 
> [(Node,[Arc])] — Object_of arc 
The [• • •] denotes a list, and (a, b) denotes the tuple formed of first element a and 
second element b. The lists of arcs correspond to the arcs, sorts and quantification 
with arc type given by their position in the data structure NodeArcs. The Nodes as 
first elements of the tuples are the actions of the events the node is connected to. 
Since the second element of the tuple is a list of Arcs, each tuple groups together 
all arcs connected to an event with the type given by the first element. 
This solution incurs a cost in the size of the network, but given the improvement 
in search i t provides, overall i t is advantageous. 
I t is because of this scheme that spec- and i n s t - events have different action types 
spec, and inst-: spec_ could be written in terms of an i n s t - event as follows: 
(Fo,R): { A V-subject - - / 0 : X; A V-action - - / 0 : inst-; AF-object - -FA: Y} 
Maintaining the distinction is however beneficial for certain processing such as 
search. Maintaining the distinction requires however that the alternative inst_ 
form for spec- is always normalised to the spec- form. However in some forms of 
processing which rely on quantification, spec- is converted back to its base inst_ 
form. This occurs for instance in the preprocessing of conversion to antonym. 
Indeed, i n s t - itself is unnecessary if arbitrary quantification is implemented na-
tively. I f originally, 
{Eo,R): { A/-subject - - / 0 : X; A/-action - - / 0 : inst-; A/-object - - / A : Y} 
then, this can be rewritten 
(Fo,R): { A/-subject_ - / 0 : X; A/-action - - / 0 : spec-; A/-object - - / A : Y} 
{Ei,R): { A A-subject - - / 0 : Y; A V-action - - / 0 : size-; AV-object--AO: 1} 
where Ei has many other subject- arcs of the form A y l-subject - - / 0 . However, 
using an i n s t - event reduces the search space various searches down the hierarchy 
need consider, for instance semantic integration 6.7 (p. 193). 
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B.3.2 Templates and a c t i o n - o f arcs 
Determining the template event associated with a particular action or event type 
is a common task. For instance, it is necessary when building new events in the 
network to ensure that they are built as instances of their template. Similarly, i t 
is used to check that the subject and object they are attached to is legal for their 
literal meanings (type-checking: 6.6 (p. 188)). Finally, important features such as 
pre- and postconditions (see 7.2.3 (p. 264)) •^re expressed on the templates. Thus, 
for many reasons, an efficient method of accessing an event's template is desirable. 
I t is very rare to traverse an actiou-of arc, as it is very rare to wish to find 
all the events with a particular action. Moreover this same information can be 
gained by searching down the inheritance hierarchy from the template event for 
all its instances, and those of its specialisations which have that action, and their 
instances. Instead, the action-of arc can be used to point only to the template 
event. This makes finding the template of any event, whether or not it is yet 
connected into the hierarchy simply a matter of traversing an action- arc to the 
relevant action, then traversing the action-of arc to the template event. 
B.3.3 Families 
In certain regions, the topology of the inheritance hierarchy is more tree-like than 
graph-like, in that one concept is partitioned into many others mainly, if not only, 
by specialised events. For instance, the node human is partitioned into many 
different kinds - owners, lecturers, managers, Greeks, ... - , yet most of these 
partitions are obtained through the use of events which apply only to humans. This 
topology reflects that a region of knowledge is of particular interest to LOLITA. But 
i t also states that the top concept of the region has properties that distinguish it 
very sharply from the rest of the network. Much reasoning involved in the region i t 
dominates will depend on these features in particular. Thus, a lot of inheritance will 
search up to i t to check these features. For instance, if one wished to know whether 
some concept could be the subject- of an owning event, one must check whether 
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i t has all the definitional features of owners. This is simple, i f i t is a specialisation 
of humans, but if it is not, the search must consider all the definitional events i t 
can inherit: i t will proceed up the hierarchy until all the paths to typeless have 
been investigated. 
Instead of searching upwards to determine whether some concept is a specialisation 
of some important often referred to concept, families can be used. In principle 
the idea is to provide a direct link between every concept and the concept that 
dominates it . For instance all concepts which refer to some kind of person have 
"human" as family. 
This could be implemented by a spec- or i n s t - event from the concept human to 
all its elements. However this would cause a few problems. I t would increase the 
network size dramatically because almost each concept would be assigned an addi-
tional spec- or i n s t - event; i t would not by itself solve the problem of searching 
upwards to typeless i f a concept being type-checked were not of the correct type, 
as there is no difference between its normal and family spec, and i n s t - events; 
and i t would lower topological determinism if one wished to determine the least 
restricted of the specialisations of the dominating concept, as the dominating con-
cept would not be connected only to them via spec, or i n s t - events, but also to 
all the other concepts it is the generalisation of. 
Instead i t is implemented as a special "family" control which takes a value cor-
responding to the dominating concept. This does not increase the network size 
significantly, nor does i t decrease topological determinism, and its difference to 
normal spec_ or i n s t _ events prevents a search upwards. However, it does break 
uniqueness, so i t requires additional machinery to ensure that i t corresponds to 
the state of the hierarchy. In practice this is not a big problem since i t is rare for 
concepts to change dominating concept. 
The use of family controls reduces the need for search dramatically. Not only can 
processing jump directly from concepts to their dominating concepts, but i t can 
also use the family values themselves: the set of dominating concepts, and their 
corresponding family values form a (small) inheritance graph. This means that 
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algorithms such as the frequently used type-checker can determine that a concept 
cannot be involved in a particular event. For instance, a horse cannot own any-
thing since owners has family type "human", and horses have type "(non-human) 
animal", and these two types do not intersect. Thus the search up to typeless 
has been avoided. However, not all search through the network is ehminated since 
the reasons for rejecting an event may involve information of finer granularity than 
that provided by family controls. For instance, an event may require as subject-
"rich humans", whereas a potential subjec t . John is human but not rich. Overall, 
the benefits in search reduction that family controls provide for many algorithms 
justify the cost of maintaining them. 
For non-literal concepts, the family value is the most specific value which is, nev-
ertheless, the ancestor of the possible dominating concepts. For instance, Mickey 
mouse, Dumbo and Caligula's horse would all take as value "animalOrHuman", 
since even i f one is not sure whether i t is human or animal, one does know that i t 
is one of them. Similarly i f a concept changes nature over time, the most specific 
value which is the ancestor of the possible dominating concepts is chosen. Thus 
if a concept appears too general to be involved in some event, the type-checking 
mechanism must resort to using a search for its defining properties. 
B.4 Sorts 
B.4.1 The need for sorts at each end of each arc 
The need for sorts at each end of each arc is demonstrated by a richness argument. 
A succession of simple schemes are presented, each to be shown insufficient. The 
manner in which each is insufficient is corrected until the final scheme is reached. 
B.4.1.1 A Control on Events 
The most obvious representation scheme would be to associate a new control with 
events. This would state whether or not the event is restricting the sense-domain 
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of the concept to which it is attached. When an event is restricting the scope 
of a concept, i t is defining i t , and the control should be definitional; whereas 
when a concept is stating some fact about the concept, it is making an observation 
about the concept, and the control should be observational. Thus for instance if 
one were trying to define the concept green plants, the event "is green" would be 
attached to the node representing "green plants" and given a definitional control. 
On the other hand, the event "Jane likes green plants" would have an observational 
control. 
Once a concept has been defined, observational events may be used to express facts 
about its elements. For instance, we may wish to state that all books are made of 
paper. This is not part of books' definition, since a book made of animal skin may 
at first seem strange, but not completely alien to the idea of a book. This does not 
however mean that only books are made of paper. Therefore the concept of those 
things made of paper and are books is a subset of the concept of things made of 
paper. Similarly observed statements can be made about the concepts themselves: 
for instance the number of 1 dollar notes in circulation is not part of a dollar's 
definition, but is an observed statement which would be expressed as the size of a 
set. 
B.4.1.2 Problems w i^th Sorts on Events: Transitive Events 
The scheme of associating a definitional control with events appears to work well 
with intransitive events above. However, it needs to also work with transitive 
events, where two concepts are involved in the event. For instance "Every one of 
Lolita's husbands had a fast car": 
{EQ,A): { V - s u b j e c t L o l i t a ; V-action--/: wives; F-object_-F: Lolita_Husbaiids} 
( E l , A): { F-subject_-F: Lolita_Husbaiids; V-action_-/: own; J'-object_-i^: Fast.Carsi} 
EQ has a definitional control since i t defines the concept Lolita_Husbands, LOLITA's 
husbands. Similarly, Ei has a definitional control since it defines the set of fast 
cars, each of LOLITA's husbands owned. 
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However consider the concept "LOLITA": Because Eo is definitional, it also de-
fines L o l i t a . Similarly, Ei also defines Lolita_Husbands. This is not what was 
intended. 
B.4.1.3 Associating a sort to each arc 
Since each concept participating in an event may be or may not be restricted by it , 
two options are available. The first involves assigning a definitional control to the 
concepts themselves. This removes the constraint that all concepts participating in 
an event need either be restricted or not by it . However i t results in that all events 
attached to a concept are either definitional or observational. As shown in the 
examples above, we want to be able to attach both definitional and observational 
events to the same concept. The second alternative involves associating something 
similar to a control to the arcs: a sort. Now that each arc may have a different 
sort, every node be i t an entity or an event may be associated with definitional and 
observational statements. 
Sorts are a form of information expressed on the arcs. They state the role each 
arc is playing with respect to its source and target nodes. Thus they are used to 
express whether an arc is restricting a node i t is connected to, or stating something 
about i t . In the first case the arc has a "definitional" sort with respect to that 
node, in the second i t has an "observational" sort. 
B.4.1.4 Problems vi^ith associating only one sort to each arc 
Because SemNet is propositional, one event s can have another t as subjec t , or 
object-. This means that the source event (s) may be definitional or observational 
with respect to the target event {t). Clearly, this is the case, since one can say 
"Every time the moon rises, John hides under his bed", where "Every time the moon 
rises" defines the set of events involving John hiding under his bed. Similarly, the 
source event can be observational with respect to the target event: "John believes 
Jack lives on Mars" Here John's belief does not restrict the set of events involving 
Jack living on Mars. 
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This raises the question: are the event's own arcs definitional or observational with 
respect to it? I t might seem obvious that they are always definitional with respect 
to i t : surely an event is defined by its arcs, which specify the various parts of the 
relation i t expresses. However, this is not the case, as the example "The only thing 
John ever did was lie". This means that the only event which has as subject-
John is a lying event. That is to say, that the set of events defined by the subject-
John is observed to have as act ion- lie: 
E2: { A/ -subjec t - - /0 : John; 0 / -ac t ion . - /0 : l i e } 
I f both arcs were definitional, the event would only say that John lied. 
B.4.2 Why sorts? 
Indeed, i f an observational arc with respect to a concept indicates that all instan-
tiations of the concept form a subset of the set defined by the observed arc, why 
should this not be expressed directly using sets and spec- relations? 
In an example of such a network, all explicitly expressed events would be defini-
tional, and all inherited ones would be observational. In this way, all events are 
definitional with respect to the nodes they are connected to, but not with respect 
to their subsets. This means that if a concept is defined by many events, i t must 
be connected to all of them. If i t is involved in many observational events, they all 
define supersets of i t and should therefore be inherited. 
This scheme results in a lot of repetition. Consider the conceptual hierarchy. For 
each concept defined, all the definitional events of its ancestors must be repeated. 
Thus the concept "man" is not only connected to the events which distinguish men 
from other animals, but is also connected to the events defining animals, living 
beings... and every other concept up to typeless. As a result, i t is difficult 
to determine which concepts are of particular relevance to men, rather than to 
animals. This type of information is needed for instance for semantic distance. 
Observed events are determined by searching up the inheritance hierarchy and vir-
tually inheriting down all events which are not explicitly connected to the concept. 
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Virtually inheriting events means that although processing must be made aware of 
them in order to use them, these events cannot be physically copied down to the 
concept's level as they would then define it , and no longer be observational. This 
search has a very bad topological determinism, since all spec- and i n s t - arcs up 
the hierarchy to typeless must be searched in order to determine that a piece of 
information is lacking, and half of them on average to find a piece of information. 
Similar difficulties occur when one wishes to refer to an observed event o, for 
instance as the cause of some other event c. An example would be "John died" 
which is observational with respect to John: a. "His death caused a mutiny" would 
be an example of c, as i t should refer to o. But o would be implemented as superset 
O of all people who died defined by a dying event e. The node John would be an 
instance of O and would not have an explicit dying event attached to i t since the 
death was observational. Since no such event is available, c must be connected 
somewhere else. I t cannot be connected to e, since this refers to all people dying, 
so has to be connected to the i n s t - relation between O and John. In a complex 
hierarchy determining exactly which inst_ or spec- event should be connected or if 
a new one should be built is difficult, and later changes are rendered more complex 
since they must not affect the meaning of the causal event. 
Finally, this scheme results in many unwanted supersets. For instance, if one wishes 
to state that there are only 3 farmers in New York, one must build the set of all 
sets of three elements, and state that the farmers in New York are an instance of 
this set. A lot of the time, one only wishes to state that a fact is observational, 
but one would never wish to refer to the corresponding observational superset. 
Obviously, this is not the most efficient of schemes, and more efficient variants can 
be found. But all suffer from the lack of locality due to the necessity of build-
ing the observational sets explicitly. This results not only in a large number of 
unnecessary sets, but also in an inheritance hierarchy which is difficult to main-
tain: adding or deleting events may affect the meaning of other statements, since 
it is the structure of the hierarchy which determines whether an event is observa-
tional or definitional. This fragility deprives one of the possibility of implementing 
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algorithms which approximate the result when manipulating the hierarchy, as is 
desirable if the the algorithm producing an exact result is inefficient. Similarly, the 
lack of locality increases the dependence on search, and decreases in many other 
schemes distributedness with respect to the role an event is playing. Al l these 
features make sorts desirable since they make an implicit global quantity explicit 
locally and thereby simplify its processing. 
Appendix C 
Further Reasoning Results 
Although depth reduces the complexity of semantic integration, semantic 
integration can be done on a non-annotated KB. Furthermore, semantic in-
tegration was found to be near-linear in terms of the number of concepts 
they explored. This appendix derives a mathematic estimate of this number 
in the average case. 
C . l A depthless algorithm to determine the or-
ange node 
See 6.7.2.2 (p. 206). 
Since the orange node is the only one through which all paths from the black 
node to typeless pass, when searching for the orange node, one wants to be sure 
that all paths to i t have been traversed. But, one does not want to traverse each 
independently, since that causes high complexity. Thus one wants to traverse each 
arc of any path only once, while somehow maintaining tally of which paths that 
arc corresponded to. To do this, one needs an identifier for each path. 
p :: Pathid is a unique identifier for each path. I t is represented as a list of 
traversed nodes (Pathid = [Node]). The ful l list of traversed nodes is unnecessary, 
since retaining only the node at which a path split, and the direction the path took 
is sufficient to uniquely identify any path. Thus, every time a node n is traversed 
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which has more than one parent, the node n is appended to the path p, and then 
each of the parents is appended to a copy of p. Each copy of p uniquely identifies 
a path through one of the parents. The path is also compressed so that if a node n 
is to be appended to a list, the last element of which is also n, n is not duplicated. 
Since not all paths to the orange node will be of equal length, in the ideal case, 
one would like a lowest-first search, as described in 6.7.2.2 (p. 206). The closest 
thing is a breadth-first search: every node in the search space «S is replaced by its 
parents at the next iteration. This replacement is called expanding a node. 
One also wants to ensure that arcs are only traversed once: this will form the basis 
of linear complexity. To ensure this, a set V of visited nodes is used. If a node is 
met while traversing the network, which was already visited, one knows that it has 
already been expanded. Thus i t does not need to be expanded again. By removing 
all visited nodes from the search space after the expansion phase at each iteration, 
one ensures that each arc will only be traversed once. 
Finally, one wants to be sure that all paths to the orange node are traversed. 
Clearly, to do this, one will use the path identifiers: i f all paths reach the orange 
node, they will all have in common the node where they split above it . The idea 
is thus to maintain a list of paths as one searches up that hierarchy, and test i t on 
the fly for a node common to all paths. Since the search is a gradual process, the 
path list only contains the paths from the black node to the just expanded nodes. 
C.1.1 Ensuring all paths reach the orange node 
How can one maintain a list of all paths without retraversing each arc? One needs 
a complete set of all paths to know that the orange node has been traversed by 
each. I f the search is breadth first and the paths have differing lengths, when 
a path reaches a node, another path may already have left i t . Stopping at this 
already visited node would mean that not all paths were fully traversed, so one 
cannot be sure that the orange node was detected. Searching all paths from this 
already visited node would blow up the complexity since only ensuring each arc is 
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traversed once keeps it down. The only apparent solution to this conundrum is to 
delay the search at any node that still has paths leading to i t that have not been 
traversed. Then once all such paths had been traversed, they could be packaged 
together in a packet to be included in the path identifier of all paths leading from 
the node. In eflFect this would mean that they all share the same search beyond 
the node, avoiding the multiplication of paths leading to combinatorial behaviour. 
In this manner a ful l list of paths would be built up which could be tested for a 
common node. 
However i t is not possible to delay a node, since that would require either knowing 
that another path will visit i t , or that a path cannot visit i t to provide a continual 
supply of nodes to expand. The first is not possible since in essence it is the 
problem: each packet represents all the paths from one node to another, which is 
the same problem as determining all the paths from the black node to the orange 
one. The second is only possible i f nodes are assigned a depth. I t might seem 
therefore that one is condemned to combinatorial complexity. But, an imphcit 
assumption was made: that the packets are needed in the determination of the 
common node. I f they are not, they can be discarded, removing the need for a 
delay. 
The packets represent all the paths from one node to another. In effect, they 
correspond to local expansions of the search space. Because of this, only the nodes 
at either end of them could conceivably be common to all paths. But the nodes 
at either end of them will be included in the shortest path's identifier ,^ so it is 
unnecessary to search paths again, resulting in the preservation of linear complexity. 
C.1.2 A data-structure to determine the common node 
Determining the common element of a set of strings is expensive. A dedicated 
data-structure can go some way towards alleviating this problem. The common 
node candidate structure (CNCS) achieves this by expressing nodes and paths in 
^Actually, for the top node, the recorded node is not that at which all paths come together, 
but the first split node above it 
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a graph, where each path is represented as a CNCS-node associated to the nodes 
in its identifier, also represented by CNCS-nodes, by a set of is-a arcs. There are 
3 types of directed arc: duplicate-, source- and is-a. Only split nodes are added to 
the CNCS as the orange node will be detected as a descendent of one of them. 
There are three basic operations: adding split nodes, deleting split nodes and 
extending paths. Adding split nodes is simply a matter of building a new common 
CNCS-node to represent the split node, and connecting i t to a specified previously 
existing path. Extending a path involves taking a previously existing path CNCS-
node, cloning i t , and assigning each copy the relevant path identifier. Cloning it 
means to copy the node's existing arcs as duplicate- arcs, and to add a source, arc 
to the node from its clones. Deleting a spht node involves deleting its CNCS-node, 
and removing every reference to it in path CNCS-nodes. I f another node were the 
source- of the node being deleted, this other node is visited to check i f i t is the 
source- of more than one resulting nodes: if only one arc is left, it is deleted. 
The number of arcs connecting each split node CNCS-node to a path CNCS-node 
expresses the number of paths to which that node is common. 
The set of common node candidates is implemented as an ordered circular list of 
pointers to each split node CNCS-node, representing all the common node can-
didates. The list is sorted with respect to the number paths to which each node 
is common. In effect the CNCS graph operations are used only to maintain this 
count. The list is sorted from smallest to largest number, so each time the number 
increases, the node's reference in the circular list is pushed back towards the end. 
When the number becomes equal to the number of active paths, one knows that 
all paths have the given node in common. 
There are two cases in which the number of paths incorporating some node may 
become equal to the number of active paths: a path may suddenly reach the 
common node, and thus the path is added to the common node's CNCS node, or 
a path may be deleted from the set of active paths, reducing the required number 
of paths. This latter case could occur if most paths of the breadth first search had 
passed the orange node, but one was still below it, and just met a previously visited 
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node. In both these cases, i t is important to test whether there is a node that is 
involved in the same number of paths as the number of current active paths. To 
avoid multiple searches to the last element of the list, references to the list can be 
made to point to its last element rather than its first. Since the fist is circular, the 
next element wil l be its smallest. Thus, testing the greatest element of the list -
the number of paths the most common node belongs to - is achieved by reading 
the first element of the list. Every time the list is sorted, or an element from i t 
deleted, an additional step will be made, but unless this occurs far more often than 
testing the number of common nodes, the effect will be beneficial. 
C.1.3 Finding the common node 
Now that the groundwork has been established, the issue is to put everything 
together. As before a breadth first search traverses all the black node's definitional 
explicit ancestors, maintaining V to ensure that previously traversed nodes are not 
investigated more than once. 
The algorithm searches through all of the black node's explicit ancestors in a 
breadth first manner. Initially the set of visited nodes V = 0. Each element 
of V is of the form (p :: Pathld,n :: Node,c :: {Node}), where n is the visited 
node being searched, p is the path that first reached it , and c is the set of n's chil-
dren though which a path has reached n. Initially the black node's parents form 
the initial path identifiers, and the initial paths. They are added to the CNCS 
graph and list, and to V the set of active paths. Each element of V is of the form 
[p :: Pathld,n :: Node,m :: Node), where n is the current node being searched 
and m is the previous node the path traversed. To obtain the breadth first search 
behaviour, V is implemented as a circular list similarly to the CNCS graph, for 
which elements are added to the end of the list (the element the list is referred to 
by), and read from the front (the element after that the list is referred to by). At 
each iteration, a path (p, n, m) is taken out of V: 
• I f there is a {p', n', m') in V the set of visited nodes such that n = n', the 
path node p is deleted from the CNCS and m is added to m' in the entry of 
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n' in V. The number of paths of V is compared with the maximal number of 
paths with a node in common of CNCS. Unless equal, the search iterates. 
• Otherwise, (p, n, { m } ) is added to V, and the set of its definitional parents A 
is found. I f A has only one element (p, x, m) is placed in V, and the search 
iterates. Otherwise, n is a new split node: it must be combined with every 
element of A to produce a new set of path identifiers which are associated 
with the elements of A and put into V. The CNCS is also updated: First n is 
added, and connected to the path node corresponding to p. This path node 
is then extended by the number of new path identifiers, and each resulting 
path node is assigned one of these path identifiers. The search then iterates. 
When the iteration stops, the node common to the most paths in the CNCS is 
the split node above the orange node. The closest descendent of this node which 
has more than one children in V is the orange node. The set of nodes traversed 
by paths is retraversed to colour them brown. This is achieved using the list of 
children associated with each visited node in V, and using another set T to restrict 
the search to uncoloured nodes. This step costs 0{V) where V is the number of 
nodes between the black and orange nodes. 
C.l.4 Optimising the search 
The search can be optimised by changing the first case to: 
• I f there is a (p', n', m') in V the set of visited nodes such that n = n', the split 
CNCS-nodes in p' not in p are deleted from the CNCS. The path node p is 
deleted from the CNCS and m is added to m' in the entry of n' in V. The 
number of paths of V is compared with the maximal number of paths with a 
node in common of CNCS. Unless equal, the search iterates. 
The additional step, the nodes in p' not in p are deleted from the CNCS, uses 
the fact only the extremities of packets need be considered. These deletions sub-
stantially reduce the number of common node candidates, improving efficiency: for 
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instance i t shortens the CNCS list, reducing the distance elements are pushed back. 
I t also reduces the number of associations between split nodes of SemNet and nodes 
of the CNCS graph, which is important if the associations are implemented as a 
tree. A tree might be used if it is ineflBcient to associate information temporarily 
directly on the nodes of SemNet, say using controls: for instance, this might require 
increasing SemNet's size in memory, which might be undesirable and the reason 
depth information was not used. 
The use of BIB trees can further improve the efficiency of this algorithm. Asso-
ciating split nodes of SemNet with their counterparts in the CNCS graph with a 
BIB tree is beneficial as in a BIB tree failure to find information is cheaper than 
success: deletion of already deleted nodes in the CNCS graph fails (early) to find 
the relevant node. This is useful if the algorithm just presented is changed so that 
when a path p reaches a previously traversed node, not only are the nodes of p 
not in p' (the first path to reach the node) are removed from CNCS, but also the 
nodes of p' not in p are removed from p'. Doing this speeds up lookup failure on 
p' (if all paths associated with nodes in V are implemented as BIB trees), so that 
determining the nodes not common to the paths of a packet is sped up: the lower 
the depth of the BIB tree, the faster the failure. I t is unlikely that some of the 
paths of a packet share many nodes, denied to others, so the increased deletion 
traffic on nodes of the CNCS is fikely to be low. If a BIB tree associates split nodes 
with the CNCS, this small increase is absorbed by early failures. 
C.1.5 Overall complexity 
For simplicity, the worst case calculation is achieved by combining the worst case 
of each component, even if each worst case would not practically co-occur. Thus a 
higher bound for the worst case is obtained. 
The use of V limits the search complexity to only one traversal for each of the E 
arcs traversed. Each arc thus traversed reaches a node, for which a test is made to 
see i f i t is already visited, and if not to add it . The worst case would be if all V 
nodes were in the visited node tree data-structure: 0{log{V)). Then, if the node 
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was already visited, the two paths must be compared involving at worst imaginable 
0{V.log{V)) operations (each path has every node as split node). This would result 
in at worst V deletions from the CNCS, each requiring at worst V steps through 
source- arcs, and V steps to delete the relevant entry from the CNCS list. The 
total complexity in this case is 0{log{V) + V.log{V) + 2V^)=0(V^). I f the node 
were not already visited, at worst imaginable, i t would be a split node involving 
V - 1 (~ V) parents, which would require adding V new paths to the CNCS. 
At worst, the extension process would require copying V is-a or duplicate- arcs V 
times, assuming all V nodes are already in the CNCS. Similarly, the reordering 
of the CNCS list required would be at worst V for each of the V nodes of the 
CNCS: V is the maximum possible length of the CNCS list, making a total of V'^. 
Adding all V paths to V is achieved in V steps. The total complexity for this case 
is 0(21/^ -I- V)—0{V'^). Since this process is repeated for every one of the E arcs, 
the total complexity is bounded by 0{E{V^ + V^))=0{EV^). 
0{EV'^) seems rather good, being low polynomial. But what are E and V? E 
and V are the number of arcs and nodes respectively that the search traversed, 
and herein lies the catch. Consider the worst case, where one of the black node's 
parents is the orange node, but the other parent splits a lot leading though very 
long paths before reaching the orange node. Also assume that every ancestor of the 
orange node has more than one parent, thus leading to many many paths. In this 
situation, a lot of the space above the orange node may be traversed before all the 
paths from the black node have reached the orange node. This overshooting of the 
orange node can incur an exponential cost with respect to the maximal difference 
between the shortest and longest paths of each packet, minus the shortest distance 
of the lower extremity of the packet to the orange node. This exponential efltect 
comes from the splitting above the orange node and is due to the breadth first 
search assigning equal chance to every path of being about to reach the orange 
node. 
Limiting this worst case is clearly a priority. 
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C.1.6 Minimising the worst case 
One additional piece of information that can be used to minimise overshooting 
are the family controls: i f the parents of the black node are of a set of families 
T, then the orange node must be of the smallest super-family / including all the 
famifies of T. This means that the search can be stopped at any node with as 
family a super-family of / . I t can also be used for a large grained lowest depth 
type algorithm which ensures that the lowest families get searched first. This is 
achieved by the normal breadth first search, but V being divided into generations 
to search: nodes above the current family level are placed in a later generation to 
be searched later. This only proves useful when the black node's parents are of 
diflFerent families, usually leading to a very large search space, but overall a rather 
rare case. 
A finer grained method is to use the information in the CNCS to direct the search. 
The problem with the breadth first search was that i t accorded equal likelihood to 
each path of encountering the orange node. What is needed is a way of ensuring that 
in the worst case the search space traversed does not explode, while not penalising 
too harshly the average case. Two points help devising such a method: 
• I f a path has suffered many splits i t is likely to be far from the black node. If 
other paths have suffered far fewer splits than i t , they are worth expanding 
first, since all paths must reach the orange node before i t is detected. 
• I f most paths from a given split node have reached an already visited node, 
it is likely that most of the paths left will too: paths are unlikely to be of 
equal length (otherwise breadth first search would have been ideal), so most 
paths will reach a previously visited node: in SemNet nodes tend to have 
more children than parents. 
Why are the path splits taken rather than raw lengths? At every point in the 
breadth first search, the raw lengths are equal, but that does not prevent potential 
combinatorial explosions: the main source of problems are the splits, not the raw 
length. 
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These two observations from the basis for the following work allocating algorithm. 
Each time a path p is taken from V, the fraction of resources to be devoted to i t 
is obtained by looking up p in the CNCS graph: the set M of split nodes in its 
path identifier are determined uniquely by first finding all the paths S source to 
p by traversing the source, arcs in one direction from p. The set M is obtained 
by traversing the is-a arcs from S. The number of paths connected to a node n is 
p{n). The fraction of resources is then 
Because only active paths that are connected to a given node are included in the 
calculation - all other paths are deleted from the CNCS - , a path gets a higher 
proportion of resources when others sharing a split node with it reach a previously 
visited node: they are deleted from the CNCS. This satisfies the second observation. 
The cost imposed by this scheduling algorithm is limited toV for each arc traver-
sal: 0{EV). The deletion of path nodes which are the source- of only one (rather 
than none or many) path, further reduces this cost. The amount of effort to be 
put into a path, can be translated into the number of arcs that path (or all paths 
derived from i t put together) should traverse by maintaining a "smallest yet en-
countered resource fraction", and dividing the calculated fraction for each new path 
by i t . 
Consider again the worst case: the black node has only two parents, one of which is 
the orange node, all other paths to the orange node are very long, and there is a lot 
of path splitting above the orange node. Because the black node has two parents, 
each path from i t will be given half the resources. This means that i f A'^ ' paths 
are traversed by paths on one parent's side, only A^ '^ will be on the other's. As a 
result, at most iV — 2N'. This contrasts with the breadth first search where A '^ 
paths may be traversed on one side, and e^' on the other, because of bad splitting. 
Similarly, at most iV' different nodes are reached through A '^ arcs. Thus the worst 
case is bound by 0(A''^), which 0(8A'''^). The bound on the worst case is thus still 
a^t worst the path identifier length is V, making V source, arcs to traverse 
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polynomial instead of exponential. If the paths of packets are of similar lengths, 
there will be little overshooting, and the division of the resources will be similar to 
that of breadth first search. 
The family method and the probabilistic method can be combined, further limiting 
some bad cases. 
C.1.7 Finding the orange node: a conclusion 
Determining the orange and brown nodes without depth is possible in polynomial 
complexity, but is not simple. I t is also more expensive than the hnear complexity 
given by depth information. To its advantage is a small reduction in SemNet 
memory size, and eliminating the depth information maintenance procedures. 
C.2 A Formal Examination of the Complexity of 
Semantic Integration 
At present SemNet does not include enough information to provide the test-bed for 
an empirical study of complexity. The only available alternative is to use a formal 
model. This is only an approximation to the problem, and may ignore salient 
information. I t should therefore be taken more as a proof of concept, rather than 
as a cast iron proof of behaviour. 
Classification in KL-ONE has been found NP-hard, co-NP-complete, and a vari-
ety of other unappealing worst-case complexities. This lead many researchers to 
devise increasingly weak, and thus increasingly useless, logics to express concepts' 
definitions. SemNet did not make the same choices. This section attempts to show 
the average complexity of downwards classification. 
A l l the results of 6.7 (p. 193) were near-linear in terms of the number of concepts 
they explored. This section attempts to show what to expect this number to be in 
the average case. 
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Again i t should be stressed that the complexity of subsumption has not been in-
vestigated. However the use of subsumption is minimised in LOLITA to testing 
possible implicit ancestors, descendents of the ancestor search space determined by 
upwards integration above the black node. 
C.2.1 A model 
C.2.1.1 The virtual inheritance lattice 
The graph S is formed from SemNet's inheritance hierarchy. For simplicity, £'s 
only edges will correspond to the set relations (spec, and inst_) of the hierarchy: 
the edges are directed and labelless. S thus expresses all the structure of LOLITA's 
inheritance hierarchy. The relations "child", "descendent", and so on, when apphed 
to S correspond to the meanings they have for SemNet's inheritance hierarchy. 
5 is a subgraph of the ful l possible inheritance hierarchy. The full possible inher-
itance hierarchy is a lattice since every concept has a most specific subsumer (the 
orange node) and a most general subsumee. To see this, recall that each definitional 
event (or action.) defines a concept and every concept can be expressed purely 
as the intersection of these definitional events. S is the explicit hierarchy and only 
expresses part of this lattice V, the virtual hierarchy. 
The difference between S and V falls into two categories: 
• The vertices of V which have no instantiations in S because they have no 
descendents occurring in E. For instance, LOLITA may know of no "hungry 
peasants". 
• The vertices of V which have do not have instantiations in £ because there is 
no information about them, although they do have descendents in 6. For in-
stance, LOLITA might know that "every small French tractor is reliable" but 
nothing about small tractors, an implicit ancestor of small French tractors. 
Vertices of the second kind will be called dummy vertices. In essence they are 
compressed out of the explicit hierarchy, resulting in arcs between non-subsequent 
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layers of the graph. This contrasts with lattices, where each generation (layer at 
depth d from the root) is connected only to the next (layer at depth d-\-l from the 
root). For instance if a node is connected to its parent and its grandparent, it is 
expressed in the lattice as a vertex connected to its parent and a dummy vertex. 
The dummy vertex is connected to the vertex's grandparent. 
V less vertices of the first kind forms I , the implicit inheritance lattice. Thus 
S = compress ( I ) , where compress is a simple compression function. 
C.2,1.2 Lattice Properties 
A lattice can be usefully described by 3 values: 
• c: The average number of children each vertex with children has. 
• p: The average number of parents each vertex with parents has. 
• d: The depth of the lattice. 
From these values the number nodes in a balanced partial lattice such as I can be 
derived. A lattice has layers. Consider the gap between two layers: every vertex 
of the higher level has c children, whereas every vertex of the lower layer has p 
parents. Overall there are c * children edges for the layer This is equal 
to the number of parents in the next layer Cn+i since vertices have parents only of 
the previous layer, and children of the next. This makes p* \Cn+i\ = c * |£„ | so, 
each new layer has ^ more nodes than the previous layer. Since the lattice has a 
root node (typeless), the total number of nodes is: 
_ 1-(J) 
d+1 
^ ^ 1 _ c 
This could have also been derived more directly: in the whole lattice, there are as 
many arcs from vertices to their children as their are from vertices to their parents: 
c - (^^y^ = p {N - 1). The N - (^^Y portion of the formula comes from the 
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fact that there are nodes without children, and the A'' — 1 portion comes from 
the fact the root node (typeless) has no parents. We obtain A'^  = ''J_p ^ which 
is equivalent to the above result. 
The formula for N gives the following for d: 
In (l + ^ N - N ) 
ln[c) — ln{p) 
C.2.1.3 Assumptions about compression of £ 
The previous section determined the number of nodes in the lattice from c, p and 
d. The corresponding N, c and p are known for any knowledge base expressed in 
SemNet, but Nj^N,c^c, p ^ p since £ is not a lattice. This section relates the 
values of £ with those of J, which is a partial lattice. 
Since £ — compress{I), some assumptions must be made about compress. Com-
pression cannot remove the elements of I about which something is being said: 
the set of concepts O connected to observational events (or arcs). I t might seem 
that removing all other concepts would result in better compression. However, this 
need not be the case, since removing them would require moving their restrictions 
down to the concepts about which something is said. This duphcation of restriction 
information (and of the set relations connecting the restrictions to their templates) 
often outweighs the compression benefit. As a result, the compression assumed 
here will emphasise sharing restrictions common to more than one concept of O 
where the restrictions cannot be inherited from an ancestor of O. This sharing 
will occur on nodes of £ not in O. Such nodes C correspond to the vertices of J 
which have more than one child in 0 or in C and which are themselves not in O. 
£ = OUC 
This might be sub-optimal in some cases, but more powerful schemes reduce shar-
ing in some cases, resulting in a degradation of the inheritance hierarchy, and a 
decrease in topological determinism of some algorithms: upwards integration, for 
instance, must search downwards to test the black node's ancestors' descendents for 
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subsumption with the black node. The more restrictions shared between different 
children of a concept are expressed on a shared child, the fewer subsumption tests 
need be made. 
Because only those vertices of X which neither have more than one child in C nor are 
qualified by an observational event are compressed out of ^, their number can be 
calculated from SemNet. Every vertex of J corresponds either to the intersection 
of restricted concepts or to the restriction of a concept. Take the vertices of X 
corresponding to the restriction of a concept, not in E: there are as many of these 
concepts as there are uninherited definitional restrictions on a node of SemNet, 
excluding those on nodes which have only one definitional restriction, and which 
are not definitional intersections of concepts. Call such restrictions I-restrictions. 
Consider now the vertices of X corresponding to intersections of restricted concepts: 
if they are in J , they have descendents in O since X contains only vertices that 
are in O or have descendents in O. There are E^=2 ^ such intersections above a 
concept with r I-restrictions. Since ~^ ^) ^ < ° ° ^'^^ ^ n\ positive, 
this sum is smaller than (e - 1) * r!. The total, including the key nodes, makes 
r - I - (e — 1) * r! vertices in X for each node of E with r I-restrictions. 
Calculating this is useful, since the number of nodes of the lattice X corresponding 
to E (some instance of SemNet) can be calculated. In particular if SemNet has 
nodes, restricted by at most r% I-restrictions, then N <{R-V 1)N, where N is the 
number of nodes of I , and R = ri + {e — 1) * ri\. 
c ^ c, for c the average number of children a node with children has, since the R 
new nodes for each node of X with respect to E must have children and parents. 
Al l new R nodes introduce En=I'(n ' - n) = ^'{ri+i){2ri+i) _ children arcs. 
Since there R such nodes, the average is ri{ri+i){2ri+Vi-3ri{ri+i) _ Q^^^^^^ ^^lere are 
RN such new nodes with ri{ri+i){2ri+V)-3ri{ri+i) children on average, and nodes 
with c children on average. Hence, 
^ 1 , (rzjn + l ) ( 2 n + 1) - 3ri{ri + 1) ^ \ 
{R + 1)N \ 6R J 
1 frijri + l ) ( 2 n + 1) - 3ri{ri + 1) \ 
{R + l) V 6 
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Similarly, p ^ p, for p the average number of parents a node with children has. As 
there are as many parent arcs as there are new children arcs, since all of the new 
RN nodes have children (recall they all are ancestors of nodes in O), the formula 
is much the same: 
1 (ri{ri + l){2ri + 1) - 3H(H -\-1) ' 
(it; + i ) V 6 
N is replaced by A?^  — 1 since the root node has no parents. 
C.2.1.4 The resulting model 
1 shall be assumed a balanced lattice. This need not be the case, as SemNet need 
not contain equal amounts of information about everything. However if LOLITA 
is to be used within certain domains, i t is not a great assumption to make that 
most of SemNet will be devoted to information in these domains. That information 
would be expected to result in a lattice since LOLITA organises similar information 
topologically close. Thus, even if all of I is not balanced, in large-scale applica-
tions, one can expect most of i t to be. The results derived from making such an 
assumption should not be far wrong. Although only experience will tell, at this 
point i t makes sense to determine the complexity (and hence whether semantic 
integration is worth further developing, or whether it should be seen as a nail in 
SemNet's coffin) making this assumption. 
I has the values c, p, and iV determined above, and since J is assumed balanced. 
It has: d = 
C.2.2 Downwards Integration 
C.2.2.1 The model 
Downwards integration in LOLITA involves searching for all descendents of the red 
nodes, and finding those that are descendents of all red nodes. Since in SemNet, 
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c > p, this search space looks exponential in the worst case. However, ways of 
taming the worst case were investigated in 6.7.3 (p. 231), so what is of interest is 
the expected average complexity. 
Instead of considering the descendents of all red nodes, only the descendent of one 
red node will be considered. Having determined the complexity Cd of determining 
the descendents of one red node, the total complexity is bounded RnCd where Rn is 
the number of red nodes. A pessimist can choose Rn to be the number of maximal 
number of red nodes of any node in SemNet. Choosing R^ to be the average 
number is probably more realistic since RnCd is pessimistic: i t assumes the worst 
case where none of the red nodes share any common descendent. The algorithm 
only traverses any piece of the network once, so if the red nodes share a common 
descendent, fewer nodes will be traversed. 
I t will be assumed that any vertex of X stands an equal chance of being a red node. 
This is an approximation, due to the fact calculations are being performed on I 
rather than £, and that the shape of £ is unknown. In essence it means any node 
of I has an equal chance of being in any given instantiation of 5. I t may seem 
strange that nodes with no children may be considered red nodes, but they model 
well the behaviour of instances: instances in £ have no children, so no search will 
be performed. Similarly, the vertices of X without children have no children, so no 
search downwards can be performed. 
Thus the question is what, on average, is the number of vertices below a vertex of 
I . The expected value is simply the sum for each vertex of X of the probability of 
that vertex times the number of vertices below it . The probability of a vertex is 
simply the likelihood it is chosen at random from all others of X. The calculation 
is simpler i f all vertices of a particular layer of the lattice are considered together: 
k is the layer, pk is the probability of that layer, and Ck is the number of vertices 
below i t : 
Pk corresponds to the proportion of the vertices of X that are in layer since all 
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nodes of X have equal chance of being chosen: 
Pk = S^d I c 
^n=0 
Cfc is the number of vertices below a node of layer k: 
d-k 
Cfe = XI -
n=0 \P/ 
Thus the expected number of nodes below is 
fc=0 
M *v -d E 
k=0 
d-k /gxn 
Sn=0 ( I 
=0 \P, n=0 
C.2.2.2 The derivation 
Deriving a simple form for is a Uttle long... 
E = 
d 
E 
fc=o 
d-k 
E 
n=0 .P^ 
1 - c 
p 
) 
1 - c 
p 
fc=o 1 \ p ) * ^ 0 V P . 
E 
1 -
E 
fc=o 
E 
1 
.p) *su 
- \ d-Jt+l^ 
E 
fe=0 .Pj KPJ 
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1 
d+i 
1 
d+i 
1 
d+\ * < 
to I \P 
E -
fc=0 \ P ) 
» - (I) 
- ' d / - \ '^+1' 
d+\ 
1 - 1 
- ^ 1 -
VP> 
d+1 
1 - 1 
p -d- (I) 
d+1 
,d+l 
p - C 
P 
p — c 
p 
p — c 
V 
d+1 
l - ( l ) 
r ( | - l ) ^ + l 
p — c 
P 
z + d+^ 
p 
d 
p 
d 
l + -^\+d 
p - c \ N 
d - P 
d 
N appears above, when i t is substituted for an equation equivalent to its definition: 
. Pj \PJ 
C.2.2.3 Conclusion 
Surprisingly, downward integration on average requires 
P d 
. 1 + 
~c-p \ N, 
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steps for each red node. Since the typical number of red nodes is bounded, at 
worst i t only multiplies the above number of steps by a constant: i f no intersection 
between any of the red node's descendents is found ^. Since 0{d)^0{c.lnN) for c, 
some constant, the overall cost of downwards integration is less that 0{ln{N)). Now 
iV < (i? + 1)N, so the order is less than 0{ln[N{R + l ) ) )=0(/n( i? + 1) + ln{N))f^ 
0(ln{N)) since -R is a constant. In other words, the average time complexity of 
downwards integration in LOLITA has been shown to be less than logarithmic in 
the size of the knowledge base. 
This is a good result, and together with the real time integration methods developed 
in 6.7.3 (p. 231), a hybrid method can be considered to achieve good average 
runtime (without the overhead of real time integration for most concepts), yet 
avoiding the worst case by using real time integration. Such work resides beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but clearly, the cost of semantic integration downwards is 
not a flaw in SemNet's foundations. 
3 The search space below shared descendents is only traversed once by the downwards integra-
tion algorithm, so this is a worst case 
Appendix D 
Extended Representation: 
Detailed Issues 
For SemNet's representation to express the content of natural language texts, 
its richness must be further enhanced. This appendix demonstrates the in-
crease in richness of the extended representation, and includes motivations 
for its design. 
D . l Values 
This section motivates the design of the values representation and demonstrates 
its richness. 
D.1.1 Representation Design and Basic Richness 
D . l . 1.1 Assumptions 
In its most abstract form, some phenomenon is being mapped to some notion of 
intensity. The phenomenon itself, be i t weight, size of a set or niceness must have 
various properties for i t to be captured by this notion of intensity. This idea of 
intensity encapsulates the notion of a total order, for which each value can be 
described as greater or smaller than any other. 
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Many of the phenomena to be described can display variations over a possibly 
continuous range of states. The values representation must be able to specify 
uniquely any particular state i f required. This can be done using a mapping from 
the state of the phenomenon to a value. The range of the mapping is the ful l range 
of states the phenomenon can display, and its domain constitutes the value type: 
all the values associated with a particular phenomenon constitute a value type. 
The mapping will be assumed to be a bijection: each state must be represented 
uniquely by a value. The transitions of the phenomenon's state are mirrored by 
transitions in the corresponding values. One would like the values to vary continu-
ously when reflecting the phenomenon's continuous transitions of states - i f indeed 
the phenomenon involves such transitions. This reflects the notion that intensity 
encapsulates the notion of total order in a meaningful way: the total order reflects 
some aspect of the phenomenon, in particular the intensity of its states. This con-
dition on the mapping function has the consequence that independent degrees of 
freedom must be expressed by different value types. 
A degree of freedom corresponds to an independent variable used in an equation 
to model a phenomena's behaviour. In essence, each value type used to describe 
the phenomenon plays the same role as an independent variable. The mapping 
corresponds to the equation. For instance one might wish to describe the state 
of a (monochrome) light. This can be described in terms of its intensity and its 
colour. There are two degrees of freedom involved here, since one can vary the 
intensity and the colour of the light independently. Therefore two value types 
should be used. I f only one were used, not only would this notion of independence 
of the two quantities be lost, but also if the bijective nature of the mapping were 
maintained, the continuous variation of either quantity could not be translated into 
the continuous variation of the corresponding value type. 
D.1.1.2 Design 
To start the ball rolling, things that are well known will be considered first: quan-
tifiable values are represented as numbers. As required, a total order can be defined 
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on numbers, and as their extensive use in the sciences demonstrates, they are suit-
able for modeling the intensity of many phenomena. 
• Numerical values 
Consider first the counting of discrete entities. This corresponds to normal scalars: 
numbers. Internal addition and multiplication operators are defined for this type 
of value. These correspond directly to addition and multiplication for any two 
numbers. In general this value type is used whenever numbers need to be referred 
to independently of any unit. 
For simplicity, this value type is assumed to be the set of positive real numbers (here 
denoted by R"*"). This corresponds to the fact that people can refer to concepts 
such as fractions or even irrational transcendentals such as TT which are real. Not 
all forms of numbers have been included though, since i t seems unlikely that the 
extension of the set of real numbers to include infinitely small and infinitely large 
numbers is of interest to any but specialized number theorists. The choice of 
positive real values as most basic form in no way is limitative, and allows the 
construction of negative numbers i f needed. Not including them in the basic value 
form will be shown to simplify the treatment of all values in the long run. I t also 
corresponds to the intuition that negative numbers are an abstraction and that one 
cannot count a negative number of entities, such as sheep. 
The purpose is not to define real numbers formally as is done in number theory, 
starting from natural numbers built with the successor function and zero, and 
building from this the set of integers, of rational numbers and finally of real num-
bers. Instead, an external definition is assumed. Thus the set of all quantifiable 
values is simply defined by a "real number" event, i t in turn defined by the "real 
number" action which is not defined in the network. 
Addition and multiplication are not defined within the semantic net. The behaviour 
they must be associated with is to be implemented by the reasoning algorithms us-
ing them. Defining them in the semantic net would be inefficient to the extreme, 
and would require very complex definitions, which is unnecessary for an NLE sys-
tem. 
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Since they have been defined to correspond to addition and multiplication, the addi-
tion and multiplication operators can be used to define useful values. In particular 
they can be used to define zero, one, infinity and negative numbers. 
o Expressing order 
I t is often necessary to express a order relation corresponding to the intensity one 
value being higher than another. For instance, "John owns more chicken than 
Giles". This relation could be represented by a separate ">" relation. However, 
such a relation breaks uniqueness since i t is possible to express the relation in 
terms of a < 6 = 35 G V.a 4- (5 = 6 as long as all elements of V are positive. Since 
expressions of this form may occur in order to define, say, the variance in chicken 
owned by farmers in Essex, i t is useful for them also to be recognised as expressing 
order, which would not happen if an independent order relation were used. 
o Defining useful values 
There are two values of R"*" which have a distinctive behaviour when involved in 
an addition: 0 and infinity. Since addition is defined outside the network, i t can be 
used to define them: Vt; G -I- 0 = is used to define 0, and Vw G Vt; -I- co = oo 
defines CXD . Similarly, one value has a distinctive behaviour with respect to multi-
plication: 1. I t can be defined hy ^Vv *\ •= v} 
Once 0 has been defined, it can be used to define the set of positive real numbers not 
including i t (here denoted by Rg ) using an absence of occurrence synonym. I t can 
also be used to define the set of negative numbers R~: Vp GR"*" 3m G R ~ . p -I- m = 0. 
The ful l set R can be expressed with these two sets using an exclusively ored syn-
onym: 
{Ea,R): {AF-subject_-FO: V; AV-subject . - / A 0; AV-action_-/0: 0; 
AF-object--FO: V} 
{E^,R): {OF-subject_-FA: R+; AV-action_-/0: real_posi t ive} 
{E2,R): {AFV-subject--FA: R j ; AW-subject_-/0: 0; AW-action_-/0: synonym.} 
{Ez,R): {AF-subject_-FO: £ '2; AV-action_-/0: size_; AV-object_-/0: 0} 
V^u € Vu * a = a applies both to a = 0 assuming v ^ 00, and to a = 00 assuming v ^0 
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{Ei,R): {AF-subject_-FO: R+; AF-subject_-FA: R"; AV-action_-JO: ©; 
AV-object_-/0: 0} 
{E5,H): {AV-subject--3!0: IR^; AF-subject--FA: R; 
AV-action_-/0: synonym.} 
iE6,Hy. {AV-subject_-3!0: R - ; AF-subject_-FA: R; 
AV-action_-/0: synonym-} 
iEr,Ry. { AF-subject_-FO: [E5, EQ]; AV-action_-/0: xor_} 
where V is the set of all values, and R+ and R~ are definitional spec_s of V. 
o Internal and external operators 
Two terms that will appear often throughout this section are "internal" and "exter-
nal" operators. Internal operators correspond to those whose arguments and result 
belong to the same set. Some (but not all) of an external operator's arguments 
have a different value-type than its result. For instance an external multiplication 
operator could have as one argument a number, and another as a temperature, 
with as result a temperature. 
o Representing the Addition and Multiplication operators 
Internal addition and multiplication are represented by two special actions © and 
(8> respectively. External multiplication is represented by the action 0 . An addition 
event corresponds t o j ^ ^ n = 0 where s„ are all the partial subject_s of the event, 
and 0 is its ob j ec t - A multiplication event corresponds to n s„ = o where again 
Sn are all the partial subject_s of the event, and 0 is its object-. 
o Expressing numerical values 
Once the values 0 and 1 have been defined, i t is possible to use the fact that the 
addition operator states that its object- is the sum of all its partial subject_s. 
For instance, an addition event which has the value 1 as both its subject-S defines 
its object- as the value 2. This scheme can be extended to the number 10. Then 
using a combination of multiplication and addition, any value can be expressed. 
For instance 0.5 would be expressed as the value which when multiplied by 10 
is 5. Since 0.5 = | = ^ = uniqueness is lost. However this is an unavoidable 
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property of numbers themselves. I f uniqueness is of paramount importance i t is 
possible to require all numbers to be normalized to their simplest form. However 
this is not always advisable. For instance 0.500 can be used to state that the error 
on the value is of the order 10"'', and has a different meaning to 0.5. In the net 
the first could be expressed as whereas the second could be expressed as ^ . 
Alternatively both could be expressed as | and the error expressed explicitly. The 
merits of these options depend on the type of value being considered, so cannot be 
determined for all values. 
In addition to the values defined in this way, some values such as TT whose numerical 
value cannot be defined explicitly in the net can be defined by their names, or by 
their properties. 
• Unquantified values 
Quantifiable value types have been presented as numbers. I t was argued in 7.1.2 
(p. 248) that i t is unnatural to represent unquantifiable value types as numbers, 
so they should not be represented in this way. However, i t was also argued that as 
similar a representation should be adopted for both kinds of value types: both are 
used in a very similar way. How can such a circle be squared? 
The difficulty lies in the fact the representation of unquantified value types wishes 
to preserve some of the properties of numbers, but not all. The question to ask is 
therefore which properties are not wanted and which are. 
By definition, unquantifiable values must stay unquantifiable. However, as estab-
lished previously all values must have a total order. Moreover, even if unquan-
tifiable value types do not have definite numbers assigned to them, one can talk 
about multiples of them: "John is twice as happy as Mary" and "John is twice as 
tall as Mary" share the same structure. I t is desirable to express them in the same 
way, without for that matter requiring them to share each other's properties. Even 
addition between unquantifiable value types appears possible "John is nicer than 
the rest of us put together". 
For values expressed numerically, i t was established that the total order could 
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be expressed in terms of the addition operator in order to preserve uniqueness: 
a<b = a + S = b. One would lilce to express total order in the same way for 
unquantifiable value types. Thus, an internal addition operation is postulated for 
unquantifiable value types. 
One also wants to represent notions such as "John is twice as happy as Mary", 
which involve one undefined value expressed as the multiplication of another by 
a scalar. This corresponds to an external multiplication operator: i t takes an 
argument from the set of scalars, in this case real numbers, and a value of the 
unquantifiable value type, and returns another such value. I t should be noticed 
that the multiplication is not internal, so strange concepts such as the intensity of 
happiness squared do not appear. 
For values expressed numerically, i t was shown that for any number to be defined 
internally in the net, all that was needed was the number one. Moreover it was 
shown that this value could be uniquely defined by internal multiplication. Since 
values of the unquantifiable kind cannot be associated with a number in any way, 
internal multiplication cannot be used with them. 
The internal operation of addition also allows two values to be defined: zero and 
infinity. However, these cannot be used to express all other values numerically. At 
worst, they can be used to express the limits of the range of the unquantified value 
type corresponding to the range of states a phenomenon can display. Assigning a 
zero value to unquantifiable value types could make sense in certain cases: "John 
is not angry" could be understood as implying that the intensity of John's anger 
is nil.2. 
o Relating Unquantifiable values to Quantifiable values 
Unquantifiable value types have an internal notion of addition, and an external 
notion of multiplication. They therefore appear to correspond to numerical val-
'•^ This would be the case in particular if a model of human emotions assiuned that all humans 
have some values expressing their emotional state at all times: the traditional form of negation 
by non-existence could not be applied since it would contradict the model in saying that John 
has no anger value at a particular time although all humans have an anger value at all times. See 
7.3.2 (p. 267) 
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ues which are unknown. For instance, "John is twice as nice as Mary" would be 
expressed in the network as the niceness value associated with John x and the nice-
ness value associated with Mary y are in the relation x = 2*y. Since no unit value 
can be defined internally without multiplication, all values of the unquantifiable 
type cannot be associated to any particular numerical value. In this sense there 
is no difference between unquantifiable values and variables which cannot have a 
number substituted for them. Exactly what is contained by the variables is of no 
concern. Thus i t is possible for them to contain real numbers. 
What the numbers are is not known, except that they must be positive: i f they 
could be negative, it would be impossible to establish an order, since this is ex-
pressed hy a < b = 35 E Va + 6 = b, but this equivalence is only if V only contains 
positive values. Similarly, "John is twice as nice as Mary" should not be under-
stood as "Mary is nicer than John", which would be the interpretation if Mary's 
niceness was negative. This applies for notions one might think of expressing by 
a negative value too: "Today is twice as cold as yesterday" should not be under-
stood as "Today was less cold than yesterday", which would be the interpretation 
if coldness was expressed as a negative value. Hence, the requirement for values to 
be by default positive values. 
Only allowing positive real numbers to correspond to the states of the phenomenon 
is in no way limiting, since any range of states can be mapped bijectively to the 
set of real positive numbers. Not only does i t capture the behaviour of natural 
language, but i t also corresponds intuitively to the notion that negative numbers 
are an additional abstract construction having more to do with the notion of lack 
or absence than to do with the presence of some sensation/perception, which is the 
usual thing unquantified values are used for. Finally it allows the same algorithms 
to work with quantified values as unquantified ones without special treatment for 
unquantified values. 
• Quantified values involving units 
Quantified values which must be expressed in terms of units sit between numeri-
cal values and unquantifiable values: although they can be expressed in terms of 
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numerical values, this depends on the choice of a unit, and for each phenomenon 
there are many possible choices of unit. No unit is more natural in general than any 
other. Just as was the case for knowledge 2.6 (p. 15), the choice of most natural 
unit depends on the problem being considered. 
The representation must allow values to be expressed in terms of more than one 
unit. At its most basic, the requirement is that an NLE system should allow 
statements such as "John believes 32°F to be 0°C" to be represented. However 
this point has deeper implications. In many cases conversions from one unit to 
another are very complicated. For instance, the Romans divided the day into 10 
hours of sunlight. This was useful since i t allowed them to use sundials. However, 
converting that representation of time into our current 24 hour system requires 
more knowledge than may actually be available: the time of year, the latitude 
of the place where the time was determined, the position of the earth in the solar 
system. Such conversion is unnatural at the very least, and completely unnecessary. 
In general, units of are used very loosely, and conversion leads to a more precise 
meaning than that originally intended: "He weighs 80 kgs" does not mean "He 
weighs 80000 g", and "The house is 100 yards to your left" does not mean "The 
house is 91.44 fnetres to your left". 
Representing statements in their original unit allows values associated with non-
literal behaviour to be detected, and their normal loose value to be simulated: In 
general, 5,10 and its multiples of 10 and so on may be used more loosely than others 
such as 7. But this also depends on the unit being used, and whether one can easily 
express the same value in terms of another unit: 15 minutes is more precise than | 
of an hour, similarly 60 minutes is more precise than an hour, but | of an hour is not 
used so 20 minutes is vaguer than either 15 or 30 minutes. Terms used in a looser 
way are given a non-literal control to ensure that reasoning algorithms do not take 
them too literally, and send them off to be interpreted by the relevant non-literal 
interpretation algorithm, so that the resulting interpretation can be used. 
Just as for unquantifiable values, internal addition is used to express total ordering 
of values which can be numerically expressed in terms of some unit. Also, as for 
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unquantifiable values, there is no internal multiplication since i t would allow the 
value 1 to be defined independently from any unit. This would indicate that there 
is a natural unit for the value type, which contradicts the idea that units are an 
artificial notion mapped upon a continuum^. This also means that units are not 
defined internally to be equal to one, but are defined purely externally. 
o Units for values having an agreed zero point 
Some value types have an agreed zero value. For instance distance, duration, 
velocity and weight have an agreed zero value. Whatever the unit chosen for each, 
if the value has a zero value in one unit i t will have a zero in all others. These value 
types usually are those for which a zero point is directly perceivable using human 
senses. Other value types do not have an agreed zero value. For instance, the units 
for temperature diff"er: 0°C = 32°F = 273.15°K. Another example is time, where 
a date in the Gregorian Calendar differs from one in the Jewish or the Muslim one. 
As units that have an agreed zero point are easier, they shall be considered first. 
Units of a value type are special values of the type which are defined exter-
nally to the network. For instance, a metre is a unit of the distance type, and 
i t is defined externally to the network, in this case simply by the word "me-
tre". By using external multiplication, the unit can be multipfied by a scalar 
to express numerically the number of units any value of its type corresponds to: 
{E,R): { A/ -subjec t - - /0 : [ l metre,5]; A/-act ion_-/0: 0; A7-object_-/A: v} 
states that w is 5 metres, v can also have its numerical value determined in terms 
of other units too such as yards. 
If a value type has an agreed zero point, this point can be expressed using internal 
addition: G V'.v + 0 = v. The correspondence of this point with the unit value 
zero can be made explicit as follows 
{Ei,Ry. { A/-subject_- /0: [ l metre,0]; A/-act ion_-/0: 0; A/-object_- /0: x } 
{E2,Ry. { AV-subject--/A: x; AF-subject--FO: V ; AV-action_-/0: 0; 
AF-object--FO: V '} 
^Having a defined method of determining the number of units, such as using a ruler, does not 
change the fact that the unit itself is not intrinsic to the phenomenon being measured. 
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where x is the zero value for that particular value type V . 
o Units for values without an agreed zero point 
Units for values without an agreed zero point are a little more complex: the notion 
of unit here refers not only to the interval between two values required for them to 
be separated by a unit, but also to the starting value from which these units are 
counted. For instance, centigrade and kelvin differ in their starting points, or zero 
points, but not in the interval between two temperatures corresponding to a unit. 
The value of a value type expressed in a particular unit depends therefore not only 
on the interval corresponding to the unit, but also to its zero point. In general, a 
value V corresponds to n units u when v — z = n*u where z is the zero value. The 
case for units with an agreed zero point is special in that z = Q. 
For these values to be expressed, the formula v — z = n * u must be expressed 
literally. Thus to state that the temperature t is 25°C, the following representation 
is needed: 
{Ei,R): { A/-subject_- /0: [1°C,25]; A/-act ion_-/0: 0 ; A/ -ob jec t . - /A : t' } 
{E2,R): { A/-subject_-/0: [0°C, t']\ A/-act ion_-/0: ®; A/-object_- /0 : t } 
This is the general form of unit expression. If a new unknown form of unit must be 
dealt with, it will be assigned its own "0-point-unit" and "1-unit" values. These 
can then be equated with the corresponding values in other unit scales if LOLITA 
comes to learn the equivalences. If the "0-unit" turns out eventually to be the 
agreed zero point of the value type, all the additional ® events can be pruned. 
The "0-point-unit" corresponds to a point of the scale, and does not necessar-
ily correspond to a value equal to zero. In particular, multiplying the "0-point-
unit" by a scalar will not result in the "0-point-unit". Similarly, the "1-unit" 
corresponds to an interval, a difference between two values, and not to the value 
"0-point-unit+1-unit". 
Units are an additional artificial external mapping on top of what is essentially 
an uncountable quantity. This means for instance that when someone says that 
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i t is twice as hot today as i t was yesterday, i t does not mean that i f i t was 10°C 
yesterday, today i t is 20°C. I t depends on the zero point he implicitly took when 
he made the statement. In general, i f a value type has an agreed zero point, it will 
usually be taken as the zero point of any statement. But in other cases the scale 
must be determined from the context. 
o Defining units in terms of others 
In some cases a unit corresponds to the product of two others. This is allowed 
since i t corresponds to external multiplication. Thus, the concepts of square and 
cubic metres are expressed in terms of the unit one metre: each of these correspond 
to a different value type. Relations between different units of the same value type 
are also possible, such as 1 metre is 100 cm. However, such conversions are only 
performed on literal uses of the term metre. 
D.1.1.3 Phenomena's ranges 
In the abstract design (D.1.1.1 (p. D-2)), i t was stated that "The range of the 
mapping is the ful l range of states the phenomenon can display, and its domain 
constitutes the value type: all the values associated with a particular phenomenon 
constitute a value type." This impHes that unquantified values may only make 
sense within a certain range of values. In particular this poses the problem of 
what should be done, say when a value is defined to be ten times the maximum 
bound of the range: is this meaningless? The short answer is yes. I f a value is 
greater or smaller than that which can be mapped to and from the phenomenon 
i t is representing, then i t is no longer describing the phenomenon. For instance 
if the sensation of heat is considered, one cannot discuss fiterally the sensation of 
heat experienced by a person when he touches the surface of the sun, since no such 
sensation exists. 
Another problem lies at the smaller bound of a value type's range. For addition to 
express ordering, the range's lower bound must at least be the smallest difference 
between any two unequal values: if a and h are very close, t must still be within the 
value's type range for an order to be expressible in the semantic net since addition 
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is internal. 
D.1.2 Network realization 
D.1.2.1 Basic design 
The value scheme is implemented as described above, with the ©, (S> and © events. 
The "real number" event required to restrict values to positive real values has as 
action rea l -pos i t ive . These 4 events suffice to express all relations between 
values. However for values to be useful, a fourth event is required: has-value. 
This associates a concept with a value, corresponding to the state in which the 
concept is. 
has_value is the general form of associating a concept with a value. It takes the 
concept as subject-, and the value as object-. Because each concept may be 
associated with many different values, each expressing an independent aspect of 
its state, the has-value event has many specializations. Each expresses state in 
terms of a different phenomenon. For instance, the degrees of belief and certainty 
an agent accords a statement are two such phenomena, as are the amplitude, tone 
and timbre of a musical instrument. Each specialization enforces typing on the 
value which expresses the state of the phenomenon it represents, thereby ensuring 
different value types are not confused. 
The set of all possible values is a restriction of typeless, defined by ®, the internal 
form of addition. Values are therefore anything which obeys a total order. This 
fits in with the notion that they correspond to gradation. A subset of this is 
the set of real numbers R"*", defined by rea l -pos i t ive . Another is the set of 
values which have internal multiplication: the set of numeral- which is defined 
by ®. R"*" has two subsets countable- and uncountable- which are antonyms 
with respect to i t . countable is defined as the intersection of R"*" and numeral-, 
whereas uncountable- is defined by being the antonym of countable. Finally, 0 , 
the external form of multiplication is defined as having one subject- and object-
arc with uncountable- targets, and more than one subject- of values- type. 
Appendix D: Extended Representation: Detailed Issues D-14 
iEo,Ry. (Q|3! |F-subject- - |V|VFA: Vpr, AW-act ion_-/0: ®; 
0 [ V V j - o b j e c t _ - ^ A : V} 
{Ei,Ry. {A |3 ! | - sub j ec t - - |VW|0 : V-p'] AV-subject_-3!0: V; 
AV-action_-/0: synonym_} 
{E2,R): {OF-subject_-FA: R + ; AV-action_-/0: real_posi t ive} 
{E3,R): { 0 1 3 ! IF - sub j ec t - -1V |VFA: numeral.p/; AW-act ion_-/0: (8»; 
{E,,R): 
0 Wj-object_-3!A: numeral} 
{ A | 3 ! | - sub1ect - - |VW|0: numeralp/; AV-object_-3!0: numeral.; 
A / - ac t i on_ - /0 : synonym_} 
{E5,R): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : countable-; A / - sub j ec t_ - /A : uncountable.; 
A / - ac t i on_ - /0 : antonym_; A/ -ob jec t_ - /0 : R " ^ } 
{Ee,R): {0[VVj-subject_-[3!jO: uncountable-; 0 [3 ! jF - sub jec t - - [ ^VFA: Vpn; 
AW-act ion_- /0 : 0 ; 0 [VVj-ob jec t - - | j ! jO : uncountable'-} 
(£^7, R)- {A|g! | -sub1ect- - |VW|0: VT>"; AV-subject--3!0: V; 
AV-action_-/0: synonym-} 
where V is the set of values; Vp' and Vp" are different subsets of the power-
set of values; numeral- and R"*" are definitional spec-S of V; countable- and 
uncountable- are definitional spec-S of R"*"; and countable- is also a definitional 
spec- of numeral-. 
The way in which values are organized in the inheritance hierarchy allows new 
number sets, such as positive and negative real numbers ( R ) or complex numbers 
to be defined as subsets of numeral- i f required, as they are entities with internal 
multiplication. Moreover i t defines unquantifiable values as those for which no 
internal multiplication exists, since only internal multiplication can assign numbers 
to values. 
The ©, 0 and 0 events also can have specialized forms for particular value types. 
This allows the type checking mechanism to test whether different value types are 
being confused. For instance a © event with subject-S of value types "distance" 
and "temperature" is meaningless. 
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D.1.3 The use of values 
D. 1.3.1 Set Cardinality 
• Size 
The size- event specifies the cardinality of the set which is its subject-. I t is a 
specialization of the generic has-value event. I t takes as object- a positive inte-
ger, of the set IN which is defined by: 
iEo,R): {AF-subject_-FO: [Ei, E2]; AV-action--/0: xor-} 
{Ei,Hy. {AF-subjec t - -FA: M; AV-subject--/0: 1; 
AV-action_-/0: 0 ; AV-object--3!0: IN ' } 
{E2,H): {AF-subjec t - -FA: IN; AV-action--/0: synonym_; AV-object-- /0: 0 } 
{E3,R): {A / - sub j ec t - - / 0 : I I ; A/-subject- - /A: H ' ; AV-action_-/0: synonym-} 
(F4,i?): {A / - sub j ec t - - / 0 : IR; A/-action--70: speC-; A/-objec t - - /A: IN } 
This states that every number n of IN is either a successor of some other number 
m of IN (n = m -h 1) or is zero. I t also states the N is a subset of R. N and IN' 
are used to allow quantification to refer to different elements of the same set. 
The size- event can be used either to restrict a set to a certain size, or to define 
the size a set has. This can be used to state that a set ^'s subset B represents a 
very small portion of it^: 
{Eo,R) 
{EuR) 
iE2,R) 
{Es,R) 
{A/ - sub j ec t - - / 0 : A, A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : spec-; A7-object_-/A: B} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : A; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : size-; A/-object_- /A: A} 
{A/ - sub j ec t - - / 0 : B; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : size-; AJ-object_-/A: B} 
{A/ - sub j ec t - - / 0 : A; A/-subject--AO: S; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : (8>; 
A/-objec t_- /0 : B} 
Here S is defined as the set of numbers for which a subset is considered very small 
with respect to its superset. This type of information proves useful in some forms 
of reasoning such as reasoning by analogy [Long et al. 93]. More generally i t can 
also be used to state that a set is smaller that its superset, for instance to state that 
John did not eat every apple which ever existed or will ever exist in the sentence: 
"John ate some apples". 
''size- depends on the frame of existence under consideration. 
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• Averages 
The definition of the size- event allows average values to be constructed. For in-
stance, every person has a weight. Thus the set of people's weights can be defined. 
The average weight is then defined as the ratio of the sum of all the weights and 
the number of people: 
{Eo,R): {AF-subject- -FO: people; AV-action--/0: has-weight; 
AF-object_-FA: W } 
{Ei,R): {A/ -sub jec t_- /0 : people; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : size-; A/ -ob jec t - - /A: A'^ } 
{E2,R): {A/-subject--VO: W; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : ®; A/ -ob jec t - - /A: T } 
{E3,R): {A/ - sub j ec t - - /A : A; A/-subjec t - - /0 : A ;^ A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : 0 ; 
A / -ob j ec t . - / 0 : T } 
A is an average person's weight, T is the total weight of all people, and A'' is the 
number of people. 
D.1.3.2 Sensations 
Sensations can be expressed by values. The way in which they are used in natural 
language will however determine the precise ranges chosen. This section discusses 
the features of their usage which will determine the choice of representation. 
As shown by the example "Today is twice as cold as yesterday" not meaning "Today 
is less cold than yesterday", the sensation of cold is considered as a positive phe-
nomenon. The same is true for the sensation of heat. Intuitively this corresponds 
to the notion that both heat and cold can be perceived as intensities of different 
sensations, especially when dealing with their extreme forms. 
Values which express sensations are agent dependent. Thus i t is possible for Paul 
to feel hot, whereas Chris feels the same room chilly. Such values are subjective 
values, and also apply to subjective qualities such as beauty. I f John finds Mary 
beautiful, Jacob may find her ugly. These subjective notions are to be contrasted 
with objective values, such as "a pink elephant". Objective values correspond to 
those for which disagreement between two people is considered a contradiction: 
"The elephant is grey" and "the elephant is green". An agreement between agents 
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is expected: one does not say "I find that elephant grey", but one can say "/ find 
that elephant friendly". 
The two sensations can be mapped to part of the range of an indirect notion of 
external temperature. This notion of temperature is defined independently from 
the sensations of cold and heat, but with respect to phenomena identified with 
other senses (for instance the sight of frozen water). Temperature is therefore not 
directly perceived, and includes values that cannot be perceived directly such as 
absolute zero, or the temperature of the surface of the sun. 
The sensation of the agent of neither heat or cold can be mapped to a certain 
temperature: the "sensation zero point". The sensation of cold is then mapped 
to the negative side of the sensation zero point in the temperature scale, and the 
sensation of heat is mapped to the positive. The zero sensation point need not 
correspond to the temperature zero in the scale associated with any particular 
unit. Indeed since it corresponds to the temperature the agent feels neither warm 
or cold at, i t depends on each agent and the state the agent is in. For instance if the 
agent has a fever, he will feel cold at the external temperature at which he usually 
feels comfortable. The ranges of cold or heat sensation are therefore mapped to 
different intervals of the range of temperature. 
Although people's definition of concepts such as "quite hot", "hot", "very hot", 
"extremely hot" are usually defined with respect their sensation of heat, their use 
of i t may not make sense as a direct perception. For instance, one might say "the 
surface of the sun is very hot". This sentence refers to the direct sensory perception 
of heat experienced day to day, as range of experience: the meaning is the same 
as "Boiling water is very hot". But the temperature considered lies outside of this 
range of perception. Thus the ranges considered must be extended when mapped 
to the temperature range. Thus the notions of "hot", "very hot" (and so on) are 
extended to the maximal temperature, which intensionally is infinite^. 
The expression of values for certain ranges depends on the object being described. 
^Even if it may be finite according to current cosmological theories. Similarly, intensionally 
the minimal temperature could be negatively infinite, eg: a parallel universe with temperature 
-3000°C 
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For instance, a small elephant would still be expected to be bigger than an enormous 
mouse. Such concepts are relational. In some cases the object with respect to 
which the measurement is being made is stated explicitly, sometimes implicitly. 
For instance "The sun is quite a cold star" is an explicit usage, whereas "Julio is 
tall" is implicit: not only is Julio being compared with a set of people, but also he 
is being compared with the specific set of Spanish people. With respect to Dutch 
people, Julio may be rather short. The same accounts for "The coffee is cold!" and 
"/ don't like warm cola!" not implying that the coffee is colder than the cola. 
I t would be rather simple minded to assume that the sentence "John is twice as nice 
as Mary" is meant to mean that John is exactly twice as nice as Mary. For instance 
this can happen when one says "John is three times her age", and one knows that 
John is 70. LOLITA would then infer that her age must be 23| exactly. However 
this case is dealt with by considering as non-literal the usage of the concept "three 
times". 
The same observations hold for sensations which are not so obviously different. 
For instance, "This room is brighter" and "That room is twice as dark" refer to 
different intensity scales derived as the result of the partitioning of the same sense. 
Other such pairs include "quiet" and "loud", "beautiful" and "ugly", and "fast" 
and "slow". In general, the choice of scale will reflect those in language. Just as 
for heat and cold, all these scales can be combined into a unique one, stating that 
something cannot literally be quiet and loud simultaneously. 
o Objective Ranges 
o Ranges of values 
Intervals of values can be expressed using the total order relation: > or > . In the 
network, the S is expressed by referring to the sets R"*" or RQ", i f the relation is 
> or > respectively. This solution works both for quantifiable and unquantifiable 
values, since R"*" includes both types of values. 
Intervals between two values a and b {[a,b]) can be expressed using two events 
representing > . Similarly, > can be used for open intervals: ]a,b]. For instance, 
the set of adolescents would be defined by: 
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{Eo,Ry. {AF-subject_-FA: Adolescents; AV-action_-/0: has-age; 
AF-objec t - -FA: Ages } 
{Ei,R): {AF-subjec t - -FA: Ages; AV-subject--^3!A: IR^-powerset; 
AV-act ion-- /0: 0 ; AV-object_-/0: 18 } 
{E2,Ry {AV-subjec t . - /0 : 13; AV-subject--/l3!A: R+_powerset; 
AV-act ion-- /0: 0 ; AF-object - -FA: Ages } 
which defines adolescents as the subset of people whose age is in [13,18[. 
o Objective Absolute Ranges 
Determining the minimum and maximum points of an absolute range is needed for 
expressions such as "John is the tallest man I ever met". A first attempt would 
be, i f Vi is a type of positive value: 
{E3,Ry. {A/ - sub jec t - - / 0 : Vi; A/-subject- - /A: V2; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : synonym-} 
{Ei,Ry. {AV-subject--3!0: V2; AV-subject--/A: minimum-; 
AV-act ion-- /0: 0 ; AF-object--FO: Vi} 
(F5 , / ? ) : {AV-subject--3!0: V2; AF-subject . -FO: Vi ; 
AV-act ion-- /0: 0 ; AV-object-- /A: maximum-} 
In other words, minimum- is the lowest value of the range: 
Vt; 6 Vi 35 G Vi . minimum- + 6 = v 
Similarly, maximiim_ is the highest value of the range: 
G Vi 35 G Vi . f -f- 5 = meiximiim-
The problem is that 6 may not be small: minimum_-f-5 may actually be greater 
than maximum- (if maximum- < minimum_-|-minimum-). What is needed is a 5 which 
is not within Vi , corresponding to the smallest difference between any two values 
of Vi . Such a value in itself would be ridiculous, i f a concept were assumed to 
have that value. For instance a person-height of 0.2mm. However, such things 
are imaginable, if not realistic. Frames of existence (D.6.4 (p. D-83)) deal with 
precisely this distinction. Thus 5 can belong to the frame-less set of values (in this 
case the heights of people I have met - including in my dreams), while Vi is its 
subset in the real frame of existence. 
Another objection one might have, is that all values are specializations of V, which 
is defined by 0 ' s template event. Should this not mean that all value ranges must 
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include 0 and oo? However, just as one can define RQ , by stating that 0 is not in 
RQ", one can state that some value range does not include oo - so all values are 
between minimum- and maximum-. 
I f Vi can have some negative values, the 5s must all be positive. I f Vi does not 
include zero, then the statements become: 
Vu G (Vi — {minimum-}) 35 G Vi . minimum- + 6 = v 
Vf G (Vi — {maximum-}) 35 G Vi . f + 5 = meiximum-
o Subjective Values 
o Netvi^ork Realization 
Some ranges of values correspond to sensations or perceptions which depend on 
the agent which experiences them. Such values cannot be interpreted as existing 
on some absolute scale, since this would mean that i f two people disagreed about, 
say, the beauty of some object, one of them must be wrong. Instead these events 
must be interpreted with respect to the agent perceiving them. 
There are two ways the agent perceiving some value can be referred to. The 
first is when the agent is believed to experience the perception, as stated by his 
believing the value judgement. The second is when the agent communicates the 
value judgement. In this second case he need not believe i t , as shown by the 
sentence "Margaret says Susan is nasty". Other stative events taking as subject-
an agent, may relate that agent and the value judgement. For instance, "John 
pretends Susan is nasty". 
The set of stative events on which subjective value events can depend is a set of 
events with generalized action subjective_value-Connector. Since all subjective 
value events depend on a connection to the agent making the value judgement 
to have any meaning, they are defined always to be connected to such an event: 
the template of all subjective value events EQ is observed always to be associated 
with such an event (Ei). This means that i f LOLITA believes in some subjective 
value, she must also be the subject , of a stative event. This additional cost can 
be reduced by sharing the "LOLITA subjective-value-connector" event using 
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inheritance. Notice that Ei is also a template event. 
{Eo,R): {0|V|V-subject-- |3! |A: W; AW-action--JO: has-subjective.value; 
0[v]V-object - - [3!]A: V} 
{Ei,R): {0V-subject--3!A: A; AV-action--70: subjective-value-connector; 
OF-object--FFO : FQ} 
where the set of agents that can be the subject - of a subjective-value-connector 
template event is A, W is the set of things that can have some subjective value, 
and V is the set of such values. Al l the elements of EQ are observational spec-S of 
has-value. 
Although subjective-value-connector events are stative, not all stative events 
should be its descendents: this would imply that all stative events could only take 
has-subjective-value events as object-S, since the template event F i has as ob-
servational object- Fo (OF-object--FO). Thus, subjective-value.connector 
must be a superset of subsets of the relevant stative events. 
There could be more than one stative event connected to a subjective value event, 
for instance via a chain. Since stative events describe the event they are connected 
to, only the events connected directly to the subjective value event should be 
considered. I f more there are more than one such events, the subjective value 
event is shared by many agents. That is to say many agents expressed or believed 
the same value judgement. 
o Subjective Absolute Ranges 
Just as an objective value can have an absolute range, so can a subjective range. 
The subjective values are defined by the relevant event below has-subjective-value 
associated with a particular agent: From this, the minimum and maximum value 
for that agent can be defined. 
D.1.3.3 The use of values in language 
Many adjectives and adverbs are naturally expressed as values. In particular all 
those that have a comparative or superlative form, either as a single word or in a 
construction involving adverbs of intensity such as "more", can be represented using 
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values: values represent the notion of gradation adjectives and adverbs express. 
However, some nouns and verbs are also easily represented using values. 
• Nouns, adjectives, adverbs and verbs 
o Adjectives and adverbs 
Adjectives and adverbs are both used to qualify other concepts. Adjectives qualify 
concepts expressed as nouns at the grammatical level, whereas adverbs qualify 
concepts expressed as verbs. But this grammatical distinction is not mirrored at 
the semantic level. An example illustrates this well: "The bomb exploded loudly last 
night, and broke my window" and "The loud explosion last night broke my window". 
Although the two sentences differ grammatically, i t is clear that their meanings do 
not. Both forms are represented by an event with act ion- explode and subject-
bomb, and are the subject- of the breaking of my window event. I t would be 
rather strange therefore to represent "loud" and "loudly" differently. They both 
express the intensity of sound associated with the event, and are represented by 
the appropriate value type and specialization of the has-value event. 
Although adjectives and adverbs may correspond to the same concept when they 
qualify an event, adjectives may have other meanings when qualifying other things. 
For instance, "Jane has a loud voice" does not mean that her voice is associated 
with a large intensity of sound, all the time whether or not she uses i t . Instead i t 
means there is a sound associated with Jane talking, and this always has a strong 
intensity. The meaning of the adjective loud therefore differs when i t qualifies an 
event (loudi) and a voice, instrument or piece of machinery (loud2). 
o Nouns and verbs 
Although one major use of values in language involves adjectives and adverbs, verbs 
may also express values. For instance "John weighs 80kgs" is directly represented as 
a has-weight event mapping concrete objects^ to the weight value type. Although 
grammatically this construction diflfers significantly from "John is 2 metres tall", 
i t shares the same semantic representation. Indeed, the choice of grammatical 
^Note that it is not the node representing John that is the subject- of a has.weight event, 
but the node representing his body. 
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construction depends on the language: in French the sentence would be "Jean 
mesure 2 metres". Such statements also allow comparative forms "John weighs 
more than I do". 
Verbs also may also include implicit references to values, for instance "to lack", "to 
grow", or "to multiply". Many nouns also involve values, for instance "a lack of", 
"richness", "a surplus", "growth" and so on. 
• Net representation 
As described previously, adjectives and adverbs are represented using events which 
are specializations of has.value. These associate the concept being qualified with 
the value qualifying i t , and provide the appropriate type restrictions. This section 
discusses particular constructions in natural language which must be represented. 
o Relational and extensional adjectives and adverbs 
As discussed in D.1.3.2 (p. D-16), the values expressed by certain adjectives de-
pend on the expected values for the concept they qualify. An example of such a 
relational adjectives is "tall": "John is a tall man" states that John's height is 
greater than men's average height. Such adjectives therefore correspond to a seg-
ment of semantic net: 
{Eo,R): {A/ -sub jec t_- /0 : John; A/-act ion_-/0: hasJieight; 
A/-objec t_- /A: h} 
iEi,R): {AF-subject_-FO: Men; AV-action_-/0: hasJieight; 
AF-object_-FA: n} 
{E2,R): {A/ -sub jec t_- /0 : Men; A/-act ion_-/0: inst_; A/ -ob jec t . - /A: John} 
{E2„R): {A/-subject_-70: Men; A/-act ion_-/0: size.; A/-object_- /A: s} 
{Ei,R): {A/ - sub jec t_ - /0 : x; A/-subject--AA: R j ; A/-act ion_-/0: ©; 
A/-objec t_- /0 : h] 
{E5,R): {A/ - sub jec t - - /A : x; A/-subject_-/0: s; A/-act ion_-/0: O; 
AJ-object_-/0: y} 
{EQ,R): {A/-subject_-VO: n; A/-act ion_-/0: ©; A/ -ob jec t - - /A: y} 
Note that the subset of tall people can be built, so that i f John and Mary both 
happen to be tall, these events need not be repeated for each. The cost of building 
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a new tall person is thereby limited to one instance event. 
Some adjectives simply state that the concept they qualify is associated with a 
certain value independently from the expected value for that concept. An example 
of such adjectives is "red": "The book is red" does not refer to any expected value, 
but only to the sensation of red that sight of the book provokes. Such adjectives 
are called extensional, and are represented by a single event and the corresponding 
value: 
{Eo,R): {A/ - sub jec t_ - /0 : Elephant; A/-act ion_-/0: pinkness; A/-object_- /A: p} 
I t is of particular interest that extensional adjectives can be inherited from super-
sets. This means that concepts such as pink elephants can be built only with subset 
relations: i t is the intersection of pink things and elephants. This saves network 
space as only one node is used instead of four. 
o Adverbs of intensity 
Adverbs like "quarter", and "half" reduce the amount the value represents: "I'm 
half happy about it", "Half the bottle is left", "Half the cows ran away". They are 
represented using multiplication: if v is the amount of liquid in the bottle, then 
•uxhalf expresses "Half the bottle"'^ External multiplication is used if the values are 
uncountable: either unquantifiable, or have no natural units. Otherwise internal 
multiplication is used. 
And adverbs like "very" that change the range to which the qualifying value be-
longs: "That's a very red tie!". Whereas a red tie may be any reddish colour, a 
very red tie is a particularly intense colour of red. Such intervals are represented by 
dividing the range of values into intervals corresponding to sensations which could 
be described by the adverbs "very", "quite", "a little", etc. Such a scheme requires 
the minimal and maximal limits of the perceptual range to be known. As discussed 
in D.1.1.3 (p. D-12) the minimal bound is zero. Similarly, as discussed in D.1.3.2 
(p. D-16) there is a maximum value, simply defined in a particular value range as 
the value greater than all others. The ranges of the adverbs of intensity are defined 
using special external unquantified values, and multiplication: very, quite, etc... 
^See D.1.1.2 (p. D-8) for more information on conversions 
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These values are defined externally to the net. 
Because of the way in which the multiplier values are used to build new range from 
an old one, they can be applied more than once, as in "I saw a very very small 
elephant today". Here the "very very" restricts the range to an even more extreme 
form. Similarly, the order in which the adverbs are placed can be accounted for: 
"/ saw a very short tall man" and "/ saw a very tall short man" correspond to 
different height ranges. 
I t might be thought that defining the maximal value perceivable would be prob-
lematic for non-literal uses of sensations, such as "the sun is very hot", where the 
notion of heat lies outside the range of sensory perception. However i t should be 
remembered that such events are non-literal, and when interpreted are represented 
in terms of the abstract sister concept of temperature. Very hot in normal conver-
sation would refer in this domain to any temperature greater than the one defined 
as lower limit for the perception of very hot. 
o Comparatives and superlatives 
Comparative constructions relate two values in a total order: "John is older than 
Mark" would be expressed as: 
{EQ,R): {A/ -sub jec t_- /0 : John; A/-act ion_-/0: has_age; A/-object_- /A: x} 
{Ei,R): {A/-subject--JO: Mark; A/-act ion_-/0: has.age; A/ -objec t - - /A: y} 
{E2,R): {A/ -sub jec t_- /0 : y; A7-subject--AA: IR^; A/-act ion_-/0: ©; 
A/ -ob jec t - - /0 : x} 
has-age is a specialization of has .value. 
Superlatives on the other hand express a total order between a object's value and 
that of all other objects of that kind. For instance "John is the oldest man in the 
laboratory". The set of men M in the laboratory other than John, and the set of 
their respective ages A is defined. Then the superlative can be expressed by stating 
that it's value is greater than any of the set of values of the objects with which i t 
is compared: 
{Eo,R): {A/ - sub jec t_ - /0 : John; A/-act ion_-/0: has_age; A/-object_- /A: x} 
{Ei,R): {AF-subject_-FO: M; AI-a.ction.-IO: has.age; AV-object_-3!A: A} 
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{E2,R): {AF-subject_-FO: A; AV-subject_-v43!A: lR^_powerset; 
AV-action_-/0: 8; AV-object_-/0: x} 
{E3,R): {AW-subjec t_- /0 : John; AFV-subject_-FA: M; 
AW-act ion_- /0 : synonym,} 
{Ei,R): {AF-subjec t - -FA: E^, AV-action_-/0: size.; AV-object_-/0: 0} 
Note that this states that there is no one in the laboratory of the same age as John. 
I f this is not known, a milder form must be used which allows for scenarios such 
as "joint oldest": identical to the scheme above, except without E3 and E^, and 
RQ-powerset is replaced by lR''"_powerset. 
Similarly, superlatives involving an order can be built, as in "The third oldest build-
ing in Cambridge". This fits the general pattern "nth x-est y". To represent this, 
first the values V corresponding the characteristic x are considered. Al l instanti-
ations of y have an associated value in V . V is then split into two parts Q and 
C using the antonym, event, where Q is defined as having n elements, and all its 
elements must be greater than any of £ 's . This in effect creates the set of values 
corresponding to the "n x-est ys". Obtaining the "nth x-est y" is done simply by 
defining i t to be the smallest element of Q. 
{Eo,R) 
{EuR) 
{E2,R) 
{AF-subject_-FO: y; AV-action_-/0: hasjc; AV-object_-3!A: V} 
{A/ - sub jec t - - /A : z; A/-action_^/0: has-x; A/-object_- /0: v} 
AW-act ion_- /0 : 0; AFV-object--FA: Q} 
{E3,R): {A/-subjec t_- /A: Q; A/-act ion_-/0: size_; A/-object_-70: n} 
{E4,R): {A/ - sub jec t_ - /0 : [G,C]; A7-action_-/0: antonym.; A/-object_- /0 : V} 
{E5,R): {AV-subject_-/A: v; AV-subject--^3!A: R+_powerset; 
AV-action_-/0: 0; AF-object_-FO: g} 
The spec- events from V to £ and Q have not been included above. Also note that 
the scheme above allows two joint "third oldest buildings". Here z corresponds to 
the n'th x-est y, and v is its x-value. 
• Interpretation 
Little work has been done in this area, but initial findings suggest that many 
values are expressed in a variety of standard grammatical constructions such as 
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comparative forms, forms using intensity adverbs and value related nouns followed 
by "of" and then the value itself or the concept being described by the value: "a 
surplus of money", "too much food" or even "The engine burned two tons of coal" 
where the interpretation process must determine that it is the coal and not the 
tons that are being burned^. I f such standard constructions for values exist, they 
will allow a few general rules to interpret a wide variety of expressions. However 
showing this by experimental work with corpora is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
D.1,3.4 Belief and certainty 
As discussed in sections A.2.3.1 (p. A-12) and A.2.3.3 (p. A-15), statements 
are associated with a certain degree of belief and certainty. These degrees are 
represented using values. This allows an order to be expressed between the degrees 
of certainty and belief of various events: "I would believe more that John's death 
was accidental than that it was suicide."; "I would be more certain that I did not 
offend him, if he hadn't been so stiff afterwards". Thus, each event - other than the 
be l ie f -va lue and certainty.value events themselves - is associated with its own 
belief and certainty value. These values are unquantified. Since belief and certainty 
are based on personal experience they are agent-dependent values, or subjective 
values. 
But values also allow belief and certainty to be classified into broad levels: low, 
medium, high... Such levels prove useful when plausible reasoning algorithms as-
sign the degree of confidence they have in statements they have derived. For an 
example, see [Long et al. 93], where the analogy algorithm determines the certainty 
for all the statements i t derives. Each such level is represented by a set of the val-
ues included in that level. These sets are defined as intervals, where the interval 
boundaries can be unquantified values defined externally. Thus for each event in 
the network there are belief and certainty values, but they need not all be assigned 
a separate node. 
Alternatively, certainty values can be partitioned into n levels by determining the 
^unlike "/ like the dog of my mother", where it is not the mother being liked 
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minimum m and maximum of their range (see D.1.3.2 (p. D-21)). The difference 
5 between these two values can then be multiplied by ^, to obtain the spacing s 
of values. This spacing can then be used to create sets of values fitting within the 
ranges [m + 0 . . . m + ^ [ , [ m + f . . . m + f [ , [ m + f . . . m + f [, . . . , [m^^^~^m+6. 
Belief and certainty currently have 3 levels: low, medium and high. 
Having a be l ie f -va lue and a certainty-value event for each other event would 
lead to an unacceptable increase in net size. The solution adopted is to use arbitrary 
quantification. I f Ei is an event that has a high belief value, then i t can share E^ 
with all other high belief value events: 
{E2,R): {AA-subject--JO: [Ei, ...]; AV-action--/0: bel ief-value; 
AV-object--3!6': nBV} 
E2 has many subject- arcs connected to it , but none of them are partial since 
arbitrary quantification never refers to the same element of a set more than once. 
HBV is the set of high belief values. 
D.2 Negation 
D . 2 .1 Use of Absence of Occurrence 
D.2.1.1 Naturalness of Absence of occurrence 
Using non-existence allows a symmetrical treatment of sentences such as "John 
thinks there are five apples in the basket, but Jane thinks there are none". This is 
represented as: 
{Eo,R): {AV-subjec t - - /0 : basket; AV-action--/0: contains; 
AF-objec t - -FA: apples-in.basket} 
{Ei,H): {A / - sub j ec t - - / 0 : apples-in_basket; A/-act ion_-/0: size-; 
A / -ob jec t - - /0 : 0} 
{E2,H): {A / - sub j ec t - - / 0 : apples_in_basket; A/-act ion_-/0: size-; 
A7-object--70: 5} 
(J53,i?): {A/ -sub jec t_- /0 : Jane; A/ -ac t ion . - /0 : think; A/ -ob jec t - - /0 : Ei} 
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{EA,R): {A7-subject--70: John; A7-action--70: think; A7-object--70: E-i] 
Notice that the size events are both hypothetical, dependent on John's and Jane's 
respective beliefs. This symmetry has to be contrasted with the form that would 
occur if a "does not contain" action were used instead of the size events: John 
believes that the basket contains a subset of apples, and that the number of these 
apples is five, whereas Jane beheves that every apple that exists, heis existed or will 
exist is the object- of a "does not contain" event whose subject- is the basket. 
This asymmetry requires a lot of processing to maintain, and is therefore unnatu-
ral: 
{Eo,H): {AV-subject--70: basket; AV-action--70: contains; 
AF-objec t - -FA: apples-in-basket} 
{Ei,H): {AV-subject--70: basket; AV-action--70: does_not_contain; 
AF-objec t - -FA: apples} 
(^2,77): {A7-subject--70: apples-in.basket; A7-action--70: size-; 
A7-object--70: 5} 
{E3,R): {A7-subject--70: Jane; A7-action--70: think; A7-object--70: Ei} 
{Ei,R): {A7-subject--70: John; A7-action--70: think; 
A7-object--70: [^0,^2]} 
D.2.1.2 Defined Absence and Uniqueness 
Al l the forms of absence of occurrence discussed so far referred to events which were 
observed not to have happened. However, one also wants to be able to represent 
sentences that define concept by the absence of some feature. For instance, "The 
people that John never met" refers to all people who were never involved in a 
meeting event involving John. 
Consider first the positive form of the statement, "The people that John met": 
{E5,R): {AV-subject--70: John; AV-action--70: meet; 
A\/-object--3!A: peoplei} 
This is equivalent to: 
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{E(i,R): {AW-subjec t_- /0 : John; AW-act ion_-/0: meet; 
A | V j V - o b j e c t _ - | ^ A : peoplei} 
(Er,R): {AF-subjec t - -FA: Fg; AV-action_-/0: size_; AV-object-- /0: 1} 
The definitional F 7 ensures only instantiations of E^ with one element are selected 
from Fe's parent E^. Throughout this thesis, we have talked somewhat loosely 
about sets, and sets of sets. Strictly speaking SemNet's concepts are not sets, since 
they are defined intensionally. Similarly, rather than speaking of sets of sets, one 
should refer to groupings of instantiations. Usually, this does not matter, but in 
this case the distinction is critical. Indeed, just as E^ could define Ee, by selecting 
only instantiations with cardinality one from Eg, so Eio can select only instantia-
tions of Es with cardinality zero: each element of Eg is a concept which happens 
not to have any instantiations: 
{EQ,R): {AW-subjec t_- /0 : John; AW-act ion_-/0: meet; 
A | v | V - o b j e c t - - | 3 ! | A : people2} 
{Eio,R): { A F - s u b j e c t _ - F A : F9; AV-ac t ion_- /0 : size.; AV-ob jec t_ - /0 : 0} 
people2 is thus defined to be the set of people whose meeting relation with John 
is an empty concept. Admittedly the notion that "something" can be restricted by 
"nothing" appears strange at first, but this stems from identifying concepts with 
mathematical sets: empty concepts still are "something", in that they are distinct, 
and in that cardinality just happens to be one of their properties; whereas cardi-
nality is tightly bound up with the definition of sets, and empty sets are equal. 
Moreover i t appears easy to build an empty set in mathematics, but in SemNet 
a concept will only have empty concepts as instantiations if such empty concepts 
occur - just like a concept will only have instantiations of concepts such as cat, if 
such instantiations occur in the agents environment: in SemNet, an empty set is 
not a construction. 
This treatment proves natural as the same process can deal with concepts ex-
pressing multiple level groupings. Thus, for instance, the same negation process 
is involved the negation "John believes the basket contains no apples" as in "John 
believes all of the baskets in that room contain no apples". 
There is currently another way of defining people2: people2 is the antonym, of 
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peoplei with respect to the concept of all people. This is due to antonym, breaking 
uniqueness: see D.6.3.3 (p. D-80). 
D .2 .2 Problems in Performing Negation 
D.2.2.1 Conversion to antonym depends on quantification and sorts 
Conversion to antonym in many cases requires changes to the quantification of 
the arguments of the event being converted. This in turn can interact with sortal 
information, rendering conversion to antonym a non-local phenomenon. First the 
interaction with quantification is illustrated. An example leads to the revelation 
that sortal information can be affected. Other difficulties are illustrated. 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the problem, but not provide an actual 
algorithm to solve i t . The actual algorithm for negating statements is a form 
of reasoning and therefore outside the scope of this thesis. However the ability 
to express negation is an important aspect of any representation, and should be 
discussed. 
• Conversion to antonym and quantification 
The conversion to antonym of an event requires a change of quantification of its 
arguments. For instance the conversion to antonym of "a man likes a fish" is 
"all men dislike all fish". I f the conversion were only "a man dislikes a fish", the 
sentence "a man likes a fish" could still be true. This intuition forms the basis 
of the treatment of negation in classical logic, which corresponds to conversion to 
antonym in LOLITA. 
In classical TOVC, predicates can take three types of argument: constants, exis-
tentially quantified variables, and universally quantified variables. When negated, 
the existential and universal quantifications associated with variables are swapped, 
but the constants do not change. This swap accounts not only for the example 
given above, but also for the invariance of the term "Sengan" in the negation of 
such statements as "Sengan likes a fish", which becomes "Sengan dislikes all fish". 
A similar distinction between the types of arguments of LOLITA's events is needed 
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for successful conversion to antonym. 
In LOLITA, the arguments of events are qualified by quantification and by sorts. To 
negate events, these arguments must be resolved into their equivalent logical type. 
One might think that this could be inferred from the three forms of quantification, 
individual, existential and universal. A suitable example can falsify this hypothesis. 
The sentence "Sengan likes a fish" is chosen as i t contains an example both of a 
logical constant (Sengan) and an logical existentially quantified variable (a fish): 
{Eo,R): {A/-subjec t_- /0 : Sengan; A/-act ion_-/0: l i k e ; 
A/-object_- /A: f i s h i } 
{Ei,R): {A/ - sub jec t - - / 0 : f isho; A/-act ion_-/0: ins t ; 
A/ -ob jec t - - /A: f i s h i } 
As both Sengan and the fish are qualified by an individual quantification, quantifi-
cation alone does not differentiate between logical constant and logical variable. 
• Conversion to antonym and sorts 
I f LOLITA's quantification does not distinguish between logical constants, and 
logical existentially quantified variables, perhaps the other qualification of events' 
arguments will: sorts. Indeed, in the example "Sengan likes a fish", the event 
Ef) is observational with respect to Sengan, but is definitional with respect to the 
fish ( f i s h i ) . This makes sense: if a constant is defined, i t will be defined outside 
the formula in which i t is used. A variable on the other hand is restricted by the 
formula in which i t is used. Sengan is not defined by his liking a fish, so with 
respect to the sentence he is a constant. The fish on the other hand is defined by 
the sentence - i t is the fish that Sengan likes, as is therefore dependent on i t for 
its meaning. Conversion to antonym must therefore use sortal information. 
• Conclusion 
Conversion to antonym must take both quantificational and sortal information into 
account when negating an event. 
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D.2.2.2 Preservation of event arity 
Event arity denotes the number of subject-S and object_s an event may have. 
The notion of ful l and partial arcs has already been introduced in 5.1.2.4 (p. 123): 
"John carried the piano" has a ful l subject- arc, and subject- arity one; whereas 
"John and Bill carried the piano" has a partial subject- arc and subject- arity 
two; and "John, Bill, and George carried the piano" has a partial subject- arc but 
subject- arity three. Further, as discussed in 5.4.3.2 (p. 151), one cannot always 
infer an event of lower arity from an event of higher arity. For instance, one cannot 
infer from the sentence "Roberto, Rick and Russell own the 3R company" that 
Roberto owns the 3R company. This means that event arity should be preserved 
by conversion to antonym. 
Requiring event arity to be preserved makes conversion to antonym a non local 
phenomenon. For instance, consider the negation -IEQ of the event "Sengan dislikes 
all fish". This would be written: 
{-^Eo,R): {AV-subject--70: Sengan; AV-action--70: dislike; 
AF-object_-FO: f i sho} 
Whereas in the natural language form, only one argument suffers a change of 
quantification ("all fish"), the quantification of all arguments was changed by the 
negation of EQ. This corresponds to the fact there is now for each fish one event of 
Sengan disliking i t . Had the change been restricted to the object- arc, only one 
event of Sengan disliking all the fish together^ would have resulted. This would 
have contravened the preservation of arity. 
Conversion to antonym must preserve the arity of its events. This results in non-
local changes of quantification which preclude treatment of negation based solely 
on individual arcs. 
D.2.2.3 The treatment of defined individuals 
The conversion to antonym of the event "Sengan likes a fish" was the event "Sengan 
dislikes all fish", -IEQ. Assume now that one wants to obtain the conversion to 
^ which is meaningless 
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antonym of the latter event. One would expect to obtain the event: "Sengan likes 
a fish". Indeed this is sufficient to render ^EQ false, and it incorporates the other 
cases which render -'EQ false: "Sengan likes two fish", "Sengan likes three fish"... 
One would however be mistaken to represent it by EQ. Indeed, EQ defines f i s h i to 
be the (one and only) fish that Sengan likes. This is because expressing concepts 
as individuals defined by some arcs is a shorthand. I t avoids writing that a concept 
is a set observed to have size one. Using EQ would therefore have been a stronger 
statement than intended. 
Since the problem lies in the definitional sort, one might want to try an event 
"Sengan likes a fish" which is observational with respect to the fish. However this 
breaks the rules ensuring conceptual uniqueness. The fish would only be defined 
by a single definitional event. Thus a definitional sort must be used, but not an 
individual quantification. This leads to the arity preserving solution: 
(Eo,R): {AV-subject_-/0: Sengan; AV-action_-/0: l i k e ; 
AF-object_-FA: f i s h i } 
{Ei,R): {A/ - sub jec t - - / 0 : f isho; A/-act ion_-/0: spec; 
A/ -ob jec t - - /A: f i s h i } 
{E2,R): {A/-subjec t_- /0 : f i s h i ; A/-act ion_-/0: size; 
A/ -ob jec t - - /A: f i sh_s ize} 
where f ish_size is stated to be greater or equal to one by an observational values 
event. 
D.2.2.4 Difficulties associated with unique existentials 
Unique existentials prove to be another cause of difficulty in the conversion to 
antonym. For instance, take "Every man likes a woman", where each man likes 
one woman only. One would expect its conversion to antonym to be "There is a 
man who dislikes all women", but in fact i t is "Either there is a man who dislikes all 
women, or there is a man who likes more than one woman, or both". In other words, 
the postulated uniqueness and the liking can both be negated independently. This 
means that negation of such events can become very complicated. For instance: 
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(Eo,R): {AF-subject--FO: meno; AV-action--70: l i k e ; 
AV-object_-3!A: womeni} 
where womeni is a definitional spec- of womeno, becomes (without some of the size-
events) 
(Ei,H): {AFV-subject- -FA: meni; AW-action--70: d i s l i k e ; 
AVF-object--FO: womeno} 
(^2,77): {AF-subjec t - -FA: mens; AV-action--70: l i k e ; 
AV-object--3!VA: women2} 
{E3,R): {A7-subject_-W0: Ei, A7-subject--V0: E2; 
AI-a.ction.-IO: or_} 
(E^,R): {AF-sub jec t - -F0 : women2; AV-action--70: size; 
AV-object--3!A: s izesi} 
where sizesi are observed to be greater or equal to two and are a definitional spec-
of set-sizes; menj and men2 are definitional spec_s of meno; women2 is a definitional 
spec- of womeno. Notice that the further complication due to the definitional sort 
for meni, results in Ei being a set of sets of events (set level 2). 
Further, conversion to antonym must ensure that its results are legal. This might 
occur when negating 3!V. In the representation this is equivalent to 3. A naive 
implementation might convert "Everyman likes at least one woman", where the set 
of women is referred to by a 3!V, to "There is a man who dislikes all women, or 
there is a man who likes more than one set of women, or both". This conversion 
occurs because it is the set that was stated to be unique. Writing the second part 
of the statement in the network is however illegal: definitional sets are maximal, 
so each of the two sets (instantiations) would be maximal. But concepts do not 
include the same instantiation twice. Thus only the first part of the statement 
may legally be written. This first part would also have been obtained had an 3 
quantification been used instead of the 3!V, assuming that SemNet included i t . 
D.2.2.5 Effect of the network being propositional 
SemNet is propositional. This adds two more diflficulties to conversion to antonym. 
Events which refer to the event being negated constitute the first problem. The 
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second problem occurs when the event being negated defines an argument which is 
an event. 
o Events referring to an event to be negated 
Events that are negated are often qualified by other events. What happens to these 
events? The events may either be definitional or observational with respect to the 
event being negated. The problem can be broken down into two parts, with this 
distinction. 
Events are httle different to arcs with respect to the event. Indeed, as pointed out 
in B.1.2.4 (p. B-6), an event's arcs behave like just like other events to i t . The 
key point is that an arc behaves like an event as far as the event of which i t is 
the source is concerned: i t states that the event is in a particular relationship with 
another concept. However, for arcs' destinations, they are only parts of events, and 
it is the ful l event that must be considered. Because of this, definitional events are 
treated just as definitional arcs are: they are included in the events' negation. The 
only exception being that the definitional action arc has its destination replaced by 
the antonym action. Because of this, the definition of the event changes, and the 
observational events and arcs are not connected to the event converted to antonym. 
o Events defined by an event to be negated 
The problem of events which are negated and define others is no different to entities 
defined by an event which is negated. For instance, an event which is defined as 
"the things John believes Roberto did on the night of the 15th June" is extensionless, 
if John disbelieves every event involving Roberto doing anything on the 15th of 
June: an extension would create a contradiction. The actual negation process 
is no different from any other node completely or partially defined by an event 
which is being negated. Few of the events presented in this thesis taking events as 
arguments have antonyms. "Believe" is one of the few exceptions. 
{Eo,R): {AV-subject_-/0: John; AV-action_-/0: believe; 
AF-object_-FA: E^} 
{Ei,H): {AV-subject_-/0: Roberto;} 
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{E2,R): {AF-subjec t - -FA: Ei, AV-action--70: at_time; 
AF-objec t - -FA: t i m e s j 
where timesi are also defined to be the set of times that occurred on the 15th 
of June. Negating EQ results in that FQ'S object arc becomes observational with 
respect to an event Ei\ defined only by an event identical to E2 and a subject-
arc with target Roberto. 
o Conclusion: effect of propositionality 
Propositionality is not a source of great difficulties in conversion to antonym. 
D.2.2.6 Implications of negating a definitional event 
Very few events are purely observational with respect to all of their arguments. 
This means that most conversions to antonym will negate an event which defines 
some other concept. This raises the question of what should be done with this 
concept: its existence depends on an event which is no longer believed true. A truth 
maintenance system must solve this problem by deciding whether to believe the 
event or its conversion to antonym. This is necessary in order to ensure consistency 
of the knowledge base. I t raises the issue of belief, since at first, two agents may 
believe something, and later one of them might change his mind and believe in the 
conversion to antonym of the event. Both the event and its conversion to antonym 
must then be maintained within the network. 
Instead of discussing the truth maintenance system, which is clearly an issue of 
reasoning, the rest of this section will concentrate on the effect of conversion to 
antonym on observational events or arcs. For simplicity, the discussion will be 
phrased as if conversion to antonym were a destructive operation on the event 
being converted, and associated concepts. The general case cannot be achieved 
by simply duplicating the concepts manipulated in this way, and then performing 
the conversion to antonym on them: each original concept is associated by a set 
relation to the corresponding changed concept. 
When an event EQ which defines a concept C is converted to its antonym, -'EQ, the 
resulting event refers observationally to the concept's closest parent, P. A concept 
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which is defined by many events is equivalent to the definitional intersection of 
as many sets each defined by one of the definitional events. This means that i f 
the concept C is defined by events additional to EQ, the closest parent P may 
have to be built as the set defined by all the definitional events of C other than 
EQ, and inserted appropriately into the set hierarchy. -^EQ will then refer to P 
observationally. Because P is not C, C's observational events will not copied to P: 
Cs observational events express facts about the concept C, that are not necessarily 
true of P i ° . 
There is however another aspect. Some of the definitional events originally con-
nected to the concept C, and now connected to its closest parent P, may have 
been mutually defining events. These would also have defined other concepts Ci, 
which in turn may be mutually defining with other concepts C2, and so on. Al l 
the concepts which are directly or indirectly mutually defining with C form the 
set C. Since all these concepts were mutually defining with C, the definition of 
C constituted part of their own definition. Thus, when they were disconnected 
from C, and connected to P, their definition changed. In other words, the same 
nodes now correspond to different concepts. This means that any observational 
events these nodes were connected to, are no longer correct, since the observa-
tional events referred to different concepts. As a result, when EQ is converted to 
its antonyms, a search must be performed over all the concepts that were mutually 
defining with any concepts that EQ happened to define. This search must remove 
all observational events connected to the mutually defining concepts. 
For instance, 
{Eo,R): {AV-subjec t - - /0 : John; AV-action_-/0: l i k e ; 
AF-object_-FA: f i s h i } 
{Ei,R): {AF-subject_-FA: f i s h i ; AV-action_-/0: has.part; 
AF-object_-FA: red_ta i l s} 
{E2,R): {AF-subject- -FO: f i s h i ; AV-action--/0: eat; 
AF-object_-FA: foodi} 
Since C is no longer defined uniquely, it should be deleted from the network, as it is illegal. 
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{Ez,R): {AF-subjec t - -FA: red- ta i l s ; AV-action_-/0: i s j r ed} 
where f i s h i , r ed - t a i l s , foodi are specializations of f i s h , t a i l s , and food 
respectively becomes 
{EQ,R): {AV-subject_-/0: John; AV-action_-/0: d i s l i k e ; 
AF-object_-FO: f i s h i } 
{Ei,R): {AF-subject_-FA: f i s h i ; AV-action_-/0: has.part; 
AF-object_-FA: r ed - t a i l s } 
{E3,R): {AF-subject_-FA: red_tai ls ; AV-action_-/0: i s j r ed} 
where f i sh i and r ed - t a i l s are specializations of f i s h and t a i l s respectively. 
Similarly, since the conversion of antonym changes the meaning of EQ to -'EQ, 
any observational events or arcs connected to EQ must be deleted. This has a 
consequence that conversion to antonym is limited to events that are defined by an 
ac t ion- arc. Since this is usually the case, i t poses no problem. 
D.2.2.7 Conclusion: conversion to antonym 
Conversion to antonym is a complex process, involving many separate problems. 
However it occurs far more rarely that the other form of negation, so cannot be 
considered severely detrimental to efficiency. Moreover, its scope is mainly limited 
to the event being negated, although the consequences of that negation aflFects any 
concept the event defines directly, or through mutual definitional dependencies. 
D.2.2.8 Negating events by absence of occurrence 
• The treatment of defined individuals 
The same diflBculties occur with defined individuals for absence of occurrence as 
for conversion to antonym. This means that the same sort of preprocessing that is 
applied to this problem for conversion to antonym is used for negation by absence 
of occurrence: D.2.2.3 (p. D-33). 
• The actual negation 
Negating individual events is performed by raising the level of quantification by 
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one: the individual is transformed into a set of one element^^. This is then negated 
by setting its observational size_ to zero. The actual process of doing this involves 
changing the quantification of all arcs whose source is the event by adding a final 
(independent) V. Thus, where the event was once an individual, i t is now a set 
(/V = V): another level of grouping has been added at the bottom of the grouping 
structure. The events that refer to the negated event must also be adapted so that 
they now refer to its instantiations. Because of event arity (D.2.2.2 (p. D-33)), 
this process is non-local. 
Negating events with many instantiations is very similar. Since events may be in 
one-to-one, many-to-one or one-to-many relations with their arguments, negation 
cannot be performed simply by adding an observational s ize , zero to the event. 
For instance, negating in this way the observational event that farmers beat the 
donkey (that they own) to produce farmers do not beat the donkey that they own 
would result in stating that there are no farmers who own a donkey because of 
the F — F quantification. The solution is again to raise the level of quantification 
by one as previously by adding a new grouping at the bottom level. Again an 
observational size_ zero event, with quantification referring to the bottom level 
but one, is used to state that there are no events which follow the quantification 
scheme. Now the size zero event has no implication on the number of farmers or 
donkeys, since the F quantification is not dependent on the lower level V. 
There are two ways of raising the quantification: one can add a level of quantifi-
cation either above all the existing levels or below. To see the diff'erence, take 
as example the negation by absence of "Each of the salesmen sold all his cars": 
"Each of the salesmen sold none of his cars". This could be represented by EQ 
(quantification above) or Ei (below), without the relevant size_ events: 
{Eo,R): {Ayi^'V-subject_-i?'0: S; AVW-action_-70: se l l ; AVFF-object_-FFA: C} 
{Ei,R): {AFVV-subject_--FO: 5; AVW-action.-/0: se l l ; AFFy-ohject.-FFA: C} 
{E2,R): {AW-subject--70: John; AW-action_-/0: se l l ; AVF-object_-FA: cars} 
iE3,R): {AW-subject_-70: John; AW-action_-70: se l l ; AJV-object--7?'A: cars} 
"see 5.4.2.3 (p. HO) 
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Assume that John is one of the salesmen. Inheritance must now map £ ' 0 or Ei to 
John. For Ei this is easy, since {E3) "John sold none of his cars" is an instance of 
El: inheritance or semantic integration can build the required set hierarchy easily. 
However this is not the case for EQ and the corresponding E2, since although E2 
is inherited from EQ, i t is not an instance of EQ. Thus the preferred solution is to 
add a new grouping at the bottom level. 
• Events that define their arguments 
As for conversion to antonym, negating events which define other concepts changes 
their definition. As for conversion to antonym, this aspect must be treated by a 
truth maintenance system. 
D.3 Relating concepts to their possible parts 
D.3.1 Parts of concepts 
D.3.1.1 Motivation 
Dividing an object into its constituent parts is a very frequent process. Indeed, 
i t is related to the partitioning process described in 2.4 (p. 13), and serves the 
same purpose. Once the parts have been identified, the object as a whole can also 
be described by the relations between them. The purpose is to determine easily 
identifiable, yet also significative parts in the sense that they participate in many 
internal relations with other parts of the object. The value of partitioning as before 
is judged on the reasoning power i t provides. For instance, one could divide a clock 
into small cubes, but the relations between the cubes would not provide any power 
for reasoning. If instead, the clock were divided into cogs, springs, and other pieces 
that resulted from it being taken apart gently, then the relations between the pieces 
would be useful. 
Although definitional events and the conceptual hierarchy implicitly partition the 
"world" into pieces, a means to state that one such piece has other pieces as parts 
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must be provided. Concrete objects obviously have parts, but so do other concepts. 
For instance, typing a text can be divided into small events each involving pressing 
a key, which can in turn be subdivided into events involving pressing the key, 
keeping i t there, and releasing i t . Many events involving interactions between 
physical objects can be modeled in this way. 
D.3.1.2 Properties of division 
Objects may be divided into parts in many different ways. For instance the geo-
graphic region of Europe can be subdivided either into countries, or into geographic 
features (plains, rivers, mountains, islands). A piece resulting from one way of di-
viding the object may have areas in common with pieces resulting from another 
division. For instance, the Alps straggle the borders of Switzerland, France and 
Italy. These pieces may be referred to, for instance as the Swiss, French and Italian 
Alps. This means that the representation must provide some way of grouping the 
results of each division i f desired. Similarly, objects may be divided into other 
objects which in turn may be further subdivided into other objects. Thus hierar-
chies of parts can be formed. The representation must allow such hierarchies to be 
expressed. 
An object may share some of its properties with its parts. For instance, if a table is 
made of wood, the table, its legs and its top all share the property of spontaneously 
burning at the wood's flash point temperature. However some of its other properties 
are not inherited, such as its weight. If the table were broken, each piece would not 
weigh the same as i t did. This difference between those properties that are known 
to be shared by an object and its parts, and those that are known not to, is the 
difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. The substance from which an 
object is made provides many such intrinsic properties, whereas extrinsic properties 
commonly correspond to properties of the object that the substance was made into. 
By annotating the properties appropriately, a scheme similar to inheritance can be 
introduced so that properties intrinsic to a substance can be inherited to the object 
itself. 
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D.3.1.3 The need for a new^  relation 
This notion of parts is different to the inst_ and spec, events, although they both 
provide means of partitioning LOLITA's world. Because the relation between an 
object and its parts distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, i t can 
relate an object to a seemingly unrelated object used in its construction. As a 
result, the same object can be divided in different ways into different parts. The 
resulting parts have little to do with their source. For instance, i f one were given 
a bolt, i t would be hard to identify whether i t were part of a building, a tractor, 
a l i f t or the Mir space station. Indeed, bolts' properties are defined independently 
of the use to which they are put. 
inst_ and spec_ on the other hand inherit all the properties true of the elements of 
the superset, so they are constrained to relating concepts and their speciahzations. 
However, inst_ can also be used to relate individual concepts, such as a group of 
men, to its elements, such as John and Mark. No properties true of the group are 
inherited to its elements, so again the meaning differs. 
D.3.1.4 Substances 
Some concepts corresponding to physical objects have the property that they are 
not thought of as identifiable individual objects. These are substances, which have 
the particularity that when you divide them into parts, the parts too are instances 
of the same concept. For instance a piece of meat, divided into pieces forms more 
pieces of meat. In natural language such concepts usually are expressed as count 
nouns: people talk of pieces of metal, or some metal, but not of metals in the sense 
of individual objects. 
D.3.1.5 Granularity of division 
Although intrinsic properties are inherited by the parts of a given object, there is a 
limit to how far the process of division can be taken. I f one divides pieces of meat 
up sufficiently, the result is no longer meat, but various proteins. Similarly, if one 
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divides an alloy, the result is no longer an alloy, but the metallic atoms involved 
in its composition. For substances this can be associated with the notion that a 
substance not only corresponds to a thing, but to a particular organization of other 
more basic things, which have relations between them, and i t is these relations or 
internal organization which result in the properties of the substance perceived at 
a different scale. 
Subdividing events, such as walking also involves a notion of granularity. Once the 
division has reached a certain stage, one cannot recognise the sub-event concerned 
as walking. The sub-event could be part of walking, or of falling, for example. 
Thus the properties defining the concepts which behave as substances must be 
associated with a range of application. 
This notion that there is a limit after which dividing a substance results in indi-
viduals can be turned the other way: if one is dealing with a large enough number 
of individuals, they start behaving like a substance with its own properties. For 
instance, a landslide is composed of stones, gravel and so on, but their movement 
as a group has many properties in common with a liquid. Similarly crowds may 
display similar types of behaviour whatever the individuals forming them. Here 
however, one must decide whether the notion of partition involves the inheritance 
of intrinsic properties or not. I f so, one would use the notion of division, otherwise 
one would use inst_ events, as described above. 
D.3.2 The has_part event 
In order to relate a concept to its parts, an event is needed: the has_part event, 
which takes as ac t ion , has_part. 
A requirement for the has-pairt event is that i t be able to group the parts resulting 
from applying a particular division scheme to some object. Thus, for instance, 
division of the human body into trunk, arms, legs and head should distinguished 
from its division into organs. I f each part were simply to be the object- of a 
separate has_part event, it would be impossible to distinguish the results of the 
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two division schemes, unless their relations were enumerated exhaustively: the 
brain is part of the head, part of the spinal cord is in the head, another part is 
in the trunk, and so on... In general exhaustive enumeration is unwise since the 
relations between elements resulting from different division schemes may not be 
known. LOLITA might not know that there are geographic regions inhabited by 
German-speakers in the state of Czechoslovakia. Nor indeed, should she need to. 
A solution which satisfies this requirement is a has.part event with as subject., 
the divided object; as act ion. , has.part; and as partial object.s, the results of 
a particular division. This also allows the has.part event to relate a single part 
of an object to the object itself with no reference to the division scheme itself: if 
a has.part event only has one object. , then it could be thought to state that 
the object has only one part. But this part would be the object itself. Thus, i f a 
has.part event only has one object . , i t will be taken to mean that its object , is 
but one of its parts. This scheme is essential, for without i t LOLITA would need to 
know the full result of the partitioning scheme before an event could be expressed. 
D.3.3 Using has .part 
D.3.3.1 Representing substances and intrinsic properties 
Substances are represented as the set of objects with the properties of that par-
ticular substance. Their behaviour with respect to division is expressed using the 
has.part event: 
(Eo, R): {AFV-subject . -FO: metals; AW-ac t ion . - /0 : has.part; 
A|w|-object.-|3! |A: metals '} 
{El, R): {A/ -sub jec t_- /0 : metals; A/ -ac t ion . - /0 : synonym.; 
A/ - sub jec t . - /0 : metals '} 
(£^2, R)- {AF-sub jec t . -FA: metals; AV-action_-/0: i s j n e t a l } 
where i s jne ta l corresponds to the definitional properties of metals. 
Appendix D: Extended Representation: Detailed Issues D-46 
Thus a gold ring is a piece of gold with additional properties, restricting i t further 
to being a ring^^. 
I f metals is observed to have certain intrinsic properties, such as only applying 
to instantiations of a minimal weight, these intrinsic properties will be definitional 
for metals ' . I t is this part of the statement which not only states the substance's 
behaviour with respect to division, but also which ensures that inheritance of in-
trinsic properties works as desired. Take as example of a substance, metal. I f only 
a part of an object is made of metal, then the object will not be an instance of 
metal, preventing i t from acquiring intrinsic properties it does not have. However, 
if an object is part of a piece of metal, it will fit one of the requirements of Eo, a 
definitional event of metal ' . Assuming one knows that i t fits the other require-
ments such as minimal weight, i t is an instance of metal ' . Thus, by Ei, it is a 
piece of metal. 
Intrinsic properties are represented in the same way. Their template defines as 
subject- a substance which has as one of its observational properties that its 
parts are also of the same substance. Other observational properties may state 
the property's range of application. For instance, for notions such as colour or 
melting point to apply, a minimal amount of substance is required. Substances 
can then be defined as combinations of the appropriate intrinsic properties, using 
bi-implicature^^. 
Other properties of objects or substances may be known to vary in predictable 
ways when an object is subjected to a has-part event. For instance, the sum of 
the weights of an object's parts is equal to its weight. Similarly, every part of an 
object is smaller than i t . For events, an event's parts all take less time than i t did. 
Such common-sense knowledge can be encoded as above, and proves essential in 
many reasoning tasks such as, say, working out whether someone's alibi stands up. 
^^ See 7.6.2.1 (p. 291) for information about synonyms 
i^see 5.4.3.3 (p. 153) 
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D.3.3.2 has.part for events 
Just as a substance can be divided into other instances of the same substance, so 
certain events can be divided up. For instance "existing": if John existed the whole 
of yesterday, he existed at any time yesterday. However, just as with substances, for 
which there is a conceptual difference between "the substance gold", and "a piece of 
gold", there is a conceptual difference between the full event and its parts: "/ ran 
to school today" includes all the running performed from leaving home to reaching 
school. Thus, there are two types of running action: run and run.substaince. The 
former has the latter as parts (except perhaps at the beginning and end). 
This difference also appears in N.L., for instance between "/ ran a mile" which 
cannot be quantified by "for twenty minutes" ( "/ ran a mile for twenty minutes") 
and "I ran towards the church" which can ( "/ ran towards the church for twenty 
minutes "). 
• Granularity 
Some events can only be divided until they reach a certain granularity. For instance, 
the "walking" event can be divided to individual steps, but further subdivisions 
would not be recognised as walking. The granularity is thus determined by the 
minimal extent an event must have to be recognised as an instance of that event: 
taking a few steps for instance. This may often be associated with a time, but 
i t should be noticed that unlike substances where a precise size might be found, 
events' granularity is not so much determined by their span as by what actually 
happens. For instance, i t might take longer to determine that a sloth is walking 
than a person, because sloths move slowly. Similarly, it might take a longer time 
to determine some viscous material is flowing, than i t does water. Glass is a prime 
example of this. As a supercooled liquid i t flows, but incredibly slowly. 
I f i t is necessary to specify a minimal time, i t must be associated with a sort of 
template event which is the superset of all events with a given subject , or object , 
type: e.g. all events with a person as subject.. Like a template event, i t describes 
attributes of a vast class of events, such as all events involving people as subject.s 
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and walking as action-. Unlike a template event, it is not only defined by its 
ac t ion- but also by its subject- and object-. 
Other events can be subdivided infinitely. For instance, "existing" is such an event. 
If an object existed from 1992 to 1994, it existed at every instant during that period, 
where an instant is an infinitely small time. Existing is expressed as non-zero set 
size, and is an instance of a has-value event. Many other has-value events share 
this property of infinite division. 
• Aside: event density 
Associated with the notion of granularity is the notion of event density. This 
corresponds to non-literal uses of events, where an event is said to occur during 
a particular time although i t did not occur during every instant of that time. 
For instance, "He walked from Inverness to Penzance" does not mean that he 
spent every minute during that event walking. He might have done, but that 
was not necessary for the statement to be made. This is one of the cases where 
homogeneity theory ([Garigliano 89]) is expected to provide a solution in the longer 
term. Currently, the walk from Inverness to Penzance would be considered non-
literal. 
• Pre- and post- conditions 
The parts of events are also events, and thus also have their own pre- and post-
conditions. I f the division of the event into parts is complete, i t is expected that all 
the preconditions of the sub-events, less the postconditions of the sub-events that 
preceded them, will be the preconditions of the whole event. The same is expected 
for the postconditions. 
For instance, "to eat" can be viewed as consisting of cutting food, putting i t in the 
mouth, chewing i t , swallowing i t , and so on. Cutting food has as precondition that 
the food can be cut, and as postcondition that the food is smaller than it was before. 
Putting food in the mouth has as condition that the piece is small enough, and 
as postcondition that the food is in the mouth. Chewing food has a precondition 
that there is food in the mouth and is not so hard i t cannot be chewed, and as 
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postcondition that the food is small and wet enough to be swallowed. Swallowing 
has as precondition the food is small and wet enough to be swallowed, and as 
postcondition that the food is in the stomach. Prom this, cutting is seen to be 
optional: one does not need to cut pieces of rice. Similarly, chewing is optional: 
one does not need to chew yogurt. Since cutting food satisfies the preconditions 
of putting i t into one's mouth, the precondition that the food is small enough to 
fit in the mouth does propagate to being a precondition of the "to eat" template 
event. However, the postcondition that the food ends up in the stomach is not the 
precondition of any other subpart of "to eat" so does get propagated to "to eai"'s 
template event. 
• Part's times 
The time of the parts of events can be specified with respect to the ful l event, 
allowing the initial, intermediate and final stages of an event to be specified. This 
is particularly important to specify the difference between ful l events and substance-
like parts of events: 
(Eo,R): {0V-subject.-3!A: WalkingJlnimals; AV-act ion.- /0 : walk} 
{Ei,R): {AF-subjec t . -FO: EQ; AV-act ion.- /0: at.time; 
AV-object--3!A: t imesi} 
{E2,R): {AF-subjec t . -FO: £^1; AV-act ion.- /0: has.part; 
AF-ob jec t . -FA: .^3} 
{E3,R): {AV-subject.-3!0: Walking.Animals; AV-act ion.- /0: leave} 
{Ei,R): {AF-subjec t . -FO: £^3; AV-act ion.- /0: at.time; 
AV-object.-3!A: times2} 
{E^,R): {AF-subjec t . -FO: [timesi,times2]; AV-action.-JO: s tar ts . ; 
Every walk event starts by a leaving event. 
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D.4 The representation of Time 
D.4.1 Time and language: A new paradigm 
Just as space, time appears to the agent to be a continuous phenomenon. Any 
conceptualization of specific times is the result of partitioning. Thus i t can be 
represented by many models. 
D.4.1.1 Scientific model 
A starting point for the representation of time could be the scientific model of time. 
Classically, time is regarded as one of the axes of a coordinate system: a continuum 
of points isomorphic to the real line. Every instant is represented uniquely by one 
of these points, which can be expressed in terms of any other, by a unique number 
of units. The units themselves are precise, and any uncertainty is expressed as a 
range: the error. Events are assumed instantaneous, but i f they take any length of 
time, they are associated with an interval on the real line, which has a start and 
end point. 
Time is thus an independent variable, indeed the independent variable par excel-
lence, on which the functions in scientific models often depend. This is because 
science models processes, which by their very nature always involve time. 
Although this model suits scientific tasks, i t does not model naturally many NL 
statements. 
D.4.1.2 Forcing the Distinction between Intervals and Instants 
The scientific model of time represents instants by a single value, and intervals 
by two values defining the interval's endpoints. There is no way of representing 
some constraint on the time of an event which could be an instant or could be an 
interval. Thus, one is forced to decide whether the event was instantaneous or not, 
in order to represent statements about its time. 
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For instance, to represent the sentence "/ woke up this morning" using the scientific 
model, one would end up stating that the event of my waking up took place between 
to±StQ and ti±6ti, and to and ti would both be further defined to have taken place 
this morning. This is because the scientific model forces one to specify whether 
the event is an interval or an instant. In the case of waking up, one can specify 
this because one knows what waking up is. But one might not know whether the 
action designated by a verb is instantaneous or not. Suppose that one does not 
know the meaning of "to laud", one is still knows that "/ lauded him this morning" 
means that the lauding occurred this morning, without knowing whether i t took 
an instant or an interval. 
In other words, the scientific representation forces one to say things one does not 
know. There is no reason why one should have to state whether "/ woke up this 
morning" is instantaneous or not, when all one wants to state is that the the event 
occurred this morning. Being forced to make distinctions unnecessarily is the sign 
of a bad partition of the problem, that the representation is not adapted to the 
problem for which i t is being used: natural language. 
To conclude, the representation of time for SemNet must allow statements to be 
made about any event without forcing one to decide whether or not the event was 
instantaneous. 
D,4.1.3 Precise times 
The scientific model of time forces the times of events to be expressed precisely, 
when precise values are not known, not meant or simply irrelevant. 
For instance, "I'll see you in five minutes" does not mean that precisely five minutes 
- 300 seconds - after the utterance, the people will meet again. Nor does i t mean 
that precisely between four minutes - 240 seconds - and six minutes - 360 seconds 
- after the utterance, the people will meet again, if an error of one minute is used. 
I t means something far vaguer: something around five minutes. As was discussed 
in 7.1 (p. 7j, certain expressions like "five minutes", "half an hour" indicate a. iai 
vaguer level of precision than "four minutes" or "thirty minutes". This behaviour 
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means that the representation of time must allow vague times to be expressed. 
A consequence of this is that conversions between units of time is delicate, "five 
minutes" is often not equivalent to "300 seconds". Similarly, conversions between 
dates in different calendars are not trivial, and should not be forced by the repre-
sentation. Indeed, the equivalence between different calendars may not be known, 
yet the representation should be able to express such dates as "On the fifth day of 
the third tenial, ..." Indeed, imposing the requirement of conversion to some 
standard calendar is unnecessary for tasks that require no reasoning. I t may even 
be counter-productive for tasks such as translation, where keeping the original form 
may be desirable, and the requirement that each calendar be convertible reduces 
the robustness of the system when it encounters a new text. In other words, the 
representation of time should support the expression of date and time in a wide 
variety of calendar systems or time units. 
For instance, the Roman day was divided into ten hours of sunlight as measured by 
a sundial. Converting this time into modern western units would require knowing 
the location (latitude) of the event. Moreover i f all times had to be converted into 
the time system used today, i t would be virtually impossible to express partially 
defined times such as "the fifth hour of some day during the forth lunar month 
434". Indeed, even i f all the precise day and latitude were known, the "fifth hour" 
might turn out to be "11:45:03" which seems to indicate a precision the original 
text did not convey. 
Simply because the representation should not force a level of precision greater than 
that meant does not mean that the representation should prevent precise values 
being represented: the representation must be able to express whatever level of 
precision is meant flexibly. 
During the French Revolution, weeks were converted to metric form: each week consisted of 
ten days. 
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D.4.1.4 Time as an axis 
The scientific model proves clumsy when representing such day-to-day sentences 
as "After meeting the chairman yesterday, Jack was seen dancing in the car park 
for more than five minutes.": Jack met the chairman between VQ and vi, and 
yesterday-start<= VQ and •^o < vi and vi < = yesterday-end. Someone saw Jack 
dancing between V2 and v^, and T;3 - '^ 2 = 4^ and vi <= V2 and V2 < V3 and 
V4 > 5 minutes. Five variables and seven ordering relations are needed to rep-
resent two times and three relations: the time when Jack met the chairman was 
yesterday (one time and one relation); the time when Jack was seen dancing was af-
ter his meeting (one time, one relation) and lasted more than five minutes (another 
relation). 
These diflficulties stem from the use of constrained variables to express uncertainty 
of knowledge. The representation in the scientific model maintains a sharp distinc-
tions between those times which can be assigned a date, and those which cannot. 
The former are represented by some number, whereas the latter are represented 
by a possibly constrained variable. The need for variables stems from the view 
of instants being points on the time axis. This choice of point means that one 
immediately knows the instant's relation to all other instants: for each one, one 
knows whether i t is earher or later than the instant. In effect one is dealing with 
a total order. The variables provide a means of escaping this, and expressing a 
partial order with constraints on the variables. 
However, in NL i t is very rare to know the exact relation between the times of all 
the events in the text being analysed. Thus in the general case, i t is impossible to 
achieve the total order required to map all these times to a single axis. Instead, 
what emerges is a graph of mutual constraints on times. The graph includes the 
temporal relations the speaker considered important, or non obvious, but will ne-
glect many others. Thus the position of many times with respect to others will not 
be known. Representing this by constrained variables proves very complex. 
Instead times could be considered as any other concept. What information is known 
about them, qualifies them. Their representation does not include any references 
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to unknown information, while maintaining the ability to represent the full range 
of temporal information. Times considered as concepts are thus constants, rather 
than variables, about which more or less may be known. There is no diflFerence 
in representation between a time for which a date is known and a time which is 
defined only as being the time when an event occurred. 
Furthermore, the representation of times as a graph reflects their usage. In the 
scientific representation of unknown times as variables, there are implicit relations 
between variables which make up the partial order. Similarly, the total order is 
implicitly in the nature of the constants assigned to the times. However, in the 
representation of times as concepts, the relations between them from a graph, 
since the concepts are nodes in the graph SemNet. The implicit partial order is 
thus explicit in the graph. 
D.4.1.5 Perceptual and Real Instants 
Events which take a certain amount of time may be presented as instants in NL 
sentences. For instance, "Sengan woke up, ate breakfast and went to work" refers 
to events as i f they were instants. On the other hand "While I was waking up, 
someone threw cold water at me", refers to the waking-up as an interval, although 
both may refer to the same event. NL often expresses intervals as instants in 
this way, only referring to the internal nature of events when needed. Henceforth, 
intervals referred to as if they were instants will be called "perceptual instants". 
"Real instants" will refer to times that are conceptually instants, independently 
from a text's viewpoint. For instance, just such an instant is the time when a ball 
thrown into the air is stationary. 
Since intervals referred to as perceptual instants are expressed in the same way as 
real instants, they should not be represented diflferently. Indeed, different represen-
tations for perceptual instants (intervals) and real instants, increase the complexity 
of the NL analysis and generations processes. For instance, there is no way of know-
ing whether a previously unknown event type is an interval or an instant i f i t is 
expressed as an instant in a sentence. "I lauded him" may be instantaneous, but 
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need not be. I f real instants are represented differently from intervals, there must 
be three different representations of time: one for intervals and perceptual instants, 
one for real instants, and one for times which may be instants or intervals. Later, 
if the same event type is referred to in a way that made i t clear that it takes an 
interval, all its instances will need the times at which they occurred to be converted 
to interval form. 
Instead of three different representations for real instants, intervals, and unknowns, 
the difference between intervals and real instants can be expressed as additional 
information. If one knows that a time is an interval or an instant, one knows more 
than if all one knows is that it is a time. Thus all times can be referred to as 
instants in NL, depending on the viewpoint adopted by the text: "The British 
Empire collapsed in the 20th century." 
In other words, the representation of an interval, a perceptual instant and a real 
instant should only be distinguished by additional information. 
D.4.1.6 Event density 
In the scientific model of time, properties have well-defined values throughout the 
time under investigation. Thus, properties that hold during an interval are implic-
it ly understood to hold at each instant during that interval. However, in NL this is 
not necessarily the case. For instance, "/ walked from Durham to Newcastle in eight 
hours" does not necessarily imply that I was walking at every instant along the 
way: I may have stopped in between. Indeed, as discussed in 7.4 (p. 269), events 
may not even make sense for intervals under a certain size. Thus, the statement 
that an event held during some time must not be taken as meaning that it held at 
every instant during that time. However the representation must also be able to 
express that the event held non-stop if so desired. 
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D.4.1.7 The need for instants and for intervals 
Representing instants and intervals may appear to be unnecessary, and to break 
uniqueness. 
Indeed, i t might be argued that instants never occur, so it is sufficient only to 
represent intervals. However, people can conceptualize the moment at the top of 
its trajectory when a ball is stationary after being thrown in the air. The fact that 
this may only be an abstract concept is irrelevant. I t is clearly a concept people 
can discuss. Similarly, concepts such as instantaneous velocity refer to the notion 
of real instant. Thus, even if it were only a conceptual device that allows people 
to think about certain phenomena, SemNet must be able to represent it . 
Alternatively, since instants are needed, it might be argued that intervals are un-
necessary. They could simply be represented as all the instants lying between their 
endpoints. However, this would imply that all events made sense at the temporal 
granularity of an instant. Thus when "Bob Dole campaigned to become the next 
president of the USA", he must have campaigned at every instant of that range 
of time. Moreover, i t must make sense to state that "Kevin ran a mile in three 
minutes for a nanosecond", since it makes sense to state that "Kevin ran a mile" 
during every instant of the three minutes i t took him to run i t . Again this is du-
bious, since running a mile definitely does not take an instant. As was explained 
in 7.4 (p. 269), events have a certain temporal granularity under which they no 
longer make sense. 
Since no coherent view can be obtained either only using instants or only using 
intervals, SemNet needs both. 
D.4.1.8 The ends of intervals 
Another issue of concern in the scientific model, when dealing with intervals is 
whether the event holds at the endpoints of the interval. The reason for this 
concern is that if an event holds during the interval [to, i i ] and does not during the 
interval [ti,t2], i t could hold and not hold simultaneously at ti if the intervals are 
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closed - i f they include both of their endpoints. 
However i t is very rare in NL that details such as whether an event holds during an 
interval's endpoints are stated. For instance, "The train trip lasted an hour" does 
not state whether i t includes the endpoints, since this is irrelevant. Indeed, the 
notion of some events holding for an instant may be disputed. I t makes therefore 
sense to make the conservative assumption that events that occur during an interval 
do not occur at it's endpoints. I f they do, this must be specified additionally: 
"The examination started at 3 o'clock precisely ended at 4 o'clock precisely" could 
be interpreted as saying that the examination held from 3 o'clock included to 4 
o'clock excluded. The difficulty in creating credible examples reflects the problem's 
artificiality. 
D.4.1.9 Representing the time of an event 
• Quantificational dependencies 
Events can depend quantificationally on the times at which they occur. For in-
stance, in the sentence "Every day the sun rises", there is an event of the sun 
rising associated with a time each day. Similarly, the times at which events oc-
cur can depend quantificationally on the events themselves. For instance, "The 
executions always take place at midday on Fridays" states that the time of every 
execution is Friday at midday. 
• Sortal dependencies 
Events can define the times at which they occur: "'When the economy has met the 
Maastricht conditions, we shall reinstate the welfare system" said Helmut Kohl'. 
The time when the welfare system is to be reinstated is defined by the condition 
"when the economy has met the Maastricht conditions". 
But times can also restrict a concept to the events which occur during them: "The 
economy will improve next year" or "John and Mary will marry tomorrow". This 
restriction also allows absence of occurrence to be expressed: "/ did not see Mary 
yesterday". 
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• Epistemological issues 
Statements can be made about the time at which events occurred. For instance, 
the time an event occurred is subject to belief: one may believe that "John bought 
a car", but not believe that he bought i t in 1900. Similarly, different people may 
have told one the event and when i t occurred: "Jack said 'John bought a car'; 
Bill said 'Ah yes, that was in 1979'." The certainty of the event's time may be in 
expressed: "I'm pretty sure that my mother's birthday is on the 9th of June". Or, 
the time at which an event did not occur can be stated: 'Hercules Poirot said "I 
know that John could not have committed the murder at midday, because I dined 
with him."' 
D.4.2 Example Templates 
The template event for the meaning of af ter_ ("The start of the second event is 
after the end of the first event.") is EQ in 
{EQ,R): {0V-subject_-3!A: A; AV-action_-/0: after_4 ; 
OV-object_-3!A: B } 
{Ei,R): {AF-subject_-FO: EQ; AV-action_-/0: duration.; 
AV-object_-3!A: C} 
(£;2,ii:): {AF-subject_-FO: A; AV-subject_-3!A: V; 
A\/-action_-/0: ends_} 
{Ei,R): {AF-subject_-FA: V; AF-subject_-FA: JF; 
AV-action_-/0: s t a r t s . } 
{EA,R): {A/ - sub jec t_ - /0 : instants; A/-act ion_-/0: spec; 
A/-objec t_- /A: V] 
{E5,R): {AF-subjec t - -FA: J ;^ AV-action_-/0: has_duration; 
AF-object_-FO: C} 
{EG,R): {AF-subject_-FO: B; AV-subject--3!A: S; 
AV-action_-/0: s t a r t s . } 
{E7,R): {A/ - sub jec t - - / 0 : instants; A/-act ion_-/0: spec_; 
A/ -ob jec t - - /A: £ } 
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{E8,R): {AF-subject_-FA: JF; AF-subject_-FA: £; 
AV-action_-/0: ends.} 
This particular meaning states that the startpoint of the later interval is C later 
than the endpoint of the earlier interval. 
The template event for f o l l o w s . ("The start of the first event precedes the start of 
the second event.") is £'0: 
{Eo,R): {0V-subject_-3!A: B; AV-action_-/0: follows_; 
OV-object_-3!A: A } 
{Ei,R): {AF-subject_-FO: £^ 0; AV-action_-/0: duration.; 
AV-object_-3!A: C} 
{E2,R): {AF-subject_-FO: A; AV-subject_-3!A: V; 
AV-action_-/0: s t a r t s . } 
{E3,R): {AF-subjec t - -FA: V; AV-action_-/0: has.duration; 
AF-object_-FO: C} 
iE^,R): {AF-subject_-FO: B; AV-subject_-3!A: £; 
AV-action_-/0: s t a r t s . } 
{EQ,R): {A/ -sub jec t_ - /0 : instants; A/-act ion_-/0: spec; 
A/ -ob jec t - - /A: £ } 
iE7,R): {AF-subject_-FA: V; AF-subject_-FA: £; 
AV-action_-/0: ends.} 
D.4.3 Time and the Inheritance Hierarchy 
Introducing time has consequences for the inheritance hierarchy. This section dis-
cusses these, starting with the notion that entities may have a limited life-span. 
This leads to qualifying the set relations by at-time events, which requires an ex-
tension to the inheritance algorithms. The implications for antonym, events is then 
reviewed. 
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D.4.3.1 Time and size-
Entities exist for a limited time. Men, for instance, are born, live, then die. Behind 
this triviality lies an important problem: the combination of time and the inher-
itance hierarchy. The first occurrence of this problem is the variation of size of a 
set. For instance, in 1992 there were 10 players in the departmental A I football 
team, whereas in 1993 there were 12 and in 1990 there were none. The concept 
of A I departmental football team does not vary, but i t can have different sizes at 
different times. This is expressed by attaching many s ize , events to the team, but 
qualifying each by a different time. 
In the same way individual entities have a life-span. Until the introduction of time, 
they were represented by constants in SemNet. Recall that constants in SemNet 
which are defined by events are in fact equivalent to sets defined by the same events 
which are observed to have size_ 1. Representing directly the fact entities have a 
limited life-span would be represented by qualifying the size_ event by an at_time 
event. The s ize , event could therefore no longer be implicit, requiring all constants 
with a limited life-span to be represented by a set of s ize , 1 for the life-span, and 
size- zero otherwise. This solution is cumbersome. The next section presents an 
alternative. 
D.4.3.2 Time and the inheritance hierarchy 
Many sets only vary in size_ because individual elements belong to different sets 
at different times. Indeed, people may change nationality, becoming a Frenchman 
after having been a German. Similarly, someone may be a painter, a fireman and 
a journalist at different points of their life. This means that the set relations must 
be qualifiable by at-time events. 
This has implications for the inheritance algorithms: How is inheritance over set 
relations qualified by at-time events performed? The answer is much in the same 
way as i t is performed for other events qualifying the set relations, such as epistemic 
events. The inherited events are restricted to the times qualifying the set relations 
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over which they were inherited. 
Since events may be qualified by a time and then be inherited through multiple 
set relations, each qualified by its own time, the resulting inherited event may be 
qualified by many times. A similar situation arises when a value inherits many 
has-value events. Either these value events are compatible, in that some value(s) 
can be found that satisfies them all, or there is a contradiction. For instance, if 
one agent believes a set has both size_ 0 and 1 (in the same frame of existence), 
there is a contradiction. 
To be defined, all concepts other than typeless must have at least one definitional 
set relation to a parent: 5.4.2.2 (p. 139). Consequently, if a concept is connected to 
definitional set relations themselves restricted by times, i t is only defined for those 
times. That is to say, i t cannot be applied to other times, so cannot be discussed. 
For instance, the concept Roberto cannot be applied to times when Roberto is 
not defined. The only problem with this scheme is i f hypothetical statements 
about what Roberto would do if he were alive are to be expressed. However such 
statements would be made in a different frame of existence, so a different concept 
of Roberto would be involved. 
Definitional events can be qualified by a time, just as observational events are. 
Thus the concept "The football team that won Euro'96" can be defined. Similarly, 
if a concept is connected to its parents by definitional events qualified by different 
times, the inherited definitional events will have these different times. Although 
this is allowed, i t is extremely rare that a concept does not have some definitional 
events true throughout its life span since concepts are stable partitions of the 
agent's environment: 2.4 (p. 13). 
D.4.3.3 The singular role of time 
Events are usually defined by an at_time event. Indeed the same sort of event may 
occur more than once. For instance, the event "Sengan eats a meal" usually occurs 
three times a day. Individual events are equivalent to sets of events observed to have 
size_ 1. Thus any individual event "Sengan ate a meal" must be distinguished from 
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all other such events by a definitional at-time event. Otherwise, the individual 
event would state that there is only one event with the feature of "Sengan eating 
a meal". In some cases this is warranted, for instance for "Sengan was born on the 
1st of March 1971". 
This feature distinguishes time from other independent variables, which might be 
thought similar. For instance, events can occur in different locations, introducing 
three new independent variables. However most events are observed to have oc-
curred in a place, rather than defining the place in which they occurred. This is 
because the partitioning process resulting in stable concepts implicitly depends on 
time: a concept is a configuration of the agent's environment that he can recognise 
when ever it occurs. Indeed even its purpose to allow the agent to interact more 
successfully with his environment has a temporal basis. 
D.4.3.4 Representing the Gregorian calendar 
• Basic calendar 
The Gregorian calendar represents dates by counting years, months and days. The 
counting starts at one. Years are counted either backwards or forwards from an 
origin point attributed to be the day Jesus Christ was born. Thus year 1 BC is 
followed by year 1 AD, without an intervening year zero. Months are counted from 
the start of the year, and days from the start of the month. 
This would seem easy enough to represent, but years, months and even days do not 
have fixed durations. The duration of leap years differs from other years. Similarly, 
months may be 28, 29, 30 or 31 days long. Days may be 23, 24 or 25 hours long, 
to allow the changes to and from summer time. And, every so often, an additional 
second is added to an hour, to take account of the slowing rotation of the Earth. In 
a representation with precise values for durations, this would cause difficulties. In 
SemNet however, the treatment of values in different units is fuzzier. For instance, 
i t is understood that one hour need not be 3600 seconds. This means that to refer 
to the year 2001, i t suffices to refer to the 1 year long interval 2000 years after the 
origin of the Gregorian calendar. Months can be referred to in a similar way, but 
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the origin will be the start point of the year in which they occur. Days are then 
indexed with respect to the start of the month. Thus the following is obtained: 
{Eo,R): {A/-subject_-70: Years-AD; A/-action_ - / 0 : spec; 
A I-object_ - / A : 3^ 1 } 
{Ei,R): { A/-subject_ - / 0 : Years_AD; A/-action_ - / 0 : spec; 
A I-object_ - / A : } 
iE2,R): { A/-subject_ - / 0 : J^i; A/-subject_ - / 0 : 3^ 2; 
A/-action_ - / 0 : antonym.; A I-object_ - / 0 : Years_AD } 
{E3,R): {AJ-subject_-70: 3^ 1; A/-action_ - / 0 : size.; 
A I-object_ - / 0 : 1 } 
{Ei,R): {AF-subject_-FA: ; AV-subject_- /0 : BJC ; 
AV-action_- /0 : starts.} 
{E5,R): {AF-subject_-FA: YearsJVD; AV-action_- /0 : follows.; 
AV-object_- /0 : BJC } 
{EQ,R): {AF-subject_-FA: F5; AV-action_- /0 : duration.; 
AF-object_-FO: Vi } 
(F7,i?): { A F-subject_ - F A : 3^ 2; AV-action_- /0 : follows.; 
A/-object_ - / 0 : BJC } 
{ES,R): { A F-subject_ - F A : E7; AV-action_- /0 : duration.; 
AF-object_-FO: V2 } 
(Fg,/?): {AF-subject_-FO: Vi; AV-subject_- /0 : l_Year ; 
AV-action_- /0 : 0 ; AF-object_-FA: V2 } 
(Eio,R): { A F-subject_ - F A : YearsJVD ; AV-action_- /0 : has.duration; 
AV-object_- /0 : l_Year } 
where Vi is the set of integer year durations, greater or equal to zero, and Years_AD 
is a specialization of the set of times. Months are then expressed with: 
(Fi3 ,i2): {AFV-subject_-FO: YearsJlD ; A W-action_ - / 0 : follows.; 
AFF-object_-FA: Months_AD } 
{Eu,R): { A F F-subject_ - F F A : F 1 3 ; A W-action_ - / 0 : duration.; 
AFV-object_-FO: V3 } 
where V3 is the set of integer month durations, greater or equal to zero but smaller 
than twelve. Months_AD is a speciahzation of the set of times. A similar treatment 
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deals with days, hours, minutes, and so on. 
There is however still a problem: the notions of duration are fuzzy in SemNet. 
This proved useful because it allowed years to be referred to as year long intervals 
occurring so many years after the origin of the Gregorian calendar, without being 
concerned with the variation of duration of individual years. However i t also means 
that LOLITA does not know that years are consecutive sharing only endpoints. 
This must be written explicitly: 
(En^R): { A F-subject_ - F A : J i ; AF-subject - -FO: Years_AD ; 
AV-action_- /0 : endS-} 
{Ei2,R)- {AF-subject - -FO: Xj ; AF-subject - -FO: ; 
A V-action - - / 0 : starts-} 
and similarly for months, etc. 
3^ 1 is defined by BJC the origin of the Gregorian calendar; and defines 3^2 - the 
set of years after I A D . Vi are integer multiples of a year duration, starting at zero. 
Thus the above states that every year y of Years-AD that occurs Y years after 
BJC, is associated with a year y' of which occurs Y + 1 years after BJC, and 
that there is an instant i of Xi which ends y but starts y'. The same scheme must 
be applied to months, days, hours and so on. Every year will be an instance of 
Years-AD, and usually also of 3^2 because of the antonym- event. Thus every year 
which occurred Y years after BFC will inherit the fact it shares its endpoint with 
a year starting Y + 1 years after BFC and if F > 0, it shares its startpoint with 
a year starting Y — 1 years after BFC. 
The calendar for dates BC is defined in a similar manner, except that the f ollows-
event takes as object-S the years, since they precede BJC. Further, the set of 
durations qualifying the follows- event takes integer year durations of one year or 
more, rather than zero years or more. This means that the year's date is exactly 
the number of years between the start of the year and BJC. 
• Improving Efficiency of access 
The representation of date described above does not allow efficient retrieval of 
events by date. Since this is a relatively common task, efficiency must be improved. 
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The inefficiency stems from the low determinism of search in finding a date: starting 
from the calendar's origin, there are many paths that could be followed to reach the 
desired dates. By using a specialization of f o l l o w s , say f ol lows. i , only to express 
dates, the search space can be limited to date information. However, each event 
with ac t ion , f o l lows. i connected to the calendar's origin must be traversed to 
determine its duration, to decide whether i t is a good candidate for further search. 
This is still bad in a large database. 
The natural solution is to structure the search space further. Given the nature of 
dates, i t would seem quite easy to build a tree to direct search. Unfortunately the 
way in which people refer to the Gregorian calendar is asymmetrical which makes 
the building of a linguistically useful hierarchy diflacult. One speaks of the 1980s 
(meaning 1980 to 1989 included), and of the 20th century (meaning 1901-2000 
included). This difference in whether one starts counting at zero or at one means 
one cannot include the representation of centuries and decennia in the the same 
tree, despite the benefits to search which would result. The solution adopted is to 
build a tree corresponding to decennia and to Hnk all but the first decennia of the 
century to i t by an i s . i n event, and to include all the missing years in much the 
same manner. The hierarchy is a binary tree using specializations of the s t a r t s , 
and ends, events to give a unique search path down from the root node. The date 
of the root node can be expressed in the usual way, although the path from i t to 
the calendar's origin is expressed by speciaHzed f o l l o w s , events, say follows.2. 
The main search tree includes years, months and days. The secondary tree includes 
centuries associated with the relevant years as described previously. There are 
obviously many choices of binary tree that could be made for the search tree. 
In particular, a balanced tree, or a tree encoding the date in binary. The first 
choice has the advantage of the keeping the tree depth to a minimum. I t has two 
disadvantages: i t requires the tree to be balanced each time a new date is inserted 
or deleted. I t also requires the date of each node to be determined as the search 
proceeds from the root, to determine which branch should be taken. Although this 
is a task with a unique search path, i t requires quite a few events to be traversed. 
The alternative choice is to use the binary pattern representing the date's number 
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for the search: 4 is 100 in binary, which for a tree of depth 3 would mean the 
following search path: endS- - s t a r t s - - s t a r t s - The depth of the tree thus 
depends on the range of dates to encode, although i t can always be increased by 
introducing a new root extra branches above the current root. Although this creates 
deeper search trees, the date of each node down the tree from the root does not 
need to be checked, which increases speed. However i t could decrease robustness: 
The binary pattern used to search the tree is implicit, whereas the nodes of the 
tree are all defined by their date expressed by f ollows-i events. These dates could 
contradict the information implicit in the order of the s t a r t s , and ends- events 
forming the tree. 
Thus the depth of the search for the first tree is log2(N)-|-log2(12)-|-log2(30), rounded 
up, where N is the year component of the latest date known to the system. As the 
hierarchy is built on the fly, memory is saved by only building the paths necessary 
to reach the dates known to the system. 
D.4.4 Aspect 
D.4.4.1 Aspect and Tense 
Statements in the past and the perfect tenses both refer to events that have already 
occurred with respect to some reference time. However there is a subtle difference 
in meaning between them: "John ate an apple" and "John has eaten an apple" 
are not equivalent. This difference is not in the ordering of events, but in the 
truth of the event's postconditions. The past does not state whether or not the 
state resulting from the event is still valid. The perfect states that i t is. "/ have 
bought a car" means that I own the car now, whereas one could say "/ bought a 
car" long after one had sold i t . I t the event is itself a state or process, rather 
than resulting in a change of state, there are no postconditions so the perfect refers 
to the continuation of the state itself. Contrast "Jane lived in London for two 
years"^^ and "Jane has lived in London for two years"^^. Similarly "I paced the 
^^ from 1965 to 1967 for instance 
until now 
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room the whole day" and "/ have paced the room the whole day". In general, the 
perfect emphasizes the end-point of its statement, often the post-conditions. This 
difference in the meaning of tense is often called a difference of aspect. 
Statements in the progressive tense refer some interval within an event. For in-
stance, "While John was making breakfast, Mary got dressed". However they do 
not state that the ful l interval during which they occurred started after the refer-
ence event, or that they were over before its end: "John phoned his mother. The 
sun was setting, and the light lit the sea stretched out in front of him" Indeed, 
they often do not even imply that the event expressed in the progressive actually 
reached completion. For instance one can say "/ was building a wall, but I ran out 
of stones", but not "/ built a wall, but I ran out of stones". As argued in 7.4 (p. 
269), the progressive often refers to a different concept than the non-progressive 
tenses, distinguished for instance by their postconditions: after "I was washing the 
floor", there is a more or less clean floor, but after "I washed the floor", the floor 
should be clean. Not all progressives refer to a different concept: "/ was seeing 
the moon" implies "/ saw the moon". These differences between continuous and 
non-continuous tenses are often classed as pertaining to aspect. 
D.4.4,2 Aspect and Classification of Verbs 
A related issue is the classification of verbs^ *". Verbs can be classified into four 
groups. 
The first distinction is between verbs that do not possess a continuous tense, such 
as to know: *"/ am knowing". These are state verbs. The other verbs have a 
continuous tense, such as to learn: "I am learning", which can further be divided 
into three categories. 
Activities are verbs which take time but have no completion point. For example, 
"I lived in Paris", or "I was running". This does not indicate that they lack 
postconditions, but that the postconditions do not change suddenly to true at 
^^ See [Kenny 63], [Vendler 67], [Mourelatos 81] for more details 
There are variations on this scheme, such as [Steedman 77] 
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some point. Usually, they involve continuous changes. They can be qualified by a 
"for duration" but not by an "in duration" construction: "/ swam for two hours" 
but not "I swam in two hours". 
Accomplishments are verbs which take some time and achieve a completion point 
when their postconditions are satisfied: "I built a wall". These verbs can be quali-
fied by an "in duration", or "take duration to" construction, which states the time 
taken to complete the accomplishment. They cannot be qualified by a "for dura-
tion" construction. For instance "/ ran a mile in a minute" but ran a mile for 
an hour". However they are associated with an equivalent activity: "I ran for an 
hour" or "/ was building a wall for an hour". 
Achievements are verbs that they have an instantaneous character: "John reached 
the summit." They can be qualified by a "in" construction: "John reached the 
summit in three hours", making them similar to accomplishments. Unlike accom-
plishments, however, they do not have equivalent activities. 
Accomplishments and their equivalent activities are different concepts, but are 
represented in English by the same words. They are distinguished grammatically, 
as usually activities are intransitive, and the corresponding accomplishments are 
transitive. I f the intransitive form does not exist, the activity concept is expressed 
by the progressive. 
Sentences can also be classed into an aspect in the same way. Tense is only one 
component in the choice of a sentence's aspect. Quantification may also play a 
role. For instance, "crossed the bridge" would appear to be an accomplishment. 
However in the sentence "Cars crossed the bridge" is an activity, since the preferred 
quantification is the distribution over the set. In contrast, "Students wrote a letter" 
is an accomplishment since the preferred reading is not the distribution over the 
set. 
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D.4.4.3 Language dependence of Aspect 
The distinction between aspect and temporal ordering appears well founded. For 
instance, whereas the ordering of events expressed by the present in English and 
French does not vary, the aspect does. In English, "I eat an apple" usually conveys 
a impression of repetition, as i t usually occurs in sentences such as "I eat an apple 
every day". Instead the progressive is used: "/ am eating an apple". No such 
inference applies in French, where the non-progressive form is used: "Je mange 
une pomme". 
In English, the simple present has a habitual meaning: "John eats a lemon" (...every 
day, to prevent scurvy). Or i t can be used to express a permanent truth: "Tigers 
eat meat". These are issues of language usage but are sometimes referred to as 
aspect. 
The differences in aspect and temporal ordering of same tenses between different 
languages suggest that different tenses express different information by the conju-
gation of verbs. Indeed, classical Greek provides an example of this using a third 
voice to the habitual active and passive, the medium, to express that the speaker 
did something for his own interest: "I do something for myself". 
D.5 Linguistic and Conceptual Nodes 
The labels associated with each node, presented in 5.1.1.4 (p. 117), allow concepts 
to be associated with a word corresponding to the concept they refer to. This 
scheme is sufficient for one unambiguous language. However in practice, LOLITA 
is to process ambiguous natural languages, in order, say, to translate text. This 
section presents a solution to this problem. 
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D.5.1 Linguistic nodes 
D.5.1.1 The problem 
The words in natural language do not correspond one-to-one to the concepts that 
prove useful in the inheritance hierarchy. Some concepts cannot be expressed by a 
single word, others correspond to many words. Similarly, the same word may refer 
to more than one concepts. If more than one language is introduced, the problem is 
compounded by the need to distinguish between labels used in different languages. 
The "one node label per node" scheme is insufficient and too inflexible to provide 
solutions to all these problems. 
D.5.1.2 The solution: linguistic nodes 
Concepts are expressed by diff'erent words in different natural languages. However, 
they may all designate the same concept: "man", "Mann", and "homme" refer to 
the same idea. Thus on the one hand there is a linguistic label "man", and on the 
other there is the concept itself man. But the label "man" is also a concept: the 
concept of the label of the concept man. As such, i t can be thought about, and 
added to LOLITA's network. Indeed, this is necessary if LOLITA is to be able 
to represent sentences such as "Some people call them freedom-fighters, others call 
them terrorists". These label concepts are called linguistic nodes, and the concepts 
they refer to are conceptual nodes. 
Now that these two forms of node have been introduced, one would like to state 
that one refers to the other. This can be done by an event whose act ion- states the 
language of the linguistic node, in-english, i n - f rench, i n - i t a l i a n , in.spanish, 
and in-chinese are examples of the generic type in.language. This takes as 
subject- a conceptual node, and as object- its corresponding linguistic node. 
D.5.1.3 The use of linguistic nodes 
• Ambiguity 
One word may be ambiguous and refer to many concepts. For instance, the word 
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"strip" can refer to the concepts of air-strip, strip of land or striptease. Such words 
are the subject_s of many in.lainguage events, linking them to all the relevant 
object- concepts. 
The frequency of occurrence of a particular word being associated with one of its 
meanings can be expressed using values^^: the in_leinguage event is the subject , of 
a has_linguistic_frequency event, which has as object- the relevant frequency. 
The information thus provided can help in ranking possible candidates meanings 
for a word, during disambiguation. Since values are used, all the normal value 
reasoning methods can be used. 
• Linguistic synonyms 
Synonyms are words which refer to the same concept. For instance, "cab" and 
"taxi" refer to the same concept. They can be expressed by two in_language 
events with different subject_s but the same object. . This avoids using two 
conceptual nodes to represent the same concept, and maintains uniqueness. 
As for ambiguous words, the in.language events can be qualified by value events 
stating the frequency of occurrence of a particular word in a particular language. 
This can be used by a natural language generator to choose its words given the style 
of the text i t is producing. For instance the word with the higher usage frequency 
would be used in a text for children. 
• Wordless concepts 
Many concepts do not correspond to a word in natural language. For many of 
these the reason is that they correspond to a phrase in natural language. For 
instance there is no single word for "large grey-coloured fish". This means that 
such concepts must be built during the interpretation process, and i f one wishes to 
know their meaning in natural language, a generator must build the appropriate 
natural language expressions for them. 
In some cases, this is due to one language having a word for a concept, but another 
^^For more information on values, see 7.1 (p. 247) 
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lacking one. For instance, in Italian there is no word for "to mow"^^. Instead the 
expression "to cut the grass" is used. Similarly, in English there is no single word to 
express the Italian "mollo" which means disgustingly soft. Here too, the generator 
should use the definition of the concept to produce a natural language expression 
for i t in the relevant language. 
Thus in general, when the natural language word or expression for a concept must 
be given in a particular language, and there is no word for that concept in that 
language, the concept is described by using it's definitional properties by a gener-
ator. Otherwise, the relevant word is used by traversing the relevant in.language 
event, such as the in_f rench event. 
• Partial and full definitions of concepts 
o Concepts for unknown words 
Although one would like all concepts in the database of a large NLP system to 
be uniquely defined, so that the computer knows the difference between lead and 
iron, in practice such a well-defined knowledge base is unUkely. Indeed, even if 
all the concepts in her network were uniquely defined, one would like LOLITA to 
display robust behaviour while processing a text containing a word unknown to 
her. This however poses a problem, in that all concepts must be uniquely defined 
in the network. 
Little is known about the concept expressed by an unknown word w. How-
ever, i t is known is that i t is referred to by the word w in the language be-
ing processed. Thus, although its meaning is unknown, i t should be available 
for further processing. For instance, LOLITA might know what galligaskins are 
in the sentence "John wore his galligaskins to work". However she should be 
able to build a concept for them, and then infer from the is sentence that galli-
gaskins are some form of clothing^^. For this to be possible, the concept corre-
sponding to the word w must be available in the network, and therefore defined 
uniquely. This is achieved by using a definitional in_language event, as follows: 
^°For further information, see [Morgan et al. 94] 
'^^ The template event 'wearing' has as object, clothing 
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{Eo,R): {A/-subjec t_- /A: galligaskins-concept; A/-action_-/0: in.english; 
A/-object_-/0: gall igaskins-word} 
Needless to say, the amount known by LOLITA about a particular concept will 
l imit her ability to reason about i t . 
o Full and partial definitions 
Even if the definition of a concept is sufficient to distinguish i t from all other 
concepts in the network, i t may be a definitional subject- of an in_language 
event. This means not all its definitional properties are explicitly stated in the 
network: the concept is partially defined. 
Sometimes all the definitional properties of a concept are explicitly stated within 
the network. This is for instance the case for the word "owner" which is defined 
as all those people who own some object. Such fully defined concepts are observed 
to correspond to a particular word in some language: 
{EQ,R): {A/-subjec t_- /0: owners-concept; A/-act ion - - /0: in-french; 
A/-object_-/0: p ropr i e t a i r e} 
o Aside; unknow^n meanings 
The scheme presented for unknown words worked when the word was completely 
unknown. However, sometimes i t is a meaning of a word that is unknown. For 
example, LOLITA might not know the American meaning of "submarine" in the 
sentence "The sailor ate the suhmarine'^'^. However she can be told that there 
is another meaning of "submarine". Adopting the previous scheme fails since the 
word "submarine" is not sufficient to define the new concept uniquely. However 
LOLITA also knows that the new meaning does not refer to the other meanings of 
the word. She can use this to define the new concept uniquely: i t is defined as the 
concept corresponding to the word "submarine" and antonymous with respect to 
typeless to all other meanings of that word Once this information is available, 
she can infer that submarine refers to some form of food. This mechanism is limited 
by uniqueness to one new undefined meaning per word. 
22 Taken from [Hirst 87] 
23If antonym-is eliminated, the same effect can be achieved using the same method as antonyms 
of events are without antonym-: see D.6.3.3 (p. D-80) 
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D.5.2 Expressing language dependent information 
The word for a concept is not the only language dependent feature of concepts. 
Independently of abstractions such as grammar, individual features of words may 
vary. This is the case for grammatical information such as gender, varying from 
English to French to German. The same word may be masculine in one language 
such as "der Wald", masculine in German and "laforet", feminine in French, both 
designating the concept "forest". Such information should be expressed at the level 
of linguistic nodes. 
D.5.2.1 Controls on linguistic nodes 
Most language dependent information such as gender, the grammatical nature of 
words (noun, verb, adverb, adjectives...), transitivity of verbs, count or mass nouns, 
or what information a particular irregular word form is expressing ("men" is the 
irregular plural of "man") and so on is expressed as linguistic controls. The reason 
for this is that expressing this data as events provides no advantages: unlike other 
information it is not reasoned about, but only used as immutable facts. 
Of special interest is the linguistic control which specifies whether a node is linguis-
tic or conceptual. This can be used to ensure both kinds of nodes are not confused. 
Also worthy of mention, linguistic and conceptual gender must be distinguished: 
the German word "das Mddchen" signifies "the young girl" and is conceptually 
feminine, but is linguistically neuter. 
D.5.2.2 Relations between linguistic nodes 
Some words have irregular forms that are not subject to regular morphological 
inflection. These forms can be represented in the network using relations between 
linguistic nodes. One such relation is the root_of event which takes as subject . 
the root form of the word and as object- the irregular form. The particular gram-
matical features of the irregular form can either be expressed by other relations at 
the linguistic level, or by linguistic controls. 
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{Eo,R): {A/-subjec t_- /0: man; A/-act ion - - /0: root-of; A/-objec t - - /0: men} 
D.5.3 Sorts and linguistic nodes 
Linguistic nodes are linguistic entities corresponding to concepts, and are defined 
by the linguistic information they carry. This means that there is only one node 
per combination of linguistic information. Thus, linguistic nodes other that events 
expressing linguistic relations, are never referred to as definitional by an arc. I t is 
the linguistic control that states that a node is linguistic, and is therefore defined 
by its controls expressing linguistic information. 
D.6 Intension, Extension and Frames of Existence 
D.6.1 Intensionality and Extensionality 
Statements may either be made about concepts or about the things to which con-
cepts refer. We need to distinguish these cases. For instance, "the morning star", 
the "evening star" and "Venus" are different concepts. The morning star is the 
last point of light in the sky to disappear at dawn; the evening star is the first 
point of light in the sky to appear at dusk; and Venus is a particular planet of the 
solar system. An Egyptian slave would have known about the first two concepts 
quite well, but not about the third. Thus they are different concepts, and refer to 
different situations. This conceptual level where relations are expressed about the 
concept is the intensional level. We also now know that the last point of light in 
the sky at dawn is the same object as the first point of light in the evening, and 
as the planet Venus. Thus the three concepts refer to the same thing, or have the 
same extension. 
The representation is intensional, in that each concept is represented by a difl^erent 
node. Each concept is defined as a restriction of typeless, using events connected 
to i t either directly, or indirectly via inheritance, by arcs with definitional sorts. 
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Concepts are different if they are restricted by different events, regardless of what 
objects satisfy all their restrictions in a particular world. Although each concept 
is restricted by different events, i t is possible for two concepts to happen to have 
the same extension in the world. That is to say that the same set of objects of 
the world satisfy the restrictions of both concepts. However this is not so much a 
consequence of their definition, as a result of the particular world being described. 
There is no reason derived uniquely from the definitions of the concepts themselves, 
for the planet Venus and the first point of light in the sky in the evening to be the 
same object. This happens to be a quirk of the world we live in. 
Distinguishing intensionally different concepts is important. For instance, it might 
be that the set of people who play departmental football, and the set of people 
from the department who work on LOLITA consists of the same people. I t might 
also be known that these people are fit. However, one would not want some causal 
reasoning algorithm to derive that one reason for these people to be fit is that they 
all work on LOLITA. This could happen if the two concepts were not distinguished 
intensionally, and expressed as one node and is avoided by having a node for each 
concept. 
Intensionality is also involved in different views of the same objects. For instance 
an astrologer and an astronomer may have very different concepts of the planet 
Venus. Similarly, flowers can be thought of as beautiful arrangements of petals on 
top of a green stem, or as the reproductive organs of plants. Choosing the right 
conceptualization is important in trying to understand why people give each other 
flowers, or in giving a biology lecture. 
D.6.2 Intensional and Extensional equality 
Since the representation represents different concepts by different nodes, there must 
be a means to state that two concepts refer to the same object. Similarly, there 
are situations where one wishes to state that some node is intensionally equal to 
another, or that both nodes refer to the same concept. To preserve uniqueness, 
this is only allowed when there is some doubt as to whether the nodes represent 
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the same concepts. An example of this is the representation of ambiguity: nodes 
representing ambiguous concepts are intensionally equal to one of their possible 
meanings. 
Equality is expressed using the synonym event^ '*. Using this event in conjunction 
with the definitional and observational sorts on the arcs proves sufficient to rep-
resent both varieties of equality: if the synonym event has observational sorts for 
both its subject-S, it states that the synonym- event is in no way responsible for 
the subject- nodes being synonymous, since in no way it restricts them. Similarly 
if the synonym- event has definitional sorts for both its subject_s, i t restricts both 
in such a way that they are synonymous. This corresponds to stating that each 
node is defined by all the definitional events connected directly or indirectly via the 
inheritance hierarchy to both nodes. The first kind of synonym, event expresses 
extensional equality, whereas the second expresses intensional equality. 
A third variety of equality is possible: the synonym, has a definitional sort on one of 
its subject- arcs, and an observational sort on the other. Here the node connected 
to the definitional subject- is defined by the restrictions of the node connected to 
the observational subject-. This variety of synonym is used for instance to build 
powersets of a set. 
I t should perhaps be mentioned that there can be a difference between a statement 
of synonymity between the concepts A and 5, and the statement that for every 
instantiation of the concept A there is an instantiation of the concept B which is 
synonymous to i t , and vice-versa: in the latter case, statements about the concept 
itself will not be mirrored over the synonym- event to both nodes. For instance, if 
a concept under consideration A is the team that won the departmental football 
trophy, and even if all its elements are definitionally synonymous with those of 
B wil l not be inferred to be the team that won the departmental football trophy. 
24This implies that no processes should compare noderefs to determine whether they are dealing 
with the SEime concept. 
Appendix D: Extended Representation: Detailed Issues D-78 
D.6.3 Synonyms and Uniqueness 
Synonyms are necessary to express extensional equality, and prove useful for build-
ing powersets, and the representation of ambiguity. However, their use has a price: 
they can break uniqueness. This section describes the way in which this cost is 
minimized. 
D.6.3,1 Definitional and Observational Sorts 
The first situation where synonyms can be used to break uniqueness involves defini-
tional and observational sorts. A synonym event could state that all instantiations 
of the concept X occur in the concept Y and vice-versa. I f Y has the same def-
initional events as X but also a few more, its additional definitional events are 
effectively observational events, despite being marked definitional. Such situations 
are prevented by rendering illegal any synonym, event between a node and its 
ancestor in the inheritance hierarchy. 
D.6.3.2 Set Union: union. 
Similarly, synonyms break the uniqueness of the definition of the union, event 
which can be represented in three different ways. 
The first alternative uses quantification only: 
{ET,R): {OF-subject.-FVA: V\ AV-action.-/0: union.; OV-object.-3!A: A] 
{EiQ,R): {AFV-subject_-F3!0: A; AF[l!|subject.-F[w]C): V; 
AW-action.-/0: synonym.} 
which simply states that for every set a in .4 (the sets which are unions of others) 
there is a set e of events in Eio and a set d of subsets of a in V: for a given d, 
to every distinct element x of each subset in d corresponds an event of e which 
states that x is equal to the corresponding element of a. I f an element is shared 
between some of the subsets of d, the corresponding event will have more than 2 
subject-s^^. 
Strictly speaking, this and the next examples do not define union. - but state truths about 
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The second alternative uses belief events to form a concept defined by a disjunction 
of properties'^. 
{E8,H): {AFVF-subject--FFO: A; AFFV-subject--FF3!0: V; 
A\/W-action--/0: synonym-} 
iE9,R): {AFF-subject--FVFO: Fg; AW-action-- /0: or.} 
Here quantification is also quite subtle: Fs's structure mirrors that of D. For each 
set of synonym- events chosen by the or. event, one or more are believed, allowing 
elements to be shared between the subsets of each d {d defined above). Each or-
event takes many subject-S because of the V in FF — F\/F. 
For completeness a third form is presented, where cardinality and not synonym-
proves sufficient to express observational union.. This form cannot be expressed 
as an inheritable expression, but does not require the use of logical disjunction. 
Let S be the superset and Vx to be its subsets. For S to be the union of the 
subsets Vx, the subsets Vx must contain every element of «S. Let X\ be the subsets 
of S which have as defining property that their elements lack at least one of the 
properties required for them to be one of the elements of Vx- Every X\ must be 
empty since every element of S must satisfy one of the conjunctions of properties 
defining the subsets Vx- Thus if each set Vx is defined by properties Px,y, then X 
is defined by Ax Vy f{Px,y) where f{p) denotes the absence of property p^'^ This 
expression still contains belief connectives (and. and or.). However, by applying 
(a V 6) A c = (a A c) V (6 A c) the statement can be transformed to an outer or-
qualifying many and-S: Vt - • • Au/(9t ,u)- The outer or. can be eliminated by re-
placing the single subset X by as many concepts X as the or. has arguments. 
Each yz is defined by the relevant group of absent properties (obtained for each 
t from Au f{Qt,u)) and each has observed size_ 0: only the subsets Vx contain 
elements of S since <S is their union.. Obviously this does not work for properties, 
such as arcs, which cannot be qualified by size- 0. 
it. The practical consequence of this is that synonym- statements which correspond to union, 
will not be integrated under unionJs definition by semantic integration. Although union- can be 
defined in this maimer, the integration thus required is beyond the ciurrent capacity of semantic 
integration. 
2^ This may be depreciated in the future since defining concepts by a logical disjunction of 
properties may render reasoning and semantic integration intractable. 
2'''Expressed in SemNet by the property's event having observed s ize- zero: see 7.3.2 (p. 267). 
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The first two forms win on compactness: the third form can require very many 
empty sets if the subsets of the union are defined by many properties. But the third 
form does not require additional machinery: no union, to recognise, no complex 
quantificational or logical reasoning. Thus xmion. is only worthwhile if its cost in 
code complexity is justified by its reduction of network size. Currently, no decision 
has been taken, and union, is maintained as a precaution. The second definition of 
union, is preferred, since i t involves simpler inheritance. Normalization is assumed 
to deal with the first case. 
D.6.3.3 Antonyms: antonym. 
The antonym, event can be defined by belief events to defined a concept by a 
disjunction of properties'^. 
{E5,H): {AFVF-subject_-FFO: A; AFFV-subject_-F^^3!0: V; 
AVW-action . - /0: synonym.} 
( ^ 6 , ^ ) : {AFF-subject . -FVFO: E5; AW -act ion . - /0: xor.} 
Here quantification is quite subtle: jE'5's structure mirrors that of V. For each set 
of events chosen by the xor. event, only one is believed, which - since everything is 
a matter of belief - states that for any set being partitioned by an antonym., each 
of its elements occurs in only one of the partitions. Each xor. event takes many 
subject.s because of the V in FF - FVF. 
The second form cannot be expressed as an inheritable expression, but does not 
require the use of logical disjunction. The general case is based on the third def-
inition of union, above. This is augmented by stating that every subset Vx is a 
partition of S. I.e., no element of S is shared by two or more Vx- Two sets A and 
B lack a common element if: 
{Ea,H): { A [ v ] V - s u b j e c t . - ^ 0 : A; A ^ V - s u b j e c t . - ^ O : B; 
AW -act ion . - /0 : synonym.} 
(Fb,i?): {AF-subject . -FO: F5; AV-action .-/0: size.; AV-object .-/0: 0 } 
By using this for every combination of pairs of sets of Vx, one can state the sets 
2^  This may be depreciated in the future since it may render reasoning and semantic integration 
intractable. 
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Vx share no common element. Even though F j can be shared using arbitrary 
quantification, this results in "'•"'^^ synonym, events, where n is the number of 
partitions. 
The above expression is augmented by many special cases, such as the complement 
set. The complement c of any set s with respect to its parent S is defined by a form 
of negation of s's definitional properties: if s is defined by the existence of property 
X and the absence of y, then c is defined by the absence of x or the presence of y. 
Any set and its complement are antonyms with respect to their parent. 
The general case of the second form fails for events like antonym verbs: the defining 
property of Vx are action, arcs, which cannot be qualified by s ize . 0. However 
this case can also be dealt with: antonym verbs occur in pairs, such as "like"/ 
"dislike". I f one of the template events t is defined by its action, the other event 
u can be defined as being the subset of S which does not include elements of t, 
where 5 is u and t's common superset. For instance, <S could be "to have feeling 
for", t could be defined by l ike, and could define u which defines disl ike. 
Just as was the case for the union, event, the first form suffers from its additional 
reasoning requirements, and the second from its space consumption. The same 
trade-offs must be made. Similarly, the first definition is currently preferred because 
it involves simpler inheritance. 
D.6.3.4 Powerset: powerset. and inf inite.powerset 
synonym, can define powerset.: For each element x in X, there is a set y in 3^  
which contains all the possible sets that one can build from the elements of x: 
(Faci?): {AF-subject . -FO: X; OV-action.-/A: powerset.; 
AF-object .-FO: y} 
(Fgi,/?): {AF|w|-subject.-F|3!|0: X; AFFF-subject.-FFFA: y-, 
AVW-action.-/0: synonym.} 
Notice that the action powerset. is defined by F31. The same should be done 
for antonym., union., and all other events that can be completely defined within 
SemNet. However, i t obfuscates the presentation, so generally has not been done. 
Appendix D; Extended Representation: Detailed Issues D-82 
Similarly, the infinite powerset can be built: 
{Es2,R)- {AF-subject--FO: X; OV-action--/A: i n f inite-powerset; 
AF-object_-FO: 3^ } 
{E33,H): {AFF-subject--FFA: X; AF|3! |-subject--F| W|A: y; 
AW-action - - /0 : synonym-} 
{E3A,H): {AFF-subject--FFO: y'; AF^giTsubject . -Fp^A: y; 
AW-action - - /0 : synonym-} 
(F35,i?): {AFF-subject--FFO: F 3 4 ; AFV-subject--F3!0: F 3 3 ; 
AFV-action--/0: or-} 
(F36,i?): {AF-subject--FO: y-, AF-subject--FA: y'; 
AV-action--/0: synonym.} 
However, the use of an or_ means that the usage of this definition may become 
depreciated: i t might render reasoning and semantic integration intractable. 
D.6.3.5 No Uniqueness Break for spec-
There is however some good news. Synonyms might be expected to break unique-
ness with respect to spec- relations: ^ X 3y E Y. {x = y) would indicate that 
X is a subset of Y. However i t should be remembered that when an event refers 
to a concept with existential quantification, it refers to all of the concepts' instan-
tiations. This prevents such schemes from working. A similar fate awaits schemes 
attempting to emulate i n s t - relations using arbitrary quantification: arbitrary 
quantification is a shorthand for an implicit i n s t . relation. However to avoid sit-
uations where arbitrary quantification is expanded out resulting in a node a being 
synonymous to another b which itself is an instance of a third c, synonym events 
are not allowed to refer to a subject, using arbitrary quantification. 
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D.6.4 Frames of existence 
D.6.4.1 The need for frames of existence 
• The problem; Are there more than one different extensions of a con-
cept ? 
Before attacking the meat of this section, an important point will be emphasized. 
I t should be remembered at all times throughout this discussion that all references 
to the world, the real world or reality do not refer to any absolute reality, if such 
a thing exists. Instead they refer to the world that the agent believes to be real, 
and to the partitions of his sensory perception which define his understanding of 
that world. This notion is quite subtle, especially when discussing the beliefs other 
agents may hold about the world. I t should be remembered that to an agent, 
the notion of other agents is yet another partitioning of his perception. Thus 
when he refers to their beliefs about the world he is not referring to what they 
really believe or even to their partitioning of their perception, since they may not 
even exist. Instead he refers to what he believes these agents as partitions of his 
sensory perception believe about the world which is also a partition of his sensory 
perception. Now that this has been clarified, the problem can be discussed. 
In the previous subsections, extension was discussed in terms of some world. This 
notion needs clarification. Intension corresponds to the partitioning of all possible 
sensory input, or "meaning space" discussed earlier (2.4 (p. 13)). Extension on 
the other hand would seem to be from the previous discussion, objects that the 
agent has experienced appearing in his perceptual space, and therefore those that 
he believes to be part of the world in which he lives and acts. However, there may 
be other forms of extension. For instance, a fictional character in a book is referred 
to as an object, extensionally rather than intensionally: "Sherlock Holmes lit his 
pipe, and coughed bitterly" does not refer to the concept of Sherlock Holmes, but to 
the person himself. The problem is that human agents know that Sherlock does not 
exist physically in the world. This knowledge prevents them from making mistakes 
such as asking someone to interview Sherlock Holmes. In order for LOLITA not to 
make mistakes, she needs such knowledge, and hence the ability to represent it . 
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01 
The right concept includes only X. and other instantiations of frame F l . 
but does not include Y or Z or other instantiations of different frames. 
4 object O p. 
in Frame 
Figure D . l : Frames of existence 
A less trivial example occurs when different plans are to be evaluated, for instance 
for their anticipated environmental impact. Although the actions and their effects 
can be discussed for each plan, none of them "exist" in that they have not yet been 
applied. Indeed, the various options discussed may involve conflicting actions which 
could not "exist" simultaneously: an extreme example could involve someone doing 
something in one of the plans, although he had been killed previously in another. 
• The solution: Partitioning extension into frames 
I t seems therefore clear that the same concept can correspond to different extensions 
depending on the situation considered. The solution adopted involves the notion of 
frames of existence. These frames correspond to the different situations in which the 
possible extensions of a concept are encountered. For instance, in the "cartoon" 
frame of existence, flying elephants could have a non-empty extension including 
Dumbo, but in the "reality" frame of existence they would have an empty extension. 
The membership of a concept's instantiation to a particular frame !Fi is simply 
modeled: the instantiation is the subject , of an inJ'rame event, which has as 
ac t i on . "in.Frame" and as objec t , the node Ti. T\ is an instance of the set of 
frame of existence markers. An object may belong to more than frames of existence, 
by being the subject , of more than one inJ"rame events with different object.s. 
The set of extensions 5 of a particular frame of existence T\ is chosen by using a 
definitional in_Frame event with ob jec t . T\. 
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D.6.4.2 The use of frames of existence 
• Structuring frames of existence 
o Structure in the inheritance hierarchy 
Frames of existence are expressed in the inheritance hierarchy. They are antonym, 
to concepts to which they cannot apply with respect to typeless. These include 
frame of existence markers, the in.Frame event, spec, and i n s t . relations, and 
other things which do not occur in possible worlds. 
Some frames of existence can be more specialized than others. This is expressed 
using the inheritance hierarchy, as for instance for: 
(En ,R): 
(Fi2 ,R): 
(Fi3 ,R): 
(Fi4 ,R): 
(Fi5 ,R): 
(Fi6 ,R): 
(Fi7 ,R): 
(Fi8 ,Ry. 
(Fi9 ,Ry-
(F20 ,Ry. 
(F21 ,Ry. 
(F22 ,Ry 
(F22 ,Ry 
AF-subject . -FA: JFQ; AV-action.-/0: inJ^rame; AV-object_-/0 
AF-subject . -FA: J^i, AV-action.-/0: inJ'rame; AV-object.-/0 
AF-subject . -FA: T2; AV-action.-/0: inJ'rame; AV-object.-/0 
AF-subject . -FA: ^^4; AV-action.-/0: inJ'rame; AV-object_-/0 
AF-subject . -FA: AV-action_-/0: inJ'rame; AV-object_-/0 
/o} 
/ i } 
/a} 
h} 
A/-object.-/0: Ti} 
A/-object.-70: T2} 
A/-object.-/A: T3} 
A/-object.-/A: 
A/-object_-/0: 0} 
A/-subject.- /0: To; A/-action.-/0: spec 
A/-subject.- /0: To] A/-action.-/0: spec: 
A/-subject.- /0: Ti, A/-action.-/0: spec 
A/-subject.- /0: ^F^, A/-action.-/0: spec. 
A/-subject.- /0: T3; A/-action.-/0: s ize . 
A/-subject.- /0: T^]; A/-action.-/0: antonym.; 
A/-object--/0: Ti} 
A/-subject.- /0: J^i, A/-action.-/0: spec; A/-object . - /A: :Fi} 
A/-subject.- /0: Ti; A/-action.-/0: spec; A/-object.-/A: J^^} 
Here the frame of existence J^2 is more specialised than JTQ. For instance, J^o could 
be the frame of existence of fictional entities, and T2 that of those appearing in 
books by Franz Kafka. Frames of existence can be stated to involve no common 
elements as shown with or be antonyms as for and with respect to 
J^i. The first situation occur between entities appearing in Chinese mythology and 
those appearing in Norse mythology, whereas the second could refer to the only 
Appendix D: Extended Representation; Detailed Issues D-86 
two books written by a particular author, 
o Storage considerations 
Frames of existence need not occupy much storage space, since once they have 
been defined, normal set relations can be used to refer to the instantiations of a 
particular concept in a particular frame of existence. This node corresponds to the 
intersection of the intensional concept under consideration, and the restriction of 
typeless corresponding to all objects occurring in the frame of existence under con-
sideration. For instance Dogsjr is the extension of all dogs in the frame of existence 
T: 
{Eo,R): { A/-subject - - / 0 : Dogs; A/-action - - / 0 : spec-; 
A 7-object - - / A : Dogsjr} 
{Ei,R): { A/-subject - - / 0 : JF; A/-action_ - / 0 : spec-; A/-object - - / A : Dogsj^} 
Not all events need have their own in_Frame event. Indeed, it is rare for there to 
be a reason for an event to refer to an in_Frame event. Thus to save on net size, a 
degree of compression can be achieved by using arbitrary quantification: 
{Ei,R): { A A-subject - - / 0 : [NQ, Ni, N2 . . . ] ; AV-action_- /0 : in-Frame; 
AV-object . -3!0: To} 
Here Ei serves as an in-Frame event for A'o and each of its other subject -S . These 
subject -S are not partial since no two arcs referring to the same concept with arbi-
trary quantification can refer to the same instantiation of that concept. Searchwise, 
this results in a substantial loss of determinism of search from the event to the node 
since their are so many subject -S to choose from. However the only reasons for 
such searches would be if the in-Frame event were referred to which is not the case 
when this shorthand is used, or if all nodes in a particular frame of existence were 
being searched for, in which case determinism of search is not relevant. 
• Referring to non-existent entities 
The size- event is used to state the number of entities that exist in a particular 
frame of existence. If there are none, the number used is zero. This allows the exis-
tence of a particular entity in a particular frame of existence to be discussed: "The 
existence of Pluto was conjectured by mathematics, and proven by observation"^^. 
29 Many of the examples in this section were taken from [Hirst 91]. 
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Similarly "The existence of Vulcan was conjectured by mathematics, but disproven 
by observation". Even the non-existence of things can talked about (by reference 
to size- zero events): "It's a good thing that carnivorous cows don't exist!" 
The size- event can be used in belief relations. This allows "John believes in 
ghosts" to be represented as John believes that the size of the concept ghosts in 
the real-world frame is greater than zero. LOLITA on the other hand may not, 
and will connect the concept to a real status s ize , zero event. Events too can be 
described in this way "John believes in the resurrection of Christ, but Mary doesn't". 
Similarly concepts such as "Christianity is monotheistic: Christians believe there 
is one god" can be expressed as stating that in the relevant frame of existence (for 
example, the real-world frame), the size- of the concept defined by the properties 
that gods have is one. 
Every node may have a different frame of existence to its neighbours. This allows 
statements such as "John believes that every dragon has a tail": 
{Eo,H): {AF-subject--FO: dragon; AV-action--/0: has.part; 
AF-objec t - -FA: t a i l } 
{Ei,R): {AV-subject-- /0: John; AV-action--/0: believe; 
AF-object--FO: Eo} 
{E2,R): {AAF-subject - -FO: Eu AAA-subject-- /0: John; 
AW-act ion-- /0 : in-Frame; AW-object - - /0 : real-world-frame} 
I f the dragon having tails and the believing events could not be in different frames of 
existence, the believing event's F-object--F quantification would force both events 
to have the same number of instantiations in the same frame of existence. The frame 
of existence that must be considered is the real-world frame since that is where the 
believing event would occur. However in the real-world frame there are no dragons, 
(and hence no dragons having tails either), so the number of events must be zero. 
This would imply that the representation does not allow the statement considered, 
or other such statements about a concept, irrespective of whether i t has real-world 
extension. I f every node can have a different frame of existence, such beliefs about 
concepts can be represented. In the example, the nodes "dragons", "dragons have 
tails" and "dragon tails" are intensional (have undefined extensionality) whereas 
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"John" and "John believes that ..." are restricted to the real-world frame. 
Concepts can be defined to "exist", yet be intensional. For instance one can refer to 
"the gold mountain that exists" without for that matter believing it has an existence 
in the real-world frame of existence. Similarly such a concept is represented as a 
node of undefined extensionality corresponding to the set of golden mountains, but 
with definitional s i z e _ 1. This states that there is one golden mountain that exists 
intensionally, and therefore in some frame of existence, but not necessarily any 
frame of existence known to LOLITA. 
• Referring to objects across frames of existence 
In some situations one may want to make references between extensions of different 
frames of existence. For instance "John models himself upon Sherlock Holmes". 
Here John and the modeling event are in the real world frame of existence, whereas 
Sherlock Holmes is fictional. Frames of existence allow this since the relevant frame 
of existence can be specified for each node separately. Even causal relations can 
occur between frames of existence: "/ dreamt John killed my wife last night, so I 
was rather unfriendly when I met him in the office this morning." 
In other situations, one might even want to define extensions in one frame of 
existence referring to extensions in another. Consider "I had a dream of a better 
world, in which they are free who here are oppressed, and they are well who here 
are sick and lame". The set of people in the better world corresponding to the 
oppressed ones in this is defined with respect to this world. This can be expressed 
using the appropriate synonym event: 
{Eo,R): {0V-subject_-3!A: oppressors; AV-action_-/0: oppress; 
OV-object_-3!A: oppressed} 
{Ei,R): {AV-31A: oppressorSa; AV-/0: oppress; 
AV-object_-3!A: oppressedi} 
{E2,R): {AAF-subject_-FA: oppressedi; AAF-subject_-FA: Ei, 
AW-action_-/0: in-Frame; AW-object_-/0: real-world} 
{E3,R): {A|Vh/-|g! [A: oppressorsfc; AW-/0: oppress; 
A V[\/-object--|3! |0: oppressed:} 
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(F4, i?) : { A F - s u b j e c t - - F O : F 3 ; AV-ac t ion_- /0 : size-; A V - o b j e c t - - / 0 : 0} 
(F5 , i? ) : { A ^ F - s u b j e c t - - F O : oppressedi; Ay4F-subject_-FA: F 3 ; 
A W - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : in-Frame; A W - o b j e c t - - / 0 : dream-worldi} 
{Ee,R): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : oppressors; A / - a c t i o n . - / 0 : spec-; 
A / - o b j e c t - - / A : oppressedi} 
{ET,R): {A7-subject - - /0 : FQ; A / -ac t ion_- /0 : spec-; 
A / - o b j e c t - - / A : F j 
The set of people in the better world corresponding to the oppressed in this world 
are observed to be free^°. This works because each instantiation of an event is also 
associated with one or more frames of existence. I t is therefore possible for the 
same people to be sick in one world, and well in another, since the being sick or 
being well occurs in different worlds. 
Although extensions in one frame of existence can be defined by referring to ex-
tensions in another, the intension of a concept in "meaning space" may only be 
defined in terms of restrictions on typeless, and not in terms of its extensions in 
any particular frame of existence. 
D.6.4.3 Intension as pan-frame intension 
The intensional nature of the representation means that when extension has been 
partitioned into frames, intension was also: there is now a concept of Venus in 
the dream-world, in the real world, and in Sherlock Holmes' world, but there is 
also a concept of Venus independent from any particular world. I t is this frame 
independent concept which corresponds to what was referred to previously as the 
intension of a concept. These concepts form an intensional meaning space which 
corresponds to restrictions of typeless, unrestricted by any in_Frame event. 
• Antonyms in the Intensional space 
Antonyms are used in the inheritance hierarchy to partition concepts. For instance, 
the concept "human" is the object- of an antonym- event with subject-S "men" 
3°they do not correspond to all free people in the better world, but a subset 
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and "women". However expressing an antonym- event in the intensional space 
would preclude any person being a man in one frame of existence and a woman in 
another. This is clearly not desirable since i t is possible for a man to dream that 
he is a woman. However, it is not possible for instantiations of the literal concept 
of human to be both male and female, or neither in the same frame of existence. 
Thus a special antonym relation, i-antonjm, is used. I t is restricted to having as 
subject-S and object-, concepts whose instantiations occur in the same frame of 
existence: 
{Eo,R): {OF-subject--FVA: X; AV-action--/0: i-antonym; 
OV-object--3!A: y} 
(EuR): {AF-subject--FVO: X; AV-action--/0: antonym-; 
AV-object--3!0: y} 
{E2,R): {AFFF-sub jec t - -FFFO: X; AVW-act ion-- /0 : in-Frame; 
A|v|W-ob.1ect--|3! |0: T] 
{E3,R): {AFF-subjec t - -FFO: y; AW-ac t ion- - /0 : in-Frame; 
A| v|V-ob1ect--|3!|A: JF} 
• Undefined extensionality 
An issue related to intensionality is undefined extensionality. This corresponds 
to a reference to an extension that may or not be believed to exist in what is 
considered to be the real world, which is implicit in some events. For instance, 
consider the verb "to need", as in "I need a hammer". The word "hammer" does 
not refer to any particular instance of a hammer. In fact, there may be no such 
thing as a hammer, as illustrated by the sentence "/ need a dragon". Rather i t 
is some possibly non-existent^^ instance of the idea of a hammer that is referred 
to: "/ need something which would allow me to travel to Australia in a matter 
of seconds" is an example of a concept for which no extension yet exists in the 
real world. I t is important for the computer to distinguish objects with undefined 
extensionality from those with extensions in the real world. For instance, assume 
that the computer is told that the user needs a hammer and is then asked for the 
list of hammers i t knows of, and their places. If i t cannot distinguish defined and 
31/; (in this world) 
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undefined extensionality, i t will also list "the hammer that the user needs" as a 
known hammer. Thus a representational device is needed to distinguish between 
the two types of statement. 
Undefined extensionality is achieved by not specifying a frame of existence for the 
relevant concept. Thus "/ need a hammer" has nodes which are defined to be part 
of the real world as subject- and event, whereas its objec t , node is not defined 
by any frame of existence. This does not prevent the event from referring to an 
instance of the concept which is in a particular frame of existence. For instance 
one can still say "/ need the hammer in the kitchen". Similarly, events can have 
undefined extensionality: "/ want to throw John into the river" refers to an event 
which does not necessarily have an extension in the real world. 
Another less obvious example of a relation which does not require any particular 
frame of existence for its arguments is "taller than": one can say "Paul is taller 
than Winnie the Pooh". However, this does not imply anything either about the 
frame of existence of Paul or that of Winnie the Pooh. 
Other events assume that their subject-, object- and event all belong to the 
same frame of existence. For instance, kissing and seeing are examples of this: "/ 
saw a unicorn today" sounds strange, since unicorns are not (usually considered) 
real, whereas I am real. Similarly "John kissed Mary" would make sense if John 
and Mary were both real, or both fictional, but not if one were real and the other 
fictional. 
Requirements for each event as to which frame(s) of existence (if any) i t , its argu-
ments, and the events qualifying it require can all be expressed on the template 
events in the usual fashion: 
(Fo,ii:): {OFV-subject--FVA: beingsi; AW-action--70: need; 
0[VVj-object--[3!jA: needs} 
{Ei,R): {AFF-subjec t - -FFO: beingsi; AW-act ion_-/0: in-Frame; 
AFV-object_-FA: J"} 
{E2,R): {AFF-subject_-FFO: FQ; AW-act ion_-/0: in-Frame; 
AFV-object--FA: JT} 
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• Template events and intensional concepts 
Template events are intensional concepts: they define the concepts an event can 
have as subject-(s) and object-(s), independently from any frame of existence. 
They must therefore be in the intensional space. 
• Belief about intensional concepts 
Another kind of problem involves preconceived ideas. For instance, Joan may wish 
to meet the Scottish golf champion because she believes he will be rich. However she 
does not wish to meet John, the actual Scottish golf champion, who is poor. In this 
case she believes that the observational attributes of the concept of "Scottish golf 
champion" involve being rich. Because of this, John cannot be an instantiation of 
a Scottish golf champion for her in the real-world frame of existence since he would 
contradict her fact of all instantiations of the concept of Scottish golf champion 
must be rich. Such situations are possible as long as Joan herself does not believe 
that the Scottish golf champion and John are the same person. I f she did, the only 
recourse for the agent would be to assume that she does not mean the same thing 
by the concepts used (such as 'rich') as it does. 
• Intensionality and sorts 
Intensional concepts have certain limitations concepts in frames of existence lack. 
Intensional concepts are not qualified by an observational s ize , event: This would 
mean that the number of extensions of a concept are predetermined, in any pos-
sible world one can imagine. But this number is only predetermined if size_ is 
definitional, otherwise i t is only a quirk of the real world, or any other frame of 
existence. Thus, 
{Eo,R): {AV-subject--3!0: ants; AV-action_-/0: eat; 
AV-object--3!0: food-pieces} 
means that there is an event for every combination of subject and object: There is 
an eating event between every ant of ants and every piece of food of f ood-pieces, 
at every time, in every location, believed by every person... The size of this set is 
clearly not finite. To reduce i t to a subset, a definitional in-Frame event is con-
nected to EQ: now only the events that (are believed to have occurred) in FQ'S 
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frame are considered. 
Indeed, any observational statement about an event need be considered very care-
fully. For instance, if the concept "Chinese Telephones" is qualified the the obser-
vational event "is black", i t would mean that it is not possible even to imagine a 
Chinese telephone that were not black. Most statements in the intensional space 
will thus limit themselves to the definition of the terms of the network. 
D.6.4,4 The choice of frames of existence 
Although the notion and representation of frames of existence has been presented, 
this thesis will not argue for any particular ontology of frames of existence. The 
particular use of frames of existence depends on the particular reasoning that one 
wants to perform with them, and as yet there is not enough evidence to make any 
conclusive choice. However, possible uses of frames of existence will be suggested 
in order to improve understanding of their scope. 
Frames of existence provide a means of structuring knowledge. In particular they 
can be used to contribute to reducing the search-space involved in processing. 
However to be used in this way, the knowledge must be structured into chunks 
which are as independent as possible. For instance, real-world events and fictional 
events can be considered as independent with respect to causal reasoning since 
"Sherlock Holmes burned London down" has no direct causal effect on the real-
world London. 
• Possible usages of frames 
o The real-world frame 
The real-world frame corresponds to things that exist or existed physically and 
causally interacted with other objects of the real-world. This includes objects as 
diverse as the people in my lab, electric fields, the cold-war and so on. The real-
world frame is shared between agents, in that John may believe that dragons exist 
whereas LOLITA does not. This would mean that John believes that dragons can 
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causally interact in the same world as his wife lives in^^. 
One important characteristic of the real-world frame is the requirement for internal 
consistency. For instance one cannot sell a cake and eat it . Any frame of existence 
that is hoping for real-world status must have such consistency. 
The real-world frame can be divided into subframes of existence. 
o Different civilizations 
Different frames of existence can be assigned to different ancient civilizations in 
the past, and to a lesser extent different cultures in the present. Even if they 
share a common language, their ideas of what concepts such as ownership may 
vary greatly. In some cultures i t is possible for people to be owned. In other 
cultures, albeit rarely, an animal can own things too. More generally customs, the 
way in which people interact, and expected behaviour vary from culture to culture. 
These differences can be considered sufficiently important for a different real-world 
subframes to be assigned to each. 
o Micro Theories 
As discussed in A.2 (p. A-7), scientific knowledge consists of a set of theories, whose 
domain of application vary. However where their domains of application intersect, 
the results they provide must be equal (within the degree of accuracy defined by 
the theory itself). Thus predictions can be made within the quantum world, the 
classical world, the relativistic world or the relativistic quantum: reasoning occurs 
within one of these worlds. One could therefore assign each such theory a frame of 
existence which is associated with its conditions of use. Statements referring to the 
assumptions of a particular micro-theory are also associated to the relevant frame 
of existence. 
However there is no need to limit this use of frames to scientific knowledge. Com-
mon sense knowledge such as "naive physics" or can also be structured in this way. 
For instance, naive physics can be given a domain of application: i t applies to slow 
moving (with respect to the speed of light) earth bound objects within a certain 
^^Remember that this world need not exist, but just be a partitioning of the input of his senses. 
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temperature range, and so on: objects fall towards the ground only on the earth, 
not in space. Supercooled liquids that can syphon themselves out of containers 
are not included. On earth in the middle of the day a cloudless sky may be blue, 
or orange if polluted, but definitely not green. Similarly other forms of knowledge 
can be structured in this way: usual human behaviour within a particular society, 
animal and plant behaviour, classical versus pop music, economics, and so on. 
The "real world" frame of existence has as distinguishing feature that i t is associ-
ated with a stringent set of causal models that must hold for all statements within 
i t . Practically this can help determine whether a text should be considered fictional 
or real: "The statue turned its head towards me and winked". 
o Fictional existence 
Different stories, or series of stories can be assigned a different frame of existence. 
This ensures that fictional events, such as "Sherlock Holmes burnt down London" 
do not get confused with real-world events. There is no requirement for statements 
in a fictional frame of existence to be consistent. This allows fictional statements 
such as found in "Alice in Wonderland" to be processed, be i t translation or quote 
finding. 
Another form of fictional existence is dream existence, involving people's dreams. 
Like stories these need not be consistent, and should not be confused with real-
world events. 
o Abstract existence 
Certain concepts exist by definition, in an abstract sense. These include mathe-
matical objects, such as the number 841, and relations such as the square root of a 
number. A separate frame of existence can be devised for such objects. In partic-
ular i t is possible to state that they occur only in a particular frame of existence: 
mathematical objects are defined among other properties as being objects of that 
frame of existence. The abstract frame of existence can be declared an antonym 
to all other frames of existence, leading to the impossibility to talk of real-world 
extensions of the concept. 
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A consequence of this would be that sentences such as "John does not believe in 
the number one" would not make sense. Sentences of the form "John believes 
in X" imply that if John is in the real-world, he believes X has a real world 
existence. However the number one is defined not to have a real-world extension. 
The sentence involves a type clash by postulating that the number one can have a 
real-world extension, before the issue of the size of its real world extension can be 
discussed. This differs from other entities which can be believed an influence on 
the real-world frame: "John believes in reincarnation". 
This structure can be useful in disambiguation too: "This is a triangle" really 
refers to the representation of a triangle, rather than the mathematical concept of 
i t . For instance this allows the same number to be represented in many different 
ways, depending on people's handwriting, and so on. Whereas you can rub the 
physical representation of a triangle out, you cannot rub out the concept itself. 
o Possibility and Plans 
Possibility corresponds to events which could occur in the real-world but which do 
not necessarily occur. For instance, "You could have done the washing" refers to 
an event which could have occurred but did not^^. Possible information can be 
expressed by a separate frame of existence: the possible-world frame. 
The real-world and possible-world frames of existence share certain behaviours: for 
instance for a frame of existence to be a possible-world frame, i t must be internally 
consistent and consistent with the real world (previous to the date at which i t 
would have occurred in the case of past plans). For an event to occur in the 
real-world frame, i t must be possible. Therefore all events in the real-world frame 
must also also have extensions in the possible-world frame. This means that the 
real-world frame is a subframe of the possible-world frame. Each possible-world 
subframe must include a substantial proportion of the real-world frame, although 
not necessarily all of it : in the possible-world subframe in which the last world-war 
^^Possibility must be distinguished from potentiality which refers to the ability to perform 
an action, a situation in which the event's preconditions were met in order for the event to be 
possible. Potentiality is involved in statements such as "I can swim", or "Birds can fly". Both 
forms can occur in the same statement "I wish I saved her, but I couldn't because I can't swim". 
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was won by the Nazis, many events would be shared with the real-world frame 
(events outside the causal influence of this event, such as the Schumacher-Levy 
comet striking Jupiter, or the battle of Hastings of 1066), but many events would 
be inconsistent with the real-world frame (like the building of the Berlin Wall). 
Similarly i f an extension does not exist within the possible-world frame, i t cannot 
occur in the real-world frame: "telepathy is impossible". Even statements such as 
"telepathy might be possible" are correctly analysed as not stating that i t actually 
occurs in the real-world frame. 
Another perhaps more practical example of possible-world subframes are plans: 
one might have various alternative plans. Each must be self consistent, consistent 
with the part of the real-world they depend on causally, but they can be mutually 
inconsistent. Expected events are also included in the possible-world frame. 
Some events involve arguments that exist only in the possible-world frame and not 
in the real-world frame. An example is the object- of cancel: "Kevin canceled the 
5-aside football match" refers to a non-existent but planned football match. 
D.6.5 The idea of a concept 
Sometimes concepts themselves are referred to. For instance, "The idea of freedom 
as a right for all is relatively recent"^'^. This cannot be expressed directly by 
referring either individually or universally to an intensional concept since this would 
be equivalent to referring to all the instances of the concept in all possible frames of 
existence, at all possible times (etc..) as a group or individually. Instead a special 
event is used to map a symbol to its meaning, the means- event. The symbol 
referred to here is the idea itself. The example would therefore be represented by 
a idea symbol node as subject- of a means- event with as individually quantified 
object- the event "all people have the right to be free". The idea symbol node is 
also the object- of a "people invented relatively recently" event. 
Different people's definition of a concept may vary. For instance LOLITA may 
•^*Note the difference to "the idea of freedom is appealing" which refers to the extension of 
freedom in no particular frame of existence 
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believe that dragons are a variety of dinosaur, whereas John might believe that they 
are large human-eating lizards. These are two different conceptions of the same 
concept. Since the semantic net is intensional, the two different conceptions will be 
assigned two distinct nodes. One can argue that the word "dragon" is ambiguous, 
referring either to John or LOLITA's between the two conceptions: John believes 
the word dragon refers to his sort of dragon, whereas LOLITA believes i t refers to 
hers. However this argument must be applied to all languages known to LOLITA 
in that John also believes that "un dragon" and "ein Drache" refer to his sort of 
dragon too. Alternatively one could argue that it is the idea of dragon that varies: 
the words "dragon", "dragon", "Drache" all refer to the same idea of dragon, which 
John and LOLITA conceptualize differently. This difference in conceptualization 
may be explicitly stated "John has quite a different idea of hard work to me". 
Such a view requires a different organization of the semantic net, where each word 
is linked to one or more ideas. This first linkage is where the usual lexical am-
biguity occurs. Additionally, each idea is linked to different conceptualizations of 
i t . This second link corresponds to the different conceptualizations of a concept 
different people may have. In this framework, at first a plausible assumption would 
be made that each new word a person utters to LOLITA corresponds to LOLITA's 
conceptualization of the concept. This could later be corrected. Maintaining this 
difference between different people's conceptions of ideas occurs, albeit rarely, in 
practical situations. I t occurs when people try to understand statements which do 
not make sense literally, but which seem to involve some words being "misused" 
(with respect to the hearer's understanding of them) systematically. This may oc-
cur when talking to people not speaking their native language, when learning a new 
field which uses words in a different way, or when talking to people who are slightly 
insane or senile. Once the different conceptualization has been understood i t can 
be classified as appropriate. For LOLITA the additional storage space involved in 
maintaining an extra layer of "ideas" is not justified given its current applications. 
But this part of the representation can fulfi l l the need, should it ever arise. 
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D.6.6 Definitional and observational sorts: a matter of ex-
pression ? 
There is a good objection to definitional and observational sorts which has been 
postponed until now because its counter-argument requires understanding of in-
tension and extension. It runs as follows: 
For the sentence "John and Mary's house is on the corner of the street", i t is suf-
ficient to know that the house is on the corner of the street for i t to be uniquely 
determined. So the house is defined by being owned by John and Mary. Similarly, 
for the sentence "The house on the comer of the street is John and Mary's", refer-
ring to the corner of the street is sufl&cient to determine the house uniquely. Thus 
the house is defined by being on the corner of the street. 
But now, two sentences that mean the same thing are represented differently! The 
same house is either defined by being owned by John and Mary and is observed 
as being on the corner of the street, or vice versa, but the representation does not 
seem to capture the fact that either statement is sufficient to determine the house 
uniquely: if both statements refer to the house with definitional sorts, it would 
mean that the house is defined uniquely only by both statements together; if both 
statements refer to the house with observational sorts, the house is not uniquely 
defined at all. Surely then, referring to something in a unique way is a matter 
of expression rather than an intrinsic property of the house? Surely, in order to 
determine a statement by which one can refer to an object uniquely, one checks in 
the database whether any other objects also satisfy the statement: i f none does, 
one has a statement which determines the object uniquely. This has nothing to do 
with the concept of house, but is a matter of expression. 
The first problem here is one of confusion between intension and extension. LOLITA's 
representation is intensional, and intensionally "John and Mary's house" is a differ-
ent concept from "The house on the corner of the street". Extensionally however, 
in the real-world frame of existence, and during a particular range of time, the two 
concepts share the same extension. However, the house itself need not change if 
John and Mary sell i t , nor is the particular house on the corner of the street neces-
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sarily the only house that John and Mary ever owned. This shows that a concept 
may refer to different extensions depending on the circumstances considered. 
However, the argument is correct to the extent that the amount of information 
required to identify a concept uniquely in a conversation depends on the context 
of that conversation. For instance, in the context of John and Mary's current jobs, 
a reference to their house would usually be understood to refer to the house they 
own now, not the one they owned previously. In the semantic net, however, refer-
ences must determine concepts uniquely with respect to the context formed by the 
whole semantic net. Arcs with definitional sorts must restrict concepts uniquely 
with respect to this maximal context. Thus part of the process of interpretation 
to transform natural language input into semantic net will involve reference resolu-
tion. In other words by maintaining some notion of the current context, references 
determined uniquely with respect to the context must be transformed so that they 
are determined uniquely with respect to the whole semantic net. 
D.7 Textual References 
In addition to the ability of representing the meaning of texts, SemNet must be 
able to represent physical texts as a sequence of words formatted into sentences, 
paragraphs, pages and so on. This is essential for many of the tasks LOLITA is to 
perform. Indeed, if LOLITA is to be used as an advanced information searching 
tool, she must remember in what texts what she read can be found. 
D.7.1 Textual references: The problem 
D.7.1.1 Text Structure 
• The need for a representation of text structure 
I f a text is clearly structured, i t is easier to read. Indeed, the way in which a text is 
organized can express an overview of its important ideas and the broad lines of its 
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argument. LOLITA can profit from such information, i f she has a representation 
suitable for representing i t . This section develops this idea. 
The structure of a clear text reflects the structure of the argument, and each of 
the ideas is presented separately. Later ideas build on previous ones, but avoid 
repetitions of earlier arguments, only referring to them if necessary. Thus, ideas are 
presented locally. This gives a context which simplifies much of the processing. For 
instance, the term "dogs" is more likely to refer to the opposing team in a football 
fanzine, but to animals in an article about pets. Exploiting such information 
reduces ambiguity. 
Texts are structured into chapters, sections, paragraphs and sentences. These 
levels of structure correspond to different levels of granularity of the argument. To 
benefit from the locality of the ideas presented in a text, LOLITA must be able to 
recognise, model, and relate these different levels of structure. 
Relating sentences in a text is required by analysis. For instance, the difference in 
interpretation between the sentences "He went to a restaurant. He went to Mac 
Donald's" and "He went to a restaurant and he went to Mac Donald's" stems from 
a difference in structure. Similarly, only structure distinguishes "John left. Bill 
had insulted him" and "John left and Bill had insulted him", yet the former is 
well formed, and the latter is not. Many other meta-level forms of analysis must 
be applied to the text to improve interpretation: stylistic, discourse or dialogue 
analyses require information about the structure of the text. 
Information about the structure of the text is also required by many applications. 
Translation, for instance, requires the translated text to appear in a similar or-
der to the original. Text retrieval systems, such as those employed by the rapid 
reaction units of political parties, need the ability to return precise references to 
incriminating quotes by opposition members, so that the relevant text can quickly 
be located. The MUC competition required coreference to be expressed by adding 
the references LOLITA determined to the original text next to the relevant words. 
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Table D . l : References using structure 
Types of logical Structure References 
Titled Chapters/Sections/Articles Table of Contents 
Keyworded sections Reference: Glossary, Dictionary... 
Numbered sections Grammar Book, Butterfly Guide... 
Types of physical Structure References 
Page number Index 
Page number and word reference Hypertext, MUG annotation, SGML... 
Book volume/Tablet/Scroll/Wall... In Index, Catalog... 
• Models of text structure 
Two main kinds of text structure can be distinguished. Logical structure is the 
division of the text by content. Physical structure is the division of the medium in 
which the text is expressed. 
Logical structure depends on the type of information expressed. Newspapers and 
magazines, for instance, are divided into articles. Books are often divided into 
chapters, and further levels of sectioning. Most texts are divided into paragraphs, 
sentences and words. Each level of sectioning can be associated with a title, or 
word. 
Physical structure is determined by the text's medium and the text's nature. En-
cyclopedias are usually divided into volumes. Books, newspapers, and magazines 
are divided into pages. Pages on computers, in particularly the world wide web, are 
divided into separate files, and file systems. Older sources of information include 
tablets, scrolls and walls. 
The structure of texts always has physical and logical components. Sometimes the 
two converge, as in the case of different volumes of a novel. In other cases they do 
not, as for pages. 
• References to text structure 
Most references within a text make use of the structure of the text. References 
^^The notion of physical structure can be the cause of some confusion: a textref corresponding 
to a page does not represent the physical page which can be burnt. It represents the structure 
given by the page to the text. Each copy of a book has the same structure, but different physical 
pages, taken from different trees. 
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often use both logical and physical structure to achieve a higher ease of use. For 
instance, a quote in a Newspaper can be located both by article title and page 
number. Table D . l (p. D-102) gives a summary of common indexing methods, 
and the text structure they use. 
• A general model of text structure 
o Salient features of text structure 
A representation of the text's structure should be capable of representing a wide 
variety of text structures, while requiring the introduction of as few new forms 
of reasoning as possible. This section considers salient features of text structure 
and concludes that text structure is very similar to another phenomenon already 
represented. 
Text is structured into segments of text following each other. This segmentation 
is such that within a particular model of text structure, there is no intersection 
between segments. For instance, paragraphs do not include other paragraphs, or 
chapters other chapters. Pages may share paragraphs, but pages are concepts of 
the physical model of a text, whereas paragraphs are concepts of the logical model. 
Within a particular model, there are different levels of segmentation. A section 
contains paragraphs containing sentences containing words... Representing the 
structure of the text corresponds to relating these different levels of segmentation. 
There are two components to the structure: the order of the segments as they 
appear in the text, and whether one segment is within another. 
The elements of a text's structure are fully fledged concepts. For instance single 
words can be referred to independently of their meaning. An example is "Every 
second word in that document is incorrectly spelt !". Similarly the ordering of seg-
ments can be discussed as in "/ think you should put that paragraph in section two". 
This means they should be represented explicitly by concept nodes in SemNet, so 
that any statement can be made about them. 
The hierarchical nature of text structure, the use of ordered segments, and the 
conceptual status of segments make text structure very similar to time. This means 
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that a similar representation can be used for both, 
o Comparison of time and text structure 
Time was modeled in terms of relations between intervals and duration. Text 
structure can similarly be modeled by relations between segments and segment 
length. 
o Intervals and Segments 
Just like segments, an interval can be contained in another, shared by a common 
subinterval with another, started by another. Similarly, intervals and segments 
share a notion of duration or length. 
o Duration and length 
The notion of segment length depends on the model of structure used. 
For logical models of structure, the length of a segment can be modeled in terms of 
the segments it contains. In other words, valid units can be chapters, paragraphs, 
sentences, words or letters. A paragraph can have as length one paragraph, three 
sentences, twenty five words, or one hundred and fifty letters. I t could be measured 
as quarter of a chapter, but this is not very accurate: chapters are fuzzy units, 
possibly varying from a few pages to few hundred pages. Notions such as half a 
chapter are usually expressed by stating that the paragraph has half the number of 
words, or the half the number of pages the chapter has. A zero length segment in 
this model is zero sentences, zero words or no letters long. The space between two 
words consists of no letters, no words. Thus, a zero length segment will be taken 
to be the space between two words. 
For physical models of structure, the length of a segment can be modeled in terms of 
segments i t contains. Valid units are book volumes, or pages. Similar observations 
hold for these units as the physical models. Zero length segments in the physical 
model correspond to the space between two pages, two books. 
Zero length segments are defined both for physical and logical models of text struc-
ture as parts of the medium or text not actively expressing information. The 
availability of a zero length segment concept is essential to the similarity between 
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the representation of time and text structure: The notion of instant is the key to 
providing a notion of order with s t a r t s , and ends, events. 
o Conclusion 
Time and Text structure are remarkably similar, and can be represented by the 
same basic representation. This is useful, since it means that the same reasoning 
processes can be applied to both. 
D.7.1.2 Statements involving the text's representation 
Texts have a dual nature, being physically represented as symbols and conveying 
meaning by being interpreted. Because SemNet focuses on concepts, most of the 
discussion in this thesis has focussed on the meaning aspect of texts. Statements 
can however also be made about representational elements of the text, such as 
words, or paragraphs. Examples of this were briefly discussed in D.7.1.1 (p. D-
103). 
References to the text can address details of the representation: "That was a short 
paragraph" or "That word is incorrectly spelt". 
They can also specify the author of the text: "Did you write these words?" or "It 
was Jack who uttered the rallying cry". Allowing reference to the words, rather 
than their interpretation is important as the interpretation may either be flawed 
or impossible: "Why did John shout 'Donkeys!' ?"; "I do not understand what you 
mean by 'The world economy is based on the purveyance of commodities"'; or "/ 
am asking you what the words of the accused were, not what you think he said to 
you.". 
Finally the text can be believed in, because the agent trusts that whoever said i t 
knew what he was talking about. This type of behaviour occurs in some religions, 
where one must have faith, even if one does not understand what is meant. I t also 
may occur in Science or Engineering, where people may believe statements such as 
"This gives a jamming margin of 5dB and any signal greater than this will jam a 
dsss signal" because they read it in a book. 
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These events are distinct from their relatives which refer to interpretations. Thus, 
for instance, there must be (at least) two meanings of "say", one of which refers 
to the actual words that were said, and the other to their interpretation. The 
distinction can be enforced using type restrictions. This might seem to be a break 
of uniqueness, if, say, a link between concepts and the text that expresses them were 
made. I t is not however, since there is not a one to one correspondence between 
language and concepts. For instance there are more than one ways of expressing 
the concept "to marry": "/ wed her", "I married her", "I took her to be my wife"... 
D,7.1.3 Linking Concepts to Text Structure 
Since text conveys meaning, references to i t usually also refer to its meaning. For 
LOLITA to be aware of this connection, the representation of a text's structure 
must be linked to its interpretation. This section discusses the need for such a 
connection in more depth, and the nature of the link. 
• The need for links between text structure and concepts 
Many of the reasons for a link between a text's structure and its interpretation 
follow from the discussion of the need of a text structure representation (D.7.1.1 
(p. D-IOOJ). However the case for expressing the link within SemNet has not been 
put. 
For a piece of information to be expressed within SemNet, there must be some 
concepts in terms of which it can be expressed. Just as the structure of a text 
can be discussed {"The first section is rather long", or "What does 'corroborate' 
mean ?"), so can the link between text structure and interpretation: "The sentence 
about the dam in China is too controversial for the Prime Minister's visit", or "John 
thinks that 'Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven' means 
that mentally handicapped people will go to heaven after they die. But Jack thinks 
that it means that people who are not attached to objects or people are in a state 
3«As discussed in A.3.2 (p. A-32), the "meaning" of a text is a loose way of referring to an 
interpretation of it. 
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of mental peace and contentment". Since the link between text structure can be a 
subject of belief, i t must be represented as an event, ie a concept. 
The result of expressing the link in SemNet is that it can be permanent. Indeed, if 
information about text structure and its links to concepts resulting from interpre-
tation were considered of interest only to the interpretation process, i t might be 
stored temporarily and locally. I t would be discarded once part or all of the text 
had been interpreted. While this would be sufl5cient for many of the concerns of 
interpretation, i t would bar LOLITA from being able to reconsider the meaning of 
words. 
Expressing the link between structure and interpretation within SemNet simplifies 
processing for many algorithms, among which algorithms that have only a passing 
interest in the rest of the text. For instance, eventually LOLITA should be able 
to judge her interpretation of texts, and determine whether she believes she has 
misunderstood a word. Assume that she had encountered the word "phreak", and 
on the basis of phonetic information had decided that this was a misspelling of 
"freak". Since the word "phreak" is rare, she may not be able to deduce much 
from the context of the text in which she first encountered the word. Al l she will 
note, is that the word "freak" seems not to fit well into the context. However, 
later she may encounter more examples of i t , and revise her previous assumption: 
"phreak" is a new word related to telephony. This type of algorithm will only 
be interested in the contexts in which the word is encountered, and perhaps the 
structure of the texts in which it occurred, but not the text itself. 
• Types of links 
Text structure and its interpretation can be linked in many ways. This section 
discusses the types of these links. 
o Words used 
The simplest of links between a concept and a phrase states that the concept was 
derived from the phrase. I t is represented by a words_used event. As an event, i t 
is subject to belief. Believing a words used event does not imply that one believes 
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in the concept i t links to the text, but only that one believes that the concept was 
expressed by the words of the text. Thus it can be used for statements such as "/ 
think the words he used were 'I hate the army"' in the context "He said he was 
unhappy at the base." "What were the exact words he said to you?" "I think ...". 
o Phrase means 
The other important link between a text and concepts is interpretation. For in-
stance, SemNet must be able to represent sentences such as "I understood him 
to have said that three hundred year old institutions such as Barings have long 
traditions of pristine controls over their employees." This task is fulfilled by the 
phrasejoieans event. 
More formally, a phrase_means event states that if the phrase it is connected to is 
believed, then the concepts to which i t is attached are also believed. Thus belief 
in a phrase_means event alone does not imply belief in the interpretation. For 
instance, an agent could believe that the statement "The Queen is dead" means 
that Elizabeth I I , Queen of England is dead, yet need not believe that the Queen 
is dead. However, i f the agent believes in the statement, a priori to understanding 
it , he must also believe in its meaning if he believes that his interpretation of the 
statement is correct. For instance, one might believe, yet not understand, the 
statement "In an impurity semiconductor containing donors, the Fermi energy lies 
above the middle of the forbidden band", because the Nobel Prize in Physics uttered 
i t . I f one also believes that one has the correct interpretation for i t - ie that one 
has understood i t , then one must believe in that interpretation. 
• Nature of the link 
The fact that one concept can be represented by many words, and one word may 
be represented by many concepts determines the structural component of the link's 
representation. 
An example of one word corresponding to many concepts is "amabo", the latin for 
"/ will love" , which refers not only to me but also to a time after now. An example 
of words corresponding to one concept is given by "to fly" which is the action of the 
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flying event. Further, many words may refer to many concepts. For instance, "a 
dog" is represented by an inst_ event and a new child of dog, the concept dogs.^ ^ 
Finally, SemNet represents phrases or sentences by events. Thus, the phrase "a 
man bit a dog" is expressed by a single event. These observations require a piece 
of text to be linked to many concepts. 
A text can be linked to many concepts through multiple links or via a central event. 
Various reasons conspire to prefer the second alternative. 
A unique event is clearly more economical in net space than many, and is simpler 
to connect meta events to, such as belief events. 
Sentences express more meanings than the individual words that constitute them. 
For instance, order is an important factor in interpretation: "John killed Bill" is not 
equivalent to "Bill killed John. Each word of a phrase could be individually linked 
to the concept EQ expressed by the phrase: "The car was burning". However, if 
a pronoun were used to refer to the phrase ("It was most upsetting to see"), the 
pronoun would also be attached to the concept EQ. AS a result there would be 
no distinction between the groups of words that express or refer to the concept. 
The words must therefore be grouped together into individual phrases that refer to 
the same concept (s). There are only two alternative ways available of performing 
the grouping. Either one uses text structure to assemble the phrase into a text 
segment that can be referred to by multiple links, or one must use a unique linking 
event. The first alternative fails to represent single phrases in sentences where the 
phrases are intertwined: in "A man, John said, bit a dog", the words " A " , "man", 
"bit", "a" and "dog" do not form a text segment, so could not be associated with 
the corresponding event by the first method. This leaves only the second method. 
The link between concepts and text is represented by a unique event with possibly 
many partial subject_s and ob jec t s . 
could be represented by a reference to the concept dogs with an arbitrary quantification, 
but that would prevent it from being referred to by another event, even if the following text were 
to refer to that concept. 
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D.7.2 Textrefs: A Representation of Text Structure 
The representation of text structure shares many features with that of time. The 
discussion of these will lead to a new general representation, similar to that of 
values: a timelike representation. This is followed by a discussion of features 
specific to textrefs. 
D.7.2.1 Shared aspects with time 
• A mirrored representation 
The representation of text structure mirrors the representation of time very closely. 
There are therefore textref variants of starts- , ends_, i s_in , and fo l lows . : T_Starts, 
T_ends, T_is_in and T_f ollows. Similarly, a specialization of has_value mirrors 
the eflfect of has_duration: T_segment_length. Just as f o l l o w s , could be quali-
fied by duration-, so T_f ollows can be by T_segment_length. 
Structure is expressed relative to the text in which i t occurs. The beginning of the 
text serves as origin. This mirrors calendars for time for which dates are expressed 
as a duration since an origin. For instance: 
{Eo,R): {A7-subject_-/A: page4; A/-act ion_-/0: T_follows; 
A/ -ob jec t_- /0 : sengan_thesis_start} 
{Ei,R): {A/-subjec t_- /A: EQ; AI-action.-10: T_segment_length; 
A/-objec t_- /0 : 4_pages} 
{E2,R): {A/ - sub jec t_ - /0 : 4; A/-subject_-/0: 1-page; 
A/-ac t ion_- /0 : 0 ; A/-object_- /A: 4_pages} 
{Es,R): {A/-subjec t_- /A: page4; A/-act ion_-/0: T_segment_length; 
A7-object_-70: 1-page} 
defines the fourth page of this thesis. 
Just as for calendars, a model of the text must be built in SemNet for i t to know 
that the forth page follows the third and precedes the fifth: all the arguments about 
the fuzzy nature of units still apply. See D.4.3.4 (p. D-62) for more details. Two 
models can be created for the same text, one corresponding to the logical and one 
Appendix D: Extended Representation: Detailed Issues D-111 
to the physical structure of the text. 
• Defining a new class of reasoning 
The use of the same type of reasoning for time and text structures, and the mir-
rored representation, means that a new class of reasoning should be defined. This 
"timelike" representation has the same generic status as the values representation 
and is defined in a similar manner. Al l events used for the time and text struc-
ture representation are specializations of their timelike equivalents. The composite 
events such as f o l l o w s , or T_follows are defined at this abstract timelike level. 
The difference between the time and text structure specializations is defined by the 
type diff'erences of the arguments of the template events. This ensures that times 
and textrefs are not related through timelike events. Reasoning algorithms that 
previously dealt with time events should now deal with time like events. 
The result is that the abilities previously reserved for reasoning about time are now 
available for text structure. Thus, constraints on the position of some information 
can be resolved to determine where i t is, in the same way as constraints on a time 
can be resolved. This is used for instance by "The sentence you are looking for is 
on an even page, in chapter 2 or 3, and at the start of a paragraph." Further, the 
analysis rules will benefit from similar sentences being represented in the same way: 
"The forth page of the book" - "The forth day of the conference", "The chapter after 
mine" - "The day after my birthday.", or "In the first chapter, John says that..." 
- "In the fifth year of the plan, Russia..." 
D.7.2.2 Differences to time 
• Labelling Textrefs 
o W h y label Textrefs ? 
Although it is sufficient to specify the location of a word to determine the word 
referred to, i t proves useful to identify the textref by the word to which i t corre-
sponds. The first method requires retaining a copy of the document. This requires 
external access to the document which renders any processing referring to the words 
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represented by the textrefs unduly complex. I t also renders the textref information 
useless if the document were lost. 
Expressing the word the textref represents within SemNet on the other hand, sim-
plifies processing for many algorithms, among which algorithms that have only a 
passing interest in the rest of the text. For instance, the algorithm discussed in 
D.7.1.3 (p. D-107) is not interested in the text itself, but only the contexts in which 
the word is encountered, and the word's spelling. This is necessary to determine 
in which contexts LOLITA interpreted "phreak" as "freak", which is a prerequisite 
to allowing her to revise her interpretation. 
o Label Textrefs, how ? 
Since there is a need to refer to the words of a text, the next question to be resolved 
is how this can be achieved. 
The standard method of qualifying a concept is to connect events to i t which express 
the information one wishes to qualify i t by. In this case, a word is represented 
by a string of characters. There are therefore two components to each letter: 
the particular character used, and its position within the word. Each would be 
represented by an event, leading to a mass of events to express even four letter 
words. Unless the independence between the types of the information expressed by 
separate events is actually needed for processing, this is an expensive solution. In 
fact, this independence proves more of a hindrance to potential applications. Take 
the example of the algorithm revising assumptions of misspellings (D.7.1.3 (p. D-
107)): i t only wishes to refer to ful l words rather than individual letters. Having 
to access each letter and place i t in the relevant slot is ineificient and cumbersome, 
unless justified by the needs of some other type of processing. 
An alternative, albeit non standard method is available. In the same way as lin-
guistic nodes do not use events to represent their letters, textrefs can use the label 
associated with each node: see 5.1.1.4 (p. 117). To avoid confusing programmers, 
linguistic nodes and textrefs are distinguished. The words that textrefs represent 
are surrounded by double quotes, whereas the corresponding linguistic nodes lack 
quotes, and the conceptual nodes lack labels. Thus "cat" is the textref for "cat". 
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This method has the advantage of simplifying not only the expression but also 
the access to the words corresponding to the textrefs. As explained in D.7.3.2 
(p. D-116), this alternative method is not restrictive, since if the structure of the 
characters in a word were needed, i t can be expressed. 
• Further qualifying textrefs 
Just as textrefs can be labelled, they can be qualified by specific events. This was 
discussed in D.7.1.2 (p. D-105), involving examples such as "Did you write these 
words?". Other specific examples are titles being associated with sections, labels 
of texts such as ISBN numbers, or associating the physical page or volume with 
the structural page. 
Since the title of a text section is itself a section of text, expressing the title of a 
section is expressed as a relation between textrefs: 
{Eo,R): { A/-subject_ - / 0 : t i t l e _ x ; A/-action_ - / 0 : e n t i t l e s ; 
A/-object_ - / A : sengan_thesis} 
A complete model of a text would therefore include a representation of textrefs, 
text content, and physical objects with which texts are represented. 
• Place in the hierarchy 
Textrefs are a specialization of the timelike concepts, defined by being subjects 
of words-Used events. Since textrefs reflect the structure of the text, each segment 
is an instance of the set of textrefs. Thus if the word "cat" appeared three times in 
a document, there would be three textrefs "cat" - one for each occurrence of the 
word "cat". This means that SemNet will include a large number of textrefs. 
Al l textrefs could be instances of the set of all textrefs, without any internal struc-
ture. However, this would result in very low topological determinism and would 
badly affect search. For instance, consider again the algorithm revising assumptions 
of misspellings (D.7.1.3 (p. D-107)). In order to determine the existence of a dis-
^^For a while at least. Clearly, if L O L I T A is to deal with any substantial quantity of text, she 
will need algorithms to eliminate less useful information. A prime target would be the common 
words expressed by textrefs, unless they had special significance. For instance, determiners such 
as "the" or "a" would usually be eliminated, unless in a sentence such as "You are only a queen. 
We can always replace you!" 
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tinct meaning for the word "phreak", the algorithm needs to access all occurrences 
of the word and the associated interpretation of it , to derive a context. A similar 
algorithm might determine that a word known to LOLITA had another meaning. 
I t too would face the same need to access all concepts attached to the word. A way 
of structuring the textrefs to improve topological determinism is therefore needed. 
The problem can be reduced by grouping textrefs of same word type. This is 
achieved by having a set of textrefs for each word type. In the "cat" example, the 
three individual "cat" textrefs would be the children of a generic "cat" textref 
set. Thus if an instance of a word is known, all other instances of it can be found 
simply by searching for the highest parent with the required name, and finding 
all its children. For instance, the word "Hamlet" may not have been known as 
a proper name to LOLITA. So she may have interpreted it as a tiny village in 
some sentences, or as a small ham in others. Only by accessing all occurrences of 
the word, may she be able to determine that there is a third meaning. Grouping 
words in this way also improves the eflSciency of stylistic analysis which may wish 
to determine whether words rythme (for poetry) or whether a sentence is repeated 
for effect. 
The hierarchy can be further structured to improve the topological determinism 
from the superset of all textrefs to the set of textrefs corresponding to any particular 
word type. 
D.7.3 The use of textrefs 
Textrefs prove useful in a wide variety of circumstances. This section reviews some 
of their uses. 
D.7.3.1 Interpretations 
The phrasejneans event states that the concepts i t links to textrefs are an inter-
pretation of the text they represent. Since interpretation is of great relevance to 
LOLITA, some examples of the use of phrase_means are presented. 
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phrasejneans can be used to present different people's interpretations of a same 
text: John might believe that Mary saying " I like you" means she loves him, but 
is shy... whereas Mary only meant that she liked him. 
Because LOLITA's NL analysis phase produces an interpretation of the source 
text, the interpretation is connected by a phrasejneans event to the relevant tex-
trefs. Strictly speaking, the result of the interpretation is a set of phrasejneans 
events connected to concepts. The strength of various aspects of the interpretation 
are expressed by belief values in the relevant phrasejneans events. Any belief in 
the conceptual structure which is the object of the phrasejneans events is depen-
dent on belief in the attached phrasejneans event. This means that the concepts 
forming the interpretation of the text are all accorded hypothetical status until 
LOLITA decides that she believes them. This decision is based on many (possi-
bly interlinked) factors such as whether they contradict her previous knowledge, 
whether the interpretation rules accord the phrasejneans events a sufficiently high 
degree of belief, and whether the source of the information is reliable. 
The advantage of marking all concepts resulting from analysis as hypothetical 
is that the information derived from them cannot interfere with the reasoning 
required by other phases of their analysis. For instance, a contradiction in SemNet 
would occur if LOLITA believed that "Bill Clinton is the president of the United 
States", and the text to analyse was "Bill Clark is the president of the United 
States". Determining whether LOLITA is to believe that the speaker is mistaken, 
that he is fantasizing, or that he is talking about a different United States or a 
different time, requires reasoning which will fail i f SemNet contains contradictions. 
Using phrasejneans allows all information to be entered into SemNet free of such 
interference. 
A problem arises however as to what should be done with statements that are 
hypothetical in NL: "// / were king, I would abolish property". Both the events 
corresponding to " I were king" and " I would abolish property" are hypothetical, 
but the event expressing the "If" relation is not. Does forcing all concepts to hypo-
thetical not destroy this distinction? Surprisingly i t does not, since only the event 
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expressing the "If" will be connected to a believed in textref by a phrase_means 
event. This illustrates the important point that believing in a textref does not 
imply believing in segments occurring within it . 
Once a text's interpretation, and the text itself is believed, the concepts forming 
the text's interpretation are believed in too. Initially their belief value will be 
a combination of the amount the interpretation is believed, and the amount the 
text's source is believed, but later other information may play a part. 
D.7.3.2 Keeping track of the words forming L O L I T A ' s facts 
The words-used event is used to keep track of the words from which a fact was 
derived. Its main use is therefore in the development cycle as a diagnostic tool for 
possible errors in the interpretation phase. 
I t proves sometimes useful to refer to parts of words. For instance, the ending 
"n't" in English corresponds to "not". For it to be linked to the resulting negation 
in the conceptual layer of SemNet, part of a word must be referred to^^. In the 
example "I didn't kill him!", part of the word "didn't" must be referenced. This 
is possible because of the general nature of the representation of text structure. 
A word too is a segment of text, which includes smaller text segments, such as 
syllables... Other possible such linkages between word morphology and concepts 
include verb conjugation, or the declension of nouns and determiners. 
Other languages also benefit from the ability to refer to parts of words. For in-
stance Turkish uses prefixes and postfixes for constructions which would use sep-
arate words in English. Chinese fits on the other end of the spectrum with no 
morphological variation. 
D.7.3.3 Coreference tasks 
words-used was used for coreferencing applications, such as the coreference task 
^^The alternative scheme of preprocessing all occurrences of "n't" into "not" solves this problem, 
but deprives later stages such as style analysis of useful information. 
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of the MUC 5 competition. The task is to annotate source texts with pronouns 
and other forms of anaphoric reference. This was achieved by using the fact that 
pronouns and the other forms of anaphoric reference are connected by words.used 
events to their reference. For instance, "Humpty Dumpty was a poor student. Be-
cause of government cuts, he climbed up a wall to steal an apple. But he slipped, and 
cost the NHS instead". words_used events connect the words "Humpty Dumpty", 
and "He" to the concept HumptyJ)umpty. 
The result proves useful to keep track of LOLITA's development, and therefore 
serves as a development tool. 
D.7.3.4 Information Retrieval 
words-Used and phrasejneans events will form the basis of any information re-
trieval system based on LOLITA. Any search conducted by LOLITA will occur 
at the conceptual level. Most information retrieval can be modeled in terms of 
queries. Once the concepts satisfying the relevant queries have been found, the 
texts in which the they occurred must be determined. Textrefs are used at this 
point to give a clear reference. 
A current LOLITA project, spearheaded by Drs M.Fox and D.Long, is to use 
LOLITA as an advanced Internet searcher. The idea is to augment the standard 
pattern matching methods used by current search engines, by using LOLITA's 
NLP analysis to reject irrelevant texts. Textrefs can express web page addresses 
in the same way as they allow the letters of a word to be expressed, such as: 
"h t tp : / /www.dur . ac .uk /~ lo l i t a " . Textrefs can also express the structure within 
hypertext, capturing the notion that referring pages may provide a context to a 
page, in a similar manner to titles. For instance a list of software titles on a page 
referred to as "pirated products" has a different meaning to the same page with 
title "Soandso's products". 
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D.7.4 Textrefs: Conclusion 
Textrefs provide a general solution to the problem of representing the text's struc-
ture by exploiting the similarity between time and textual structure. This allows all 
the standard reasoning algorithms used for time to be used for textual structure. 
D.8 Ambiguity 
Natural language texts often demonstrate a considerable degree of ambiguity. Even 
simple sentences such as "A bishop blesses every novice near a river" prove highly 
ambiguous. The ambiguity varies from differing meanings of words to scopal or 
attachment ambiguity. Inference is needed to perform disambiguation. Since in-
ference is usually performed on the net i t is advantageous to use a representation 
where ambiguous information is freely accessible in the net to avoid replicating the 
inference algorithms for use by the disambiguation process. This need becomes 
more urgent i f a lazy disambiguation technique is used, whereby some of the dis-
ambiguation of a sentence may be performed a few sentences later when further 
relevant information has been determined. Thus a first requirement for the ambigu-
ity representation is that i t should allow processing of the information in the net to 
be performed by the same routines as those dealing with unambiguous statements. 
As a consequence of this, the lesser the difference between the representation of 
ambiguous and unambiguous statements, the better. 
D.8.1 The type of ambiguity to represent 
D.8.1.1 Ambiguity in Natural Language 
The ambiguity encountered in Natural Language texts consists of sets of alterna-
tives. Let us consider a simple sentence: "/ saw the lady with the hat". Such a 
simple sentence has a considerable degree of ambiguity. Firstly, the words "saw", 
"lady", "with" and "hat" all correspond to more than one meaning. This means 
that each is associated with a set of alternatives. Secondly, the prepositional phrase 
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"with the hat" could either be attached to the seeing event (where "with" could 
mean using) or to the lady herself (where "with" could mean accompanied by, wear-
ing...): another alternative. Finally, more than one lady may fit the description, 
leading to a further set of alternatives, once a referent is to be chosen. 
D.8.1.2 A simple attempt: Global ambiguity 
The simplest method of dealing with ambiguity in the required way would be to 
create all the possible interpretations of the sentence. If each of these were expressed 
in its own copy of the semantic net, the knowledge of each such semantic net would 
completely unambiguous and reasoning could easily be performed in each. 
Further processing of the text must occur in all these nets. Thus adding new infor-
mation, and determining impossible or unlikely interpretations must be repeated 
for each copy of the net. Since there is an interpretation for each combination of 
alternatives, this scheme requires a combinatorial number of copies of the net. This 
in turn imposes a combinatorial processing load, since each copy of the network 
must be processed independently. 
For instance, consider only ambiguity due to ambiguous words in the sentence "The 
shortest path between two points is a straight line". The syntactic analysis assigned 
to this sentence restricts the number of meanings to: 11 of 17 to "shortest", 4 
of 4 to "path", 1 of 2 to "between", 16 of 23 to "points", 5 of 11 to "is", 13 of 
14 to "straight", and 25 of 31 to "line". This represents a total of 11 * 4 * 16 * 
5 * 13 * 25 = 1144000 interpretations! This should be further increased to take 
account of other sources of ambiguity such as attachment decisions, and quantifier 
scoping. Clearly, a naive approach to ambiguity is not practical for large scale 
systems where ambiguity may not be resolved until further sentences have been 
processed. Obtaining a representation of ambiguity that allows efficient processing 
is thus essential. 
^"These numbers axe taken from LOLITA's current knowledge base. However the numbers 
depend on the distinctions made by the chosen ontology. 
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D.8.1,3 Sharing and alternative arcs: Local ambiguity 
The failure of the simplest method of dealing with ambiguity is that i t replaces 
local ambiguities by global ones: to avoid representing the various meanings of a 
word, it replicates the net. Each such copy is distinguished only by a few arcs. 
Instead, i f the common structures were shared between possible interpretations, 
all processing involving them would only need to be performed once. Therefore, i t 
is computationally efficient to maximise sharing as long as this in itself does not 
incur a combinatorial or worse cost. 
By comparing the structures in the various semantic nets discussed above for 
the different interpretations of a sentence, one observes that ambiguity resides 
purely in the attachment of arcs. For instance, consider the sentence "/ bought 
a small dog". Here the words "buy", "small" and "dog" are all ambiguous. By 
implementing a scheme where arcs may correspond to one of many alternatives, 
one obtains a structure with a high degree of sharing. After syntactic analysis, 
4, 10 and 5 meanings remain for the concepts buy, small and dog respectively: 
(Eo,R): {A/ -subjec t_- /A: Sengan; 
A/-ac t ion_- /0 : buyi / A/-act ion_- /0: buy2/ 
A/-ac t ion_- /0 : buys/ A/-act ion_- /0: b u y 4 ; 
A/-objec t_- /0 : <SX>oo/ A/-object_- /0 : SVQI/ 
• • •/ A/ -objec t_- /0 : SV^^} 
where SVnm is the subset of the nth meaning of small and the mth meaning of dog, 
so there are implicitly 100 additional inst_ events in the example above. However, 
this "alternative arc" solution has two major deficiencies. Firstly i t requires the 
programmer to write additional routines to deal with the ambiguous arcs thereby 
violating the first requirement. This was to ensure that the standard net processing 
algorithms will work. Secondly, and more seriously, it does not allow information 
useful for disambiguation to be expressed. 
The failure of the alternative arc scheme resides in that it attempts to increase 
sharing by enforcing too strict a degree of locality onto ambiguity. To see this, 
consider the sentence "John went to the cinema the day before I met him". If I 
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know more than one John, i t may not be obvious to me which is being referred 
to. Thus there is ambiguity of the noun "John". In the alternative arc scheme, 
the subject- of the "going" event and the object- of the "meeting" event would 
both be ambiguous arcs having as alternative targets the various possible Johns. 
Since each alternative arc is independent from all others, i t would be possible for 
the "going" event to involve a diflferent John from the "meeting" event. Although 
the use of the pronoun "him" clearly indicates that the same "John" is involved, 
there is no means of expressing this information which transcends the locality of 
the alternative arc. 
D.8.1.4 Reflecting the locality of ambiguity in the representation 
Both of the previous schemes failed either in their computational complexity, or 
in their ability to represent all the required forms of ambiguity. They also both 
fix the level of locality of the ambiguity they can represent. However the types of 
ambiguity in NL vary from very local ambiguity, such as different word meanings, 
to global ambiguity, such as attachment decisions or anaphoric references spanning 
many sentences. By representing ambiguity flexibly at level where i t occurs, sharing 
can be maximised without limiting the ambiguity that can be expressed. 
D.8.2 The nature of ambiguity modelled 
The ambiguity considered stems from the nature of the analysis phase: i t is an 
interpretive phase. Thus its task is to take natural language input, and derive 
from i t a meaning that is coherent with its model of the world. Coherent here 
means that the meaning derived is possible with respect to the facts expressed in 
its model of the world, and that i t does not require a large change to that model 
to fit in consistently. The notion of "Large change" encompasses both quantitative 
and qualitative notions: important facts on which a lot depends cannot be revised 
easily. This derivation process is aided by restrictions on the meanings that can 
be derived: these are the linguistic rules that LOLITA is given. Note that it is 
neither assumed that LOLITA's conversant has the same linguistic rules, nor has 
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the same concepts as LOLITA. This means that neither a universal form of meaning 
is assumed, nor language is considered as a compressed form of such meaning using 
standard rules. Rather all that is assumed is a sufficient degree of commonality for 
statement made by one agent to be understandable most of the time to the other. 
This is an obvious necessity, since speaking a language is an effort which must be 
rewarded by some practical gain. 
Within this framework, i t is the notion of interpretation that is fundamental. Am-
biguity, seen from this viewpoint, corresponds to a set of possible alternative inter-
pretations that have been derived from the surface utterance at a particular point 
in the processing. This set will be reduced by disambiguation, such as provided by 
discourse rules, coherence checking, and so on. Other rules increase i t by mapping 
a surface form to many alternative meanings. 
The question therefore becomes what does LOLITA believe the surface form to 
mean? What meaning does LOLITA assign to the utterance? As discussed in the 
epistemological section, meaning is fundamentally a belief about the world which 
will determine further actions within i t . Thus the question can be reformulated as: 
if LOLITA believed the surface form of the statement, what beHef does this imply 
LOLITA holds about the world? In general this applies to any agent, so the key 
notion is that of "what world belief does belief in the surface form of a particular 
statement imply?" 
D.8.3 A general representation of ambiguity 
Analysis of ambiguity led to two conclusions relevant to the design of a represen-
tation of ambiguity: 
The ambiguity to be modelled results from the interpretation process. I t corre-
sponds to different interpretations that LOLITA can derive from the text. Dis-
ambiguation occurs when LOLITA decides she believes in one interpretation more 
than another. 
The contradictory demands of representing all forms of ambiguity, yet maximising 
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sharing can be satisfied by a flexible representation which captures the locality of 
the ambiguity. 
This section develops a representation that satisfies these twin demands. 
D.8.3.1 Representing interpretation 
The fundamental notion that the representation must capture is that the text is 
interpreted. For this, a representation is needed for the text itself, for the corre-
sponding concepts, and a mapping between them. But such a representation has 
already been introduced! Textrefs provided a representation of the text itself: its 
words, and its format. The wordS-used and phrasejneans events provided a map-
ping from the concrete text to LOLITA's interpretation of i t . Thus this part of the 
work has already been done. 
I t is however useful at this point to clarify the exact meaning of the words-used 
and phrase-means events. 
words-used events simply state that a particular conceptual structure was derived 
from the words corresponding to the textrefs that are the words-used's subject-S. 
Belief in a words-used event does not state any belief in its object- concept. 
A phrase_means event is usually used to state that LOLITA believes that the 
phrase expressed by the event's subject , textref(s) means the conceptual event(s) 
that are its object-(s). More formally, a phrase-means event states that i f the 
phrase expressed by the event's subject- textrefs is believed, then so must be the 
events that are its object-(s). Thus belief in a phrase-means event alone does not 
imply belief in the interpretation. For instance, LOLITA can believe that the state-
ment "The Queen is dead" means that Elizabeth I I , queen of England is dead, but 
she need not believe i t . However, i f LOLITA believes in the statement, a priori to 
understanding i t , she must also believe in its meaning if she believes that her inter-
pretation of the statement is correct. For instance, LOLITA might believe, yet not 
understand, the statement "In an impurity semiconductor containing donors, the 
Fermi energy lies above the middle of the forbidden band", because the Nobel Prize 
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in Physics uttered i t . I f she also believes that she has the correct interpretation for 
i t - i.e. that she has understood it , then she must believe in that interpretation. 
As was explained in D.7 (p. D-lOO), all events added to SemNet during interpre-
tation are added as hypothetical*^ and the o b j e c t - of a phrase_means event (or 
equivalently, of an and_ event, itself the o b j e c t - of a phrase-means event). 
D.8.3.2 Variable nodes 
• Variable nodes: Motivation 
Ambiguity can already be represented by the wordS-Used events. Indeed, suppose 
that LOLITA is unsure to which of two meanings a word corresponds. This would 
mean that there are two possible interpretations of the word, one of which she 
believes is correct. This can directly be mapped into the representation by con-
necting the word to the two concepts with two hypothetical words-Used events, 
themselves the subjects of a x o r - event. Whether the xor_ event is believed de-
pends on whether the interpretation i t represents is believed: if it were not for 
the interpretation, there would not even be words .used events to choose from. 
Thus, the x o r - event is one of the s u b j e c t - S of an and- event (representing one 
ful l interpretation), itself the o b j e c t - of a phrase_meaiis event. 
The problem with this scheme is that it does not allow sharing of common con-
ceptual structures. The alternative wordS-Used events split the word into separate 
meanings at the conceptual level. This means that common structures cannot be 
shared at the conceptual level, precisely contradicting what is wanted. For in-
stance the representation of a sentence with only two ambiguous words, "Ross was 
escorted from bar to the dock"^'^ would require four similar structures: one for each 
of the four combinations of meanings. 
Variable nodes provide a solution to this problem, by delaying the splitting of a 
word or sentence into alternatives until the conceptual level is reached. 
^^except events corresponding to hypothetical statements in the text: see D.7 (p. D-lOO). 
•^ ^This might either invoke a courtroom or a harbour scene (taken from [Hirst 87]) 
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• The representation of Variable Nodes 
Variable nodes represent nodes which correspond to one of a set of alternative 
concepts. Their alternatives are expressed using hypothetical synonym, events, 
all of which are the subject , of a xor- event, itself dependent on the relevant 
phrase-means event. Thus they are concepts defined as being synonymous with 
one of their alternatives. They provide a unique reference point to which the events 
from the rest of the text can be connected. The synonym, events are definitional 
with respect to the variable node, but observational with respect to the alternative 
concepts. 
The variable node may be the object- of the relevant words.used event, but need 
not be. For instance, if the phrase "a cat" is processed, the words.used event 
would be connected to an instance of the variable node, rather than the variable 
node itself (a set). The instance event would however be connected to the same 
phrase-means event as the xor- event via an and- event. 
Prepositions are often ambiguous. For instance, "with" may refer to accompani-
ment as in "I went to the cinema with John", instrument as in "/ opened the bottle 
with a corkscrew", wearing as in "The lady with the red hat", and many other forms 
of association "The soldier with the sister". I t is possible to express this type of 
information as ambiguity of the ac t ion , of an event.^ ^ 
Variable nodes are also used in the treatment of anaphoric reference. Thus, one 
can state that there is only one John involved in the sentence "John was sacked 
the day before I met him", although it may not be clear to which of the Johns i t 
knows, the agent is referring: 
{Eo,H): {A/ - sub jec t - - /A : peoplei; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : sack; 
A / - o b j e c t . - / 0 : VAfi} 
{Ei,H): {A/ - sub jec t - - /A : Sengan; A / -ac t ion . - /0 : meet; 
A / -ob jec t - - / 0 : V^^l} 
'^Ht is not claimed that explicitly enumerating all the possibilities need be the only method used 
to solve this problem. A hybrid method of enumerating the common possibiUties, while including 
an unpreferred generic ahernative to be refined by other algorithms may be more appropriate. 
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{E2,H): {A / - sub j ec t - - / 0 : "John"; A/-act ion_-/0: words-Used; 
A/-ob j ec t - - / 0 : VA^i} 
{E3,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [EQ, Ey, . . . ] ; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : xor-} 
{Ei,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [EQ, Ei, E2, E3, ...] ; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : andJ 
(E^jR): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : "John was sacked . . . I met him"; 
A/-ac t ion_- /0 : phrase_means; A/ -ob jec t - - /0 : £ ^ 4 } 
( £ ^ 6 , ^ ) : { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : Johni; A/-subject - - /A: VAfu 
A/-ac t ion_- /0 : synonym-} 
{E7,H): {A / - sub j ec t - - / 0 : Johna; A/-subject - - /A: VAfi] 
A/-ac t ion - - /0 : synonym-} 
Similarly, sentences such as "John hit Bill. He died" can be treated: "He" may 
refer either to John or to Bil l , but initially which is not known. 
o Under-specified variable nodes 
Another important feature of variable nodes is that they are integrated into the 
hierarchy. I t would be possible to make all variable nodes children of typeless, 
but i t proves more useful to make them into the smallest common superset which 
includes all of their alternatives. The variable node then has all the features com-
mon to the alternatives i t represents. I t is under-specified, in that i t is a concept 
which includes all of its alternatives. Often however, the information shared by the 
alternatives is sufficient for useful disambiguation. Take for instance "The frog lived 
near the fence". LOLITA has 3 meanings of frog: an adornment, a Frenchman, 
and an amphibian. Even i f LOLITA is unable to decide whether a Frenchman or 
an amphibian is being referred to, she knows it is an animate being, since semantic 
selection of the verb "live" dismisses the adornment meaning. I f the next sentence 
is "It rose every morning", the meaning of "rise" reserved for astronomical objects 
such as the sun, moon and so on, can be dismissed because the frog is animate. 
In computational terms, it is far better to access shared information than it is to 
consider each alternative individually. 
''^In many languages the syntactic gender of the pronoun can further refine the choice, "if' 
indicates "the frog". 
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Maintaining the variable node as the smallest common superset requires processing 
each time one of its alternatives is deleted. However, the information about the 
features shared by the alternatives is accessed very often. When processing often 
performs the same operation, computational efficiency is improved by memoizing 
the resulting information. Seen in this light, ensuring that the variable node is 
always the smallest common superset is of obvious computational benefit. 
By providing a clear conceptual distinction between features shared by all of the 
alternatives, and features true of each individually, variable nodes substantially 
simplify the disambiguation algorithms. Two classes of disambiguation algorithms 
are obtained: a simpler class applying only to variable nodes, which use less in-
formation and which are thus used as a first filter. The second class are those 
that apply to individual alternatives. These are used for variable nodes with few 
alternatives once the simpler rules have been applied. 
o Variable node grouping 
Variable nodes are further extensible by allowing their alternatives to be further 
grouped into smaller sets. For instance, the word "cabinet" can refer either to a 
piece of furniture, the people in the cabinet office, or to the cabinet office itself. 
By grouping these meanings into furniture and government pertaining concepts, 
sentences such as "The craftsman built the cabinet" can quickly be disambiguated. 
In general, the ambiguity will involve many more meanings than the above three, 
and grouping will prove essential when processing packed structures (see D.8.4 (p. 
D-128) below). 
Grouping is obtained simply by adding new variable nodes, each connected to the 
alternatives forming part of its group. The main variable node is then connected 
to these new variable nodes, and to any alternatives remaining single after the 
grouping process. For instance, 
{Eo,H): {A/ - sub jec t - - /A : craftsmani; A/ -ac t ion- - /0 : bu i ld ; 
A/-objec t_- /A: VMi} 
{Ei,H): (A/ -sub jec t - - /A: VAfi; A/ -subjec t - - /0 : cabinet/„rmtixre; 
A/-ac t ion_- /0 : synonym. } 
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{E2,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VA^i; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : VA/'a; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym- } 
{E3,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : VAfu A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : i n s t - ; 
A / - o b j e c t _ - / A : VM^} 
{Ei,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : £^1; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : £"2; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : x o r - } 
{E5,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VA^s; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : cabinetiyuiiding; 
AI-a.ction.-IO: synonym- } 
{Ee,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VMs; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : cabinet„iem6ers; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym- } 
iE7,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [E5,Ee]; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : xor_ } 
(Es^H): { A 7 - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [£^0, ^ 3 , £^4, E7, . . . ] ; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : and . } 
{Eg,R): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : "The c r a f t s m a n b u i l t the cabinet"; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : phrase-means; A / - o b j e c t - - / 0 : Eg} 
D.8.4 Packed Structures 
As the analysis proceeds, likely combinations of meanings emerge. For instance, 
in the sentence "Ross was escorted from the bar to the dock", the words "bar" and 
"dock" may invoke either a courtroom scene of a harbourside-scene. For simplicity 
we will only consider the 2 meanings of bar and dock. Of the resulting 4 meaning 
combinations, two are preferred: either both bar and dock are expected to refer 
to their courtroom meaning, or to their harbourside meaning. As variable nodes 
cannot capture this correlation, this type of information can only be expressed by 
unpacking the shared structures, and obtaining four structures, one for each of the 
possible interpretations of the sentence. 
D.8.4.1 Correlations in ambiguous statements 
Packed structures allow correlations between alternatives of different variable nodes 
to be expressed. This is achieved by realizing that the alternatives are expressed 
in terms of belief operators: x o r - events. Just as x o r - events are used to alternate 
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between synon3nn-S, and- events can be used to gather alternatives into an inter-
pretation. The and- event joining the alternatives into an interpretation states a 
belief in which alternatives the variable nodes express. 
{EQ,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : peoplei; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : e s c o r t ; 
A / - o b j e c t _ - / 0 : Ross} 
{Ei,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : £"0; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : o r i g i n - ; 
A7 -object_-7A: VMi} 
(E2,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : £^0; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : d e s t i n a t i o n - ; 
A / - o b j e c t - - / A : VM2} 
{E3,R): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : "bar"; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : wordS-Used; 
A / - o b j e c t _ - / 0 : VMi} 
{Ei,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VA^i; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : b a r d r m j k ; 
A / - a c t i o n . - / 0 : synonym. } 
{E5,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VA^i; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : bar^^^ri; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym- } 
[ET,R): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : "dock"; A 7 - a c t i o n . - / 0 : words.used; 
A / - o b j e c t - - / 0 : VM2} 
{Es,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VN'2\ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : dozkharbouT; 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : synonym. } 
{EQ,H): { A 7 - s u b j e c t . - / A : VMi, A / - s u b j e c t . - / 0 : docY^ouru 
A / - a c t i o n . - / 0 : synonym. } 
{Eii,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [Ei,E^; A / - a c t i o n . - / 0 : and. } 
{Ei2,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [E^,E^]; A / - a c t i o n . - / 0 : a n d . } 
{En,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : En ; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : Ei2\ 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : x o r . } 
[En,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - J O : [EQ, Ei, E2, £^13, •••] ; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : and-} 
{Ei5,R): { A 7 - s u b j e c t . - / 0 : "Ross was . . . dock"; 
A / - a c t i o n - - J O : phrase-means; A / - o b j e c t - - / 0 : Eu} 
En and £ ' 1 2 express the two preferred interpretations. 
4^  Note that the representation given in the example is simplified: no particular commitment 
is made to the example representation of origin and destination, however if they were to be used 
they would refer to positions in a location model, rather the concepts "bar" and "dock". Also, 
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D.8.4.2 Belief and Interpretation 
The existence of a node corresponding to an interpretation of the text allows in-
terpretations to be referred to as concepts. Thus, alternative interpretations may 
be expressed, either as possibihties contemplated by LOLITA, or as believed in by 
different people. I t also allows chains of reasoning to refer to interpretations, as in 
"It was because John thought Margaret meant his wife was having an affair, that 
he disappeared." 
Because ambiguity is modelled in terms of behef, the b e l i e f - v a l u e event is used 
to rank alternative interpretations, in the opinion of different agents, including 
LOLITA. A subtle but important distinction must be made between b e l i e f . v a l u e 
events connected to p h r a s e .means events and those connected to the logical con-
nectives joining the parts of the various interpretations together. The former sig-
nify how much the agent believes that the phrase-means s u b j e c t , textrefs mean 
their o b j e c t , concepts. The latter signify how much the agent believes the state-
ments formed by the conjunction of the interpretation's parts, independently from 
whether i t believes the statement to be the meaning of the textrefs. For instance, 
one might not believe that John wanted some birthday present, but beheve that 
the interpretation of "Oh! Just what I always wanted!" is that he wanted it . 
D.8.4.3 Dismissing interpretations 
The representation also allows impossible correlations to be expressed as such. For 
instance, "The fan broke the window" either means "someone broke the window with 
a fan" or "A fan broke the window", as in a football fan. Although disambiguation 
may not be able to chose which of the interpretations is appropriate, i t should be 
able to represent that there is a choice between two of them. This might seem 
trivial, simply being a matter of a x o r . node between the two possibilities, but 
such solutions decrease sharing. 
At different points throughout the disambiguation process, impossible meaning 
properly Ei and E2 should be connected to instances of VWi and VJV2 respectively. 
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combinations may be found by different algorithms. Simply removing the interpre-
tation from the packed structure often destroys the packed structure and reduces 
sharing dramatically. Since sharing is essential to maintaining efficiency, the rep-
resentation must allow impossible meaning combinations to be represented while 
maintaining sharing. 
The text being analysed is associated with a textref. The concepts forming its 
interpretation are the subject-S of an and. event, which is connected to the textref 
by a phrase-means event. Rejecting an interpretation corresponds to a disbelief 
that the textref means that interpretation. This can be expressed directly in the 
network by writing that the dismissed interpretations as subject-S of a nand-
event, itself the subject- of the and- event connected to the phrase-means event. 
For instance, in "The frog found the bugs", the interpretation "the amphibian found 
the errors" can be dismissed: 
Eo,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VAfi, A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : f i n d ; 
A / - o b j e c t - - / A : V ^ s } 
Ei,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : V A ^ i ; A / - sub j ec t - - / 0 : bugerrori 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym- } 
E2,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VA^i; A / - sub jec t - - /0 : bugi^^ect; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym- } 
E3,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VA^i; A / - sub jec t - - /0 : hngspy.device] 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym- } 
Ei,H): { A / - s u b j e c t . - / 0 : V J V I ; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : i n s t . ; 
A / - o b j e c t _ - / A : VMi} 
E^,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : [Ex, E2, E3]; AI-a.ction.-IO: xor- } 
Ee,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VAf^; A / - s u b j e c t . - / 0 : frogamphibian; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonjrm. } 
E7,H): {A / - sub jec t - -7A: VMa] A / - sub jec t - - /0 : frog/^encAman; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym- } 
Es,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : VM3; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : i n s t - ; 
A / - o b j e c t - - / A : V^f^} 
EQ,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [Ee, £ 7 ] ; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : xor- } 
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(Eio,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [Ei, E^]; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : nand- } 
{En,Hy. { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [^o, E,, E^, Es, E^, E^o, . •.]; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : and-} 
{Ei2,R): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : "The f r o g found the bug"; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : phrase jneans ; A / - o b j e c t . - / 0 : £ ^ 1 1 } 
The input to LOLITA is currently text, but SemNet could also be used for a system 
with speech input. Other examples of this type of ambiguity occur in NL speech: 
"Each bill requires a check/cheque"'^^, is ambiguous as to whether each bill must 
be payed by cheque, or each new law must be checked. 
D.8.4.4 Structuring ambiguity 
Disambiguation algorithms can further benefit if they structure the information 
they process to reflect information that is salient to them. This section describes 
three examples of such structure and shows how the representation allows i t to be 
represented. 
• Examples of structure in ambiguity 
The locality of ambiguity may an important consideration. I f many sentences are 
ambiguous because of one global ambiguity, it may be worth concentrating effort 
on disambiguating this ambiguity, than on the many local ambiguities. Indeed, 
the information given by a text is useless if most of the facts derived from i t are 
still ambiguous. For this, the representation should be able to express locality of 
ambiguity. 
Alternatively, the disambiguation algorithm may benefit more from a structure 
emphasising dependencies of ambiguity. I f ambiguity is grouped by dependency, 
once an ambiguity has been resolved, simply reading the representation tells one 
the dependent ambiguities which might now be solved. Clearly, a group of am-
biguities may depend on another group, so the representation must allow many 
levels of grouping. This structure would improve the efficiency of disambiguation. 
''^  Example taken from [Hirst 87] 
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by guiding the search through the remaining ambiguity. 
The structure could also reflect the preference for certain interpretations. Some 
interpretations may be preferred to others for a variety of reasons. For instance, 
frequently used senses of words may be preferred, whereas non-literal uses of words 
may be dispreferred. The structure could reflect this, so that disambiguation algo-
rithms concentrate on the current best choices, while maintaining other possibili-
ties: a classic best first strategy. 
• Expressing the structure of ambiguity 
Different interpretations of the text are formed by combining individual ambiguities 
using logical connectives. Because logical connectives are used and have properties 
such as associativity and distributedness, different structures can be built which 
are logically equivalent. 
This observation allows dependencies between possible alternatives to be expressed. 
For instance, i f a and h depend on c and d respectively and vice-versa, the flat 
alternative structure (a A 6 A c A d) can be rearranged to the logically equivalent 
((a A c) A (6 A c?)). This can be repeated at many levels, where each step through 
the tree of and. events from the topmost event expresses an increase in the level of 
mutual dependency between the alternatives forming its subjec t -S . 
The S t ructure can also reflect the preference for certain interpretations. To do this, 
i t m u s t be possible to represent any interpretation by a node. Representing corre-
lations between alternatives, has the same requirement. To do this, the equivalence 
between statements like xor_(ai, 61, C i ) A xor-(a2, &2, C2) and 
xor_((ai A 02), (ai A 62), (oi A C 2 ) , (&i A 02), (61 A 62), (61 A C 2 ) , (cj A 02), (ci A 62), 
(ci AC2)) can be used. Since this step reduces sharing, i t is often desirable to 
keep most of the expression of ambiguity in the first form, and only expand the 
preferred interpretation. I t is not possible to do this using pure xor- and and-S. 
Indeed, the packed structure expressing all the interpretations will include the pre-
ferred interpretation. Creating a structure that did not include it would result in 
less sharing. For instance if ai A 02 were the preferred interpretation, the structure 
not including it would be: xor-([ai A 62], [«! A C2] , [xor-(6i ,C2) A xor-(a2, 62, C2) ] ) 
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Instead if maximal packing is maintained, the top logical connective between the 
packed structure and the preferred interpretation must be or.. Otherwise, the 
repetition of the preferred interpretation outside and inside the packed structure 
would eliminate itself: True xor . True is False. Thus the full example would be 
(ai A 02)V xor-(ai, 61, ci) A xor-(a2,62, C2) By unpacking the preferred interpreta-
tion and placing i t under the top logical connective, the disambiguation algorithms 
can concentrate on i t . They do not need to deal with the extra weight of process-
ing less likely candidates, as would be imposed by a representation which forced 
maximum sharing at all times. However the alternative candidates are maintained, 
and can be processed if the current preferred interpretation is dismissed. 
There is also structure in the textrefs, which encodes notions such as locality: some 
textrefs correspond to phrases, others to sentences, and others to paragraphs, etc... 
Each may be the subject- of a phrase-means event, which can be associated with 
the ambiguity at its level. For instance suppose that ambiguity in the referent of 
a pronoun spans two sentences a and b. a and b are each represented by a textref. 
These textrefs are each connected via a phrase-means event to an and- event, c and 
d respectively. The ambiguity, represented by a xor- event x will be a subject- of 
both of these and. events. But the paragraph in which a and b are, is also associated 
with an and- event, e. e will not only have c and d as subject-S, but also x. This 
represents the fact that the ambiguity occurs at a super-sentence level. In common 
with the structure expressing preference, the ambiguity to process is expressed 
higher up the logical connective structure: nearer the nodes corresponding to the 
interpretation of the whole text. 
Using structure within the tree of logical connectives is complementary to using 
logical connectives for correlating ambiguity, or for dismissing certain interpreta-
tions. Indeed, the disambiguation algorithms can use an algebra of transformations 
on the logical connective tree. For instance, when certain interpretations have been 
dismissed, it may be possible to delete the positive expression of the interpretation 
if the resulting tree retains the same amount of sharing, by using a xor . -lO is true. 
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D.8.5 Hidden Assumptions 
The discussion of ambiguity so far has been informal to simplify i t . However, two 
hidden assumptions must be rendered explicit. 
The first assumption is that ambiguity ultimately can be resolved to a unique 
meaning. That is to say every statement ultimately has only one interpretation. 
Al though the precise interpretation may not be known, the assumption is that i f 
one interpretation is chosen, the statement has no other meaning. Even though 
this is false for deliberately ambiguous statements, double-ententes and puns, i t 
is a fair assumption for the factual type of information, and day to day state-
ments L O L I T A is designed to process. The scheme presented may be extendible 
to cover such possibilities, but this w i l l not be considered wi th in the scope of this 
thesis. Currently L O L I T A st i l l has difficulties producing a good interpretation of 
many li teral sentences. Much work is s t i l l needed on this question before problems 
such as double meanings can be addressed. This l imi ta t ion is therefore based on 
an understanding of the current limitations of natural language analysis, and the 
assumption that these w i l l take quite a long time to resolve. 
The second assumption is a consequence of the first: although concepts have been 
argued to be fuzzy to a certain degree, they are s t i l l assumed to be distinguishable. 
Thus although the ambiguity may involve two very similar concepts and be very 
subtle, the representations considered all insist that either one or the other of the 
concepts was meant. This insistence w i l l occur despite the fact that there may be 
no information to decide, and i t really makes no difference either way. Although us-
ing variable nodes w i l l decrease the inconvenience posed by this insistence for most 
types of processing, the scheme could result in a large amount of the semantic net 
being occupied by useless ambiguity information. This can however be avoided 
using a clever disambiguation algorithm which detects these cases and adds new 
subsuming concept where necessary. Obviously the diff iculty then lies in establish-
ing how important the difference between two concepts is. Such an algorithm is 
beyond the scope of this discussion. 
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D.8.6 Features of the representation for disambiguation 
As was shown by the example "The shortest path between two points is a straight 
line", ambiguity is diff icult because of its combinatorial behaviour. A naive repre-
sentation, such as multiple semantic nets, w i l l impose combinatorial complexity on 
disambiguation. The only method of defeating i t , is "divide and conquer" strat-
egy. Since the complexity stems f rom the number of possible combinations being a 
product of the number of alternatives of each local ambiguity, each local ambiguity 
must be treated as independently f rom all the others as possible. Since the N L 
analysis algorithms must also build and read f rom the representation, a represen-
ta t ion that requires each combination to be wri t ten explicitly, without allowing any 
sharing, w i l l necessarily have combinatorial complexity. A representation that em-
phasizes sharing of common structures w i l l not impose combinatorial complexity on 
the disambiguation algorithms^'', and gives ample opportunity for clever strategies 
exploiting common structures. 
SemNet's representation of ambiguity emphasizes sharing and allows clever disam-
biguation algorithms to exploit sharing. This section develops a few examples of 
this type of processing. 
D.8.6.1 "The shortest path..." 
The first example is "The shortest path between two points is a straight line". Af -
ter syntactic analysis, this had 1 1 * 4 * 16 * 5 * 13 * 25 = 1144000 interpretations, 
due to word ambiguity. Much of this ambiguity is due to many subtle distinctions 
in meaning of the words, which could be grouped into broad bands of meaning. 
This diff icul ty can be alleviated by using variable node grouping, and underspeci-
fied definitions. The resulting broader concepts st i l l retain enough information to 
make useful disambiguation decisions. Since fewer, albeit vaguer, concepts are con-
sidered the number of interpretations considered by the disambiguation algorithm 
is reduced substantially. One of the simplest forms of disambiguation is seman-
Clearly, even with a representation emphasizing sharing, it is possible to write algorithms 
with combinatorial complexity. 
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t ic selection. Substantial computational costs can be saved by using a first pass 
to perform semantic selection at the family level, which requires only looking up 
controls rather than searching through the net. For this reason, and since family 
broadly expresses conceptual similarity, family information is used to create the 
variable node grouping. The number of interpretations to consider is reduced to 
2 * 3 * 1 0 * 5 * 2 * 10 = 6000 which is some 2 orders of magnitude less. 
I f the decisions used to create the variable node grouping reflected the type of 
information needed to quickly eliminate some interpretations, a large number of 
possibilities can quickly be eliminated. Once this has been done, the surviving 
alternative concepts can again be combined into new variable node groupings, and 
the process repeated: the resulting variable node groupings are more specific than 
those of the previous generation. Eventually, the granularity may reach the al-
ternative meanings of the sentence themselves. I n essence, the process avoids the 
disambiguation algorithms being swamped by too much irrelevant information at 
a particular stage of processing. 
D.8.6.2 A detailed example: "The astronomer married the star" 
Consider the example of "The astronomer married the star". There are four mean-
ings of star in Wordnet: the astronomical object; anything looking like the star 
shaped figure; the lead actor in a play or film; and an expert, ace or whizz. Using 
fami ly controls nodes, these can be combined into three variable node groupings: 
one for inanimate objects, one for shapes, and one for humans. There are two 
meanings of marry in Wordnet, illustrated by the sentences "John married Mary", 
and "the priest married the couple". I n both cases, the template o b j e c t - has fam-
i ly type "human", so the interpretations of star expressed by the variable nodes 
"figure" and "inanimate objects" can be dismissed. 
There is no fur ther information to disambiguate further the meaning of "star", so 
the second stage is the disambiguation of "marry". The templates of both meanings 
of "marry" diflter in the quantification of their ob jec t - . The "John married Mary" 
meaning takes one object per event as expressed by a F - F quantification on the 
Appendix D: Extended Representation: Detailed Issues D-138 
o b j e c t - arc. The "The priest married the couple" meaning takes a set of people 
of two elements for each event: F — FV quantification and the relevant s i z e , two 
event. Thus, the "marry" has been disambiguated. 
The remaining ambiguity can only be resolved using additional information, for 
instance provided later i n the text. The underspecified variable grouping node w i l l 
therefore be maintained. The bulk of the disambiguation was done linearly in three 
steps, instead of combinatorially in six. 
D.8.6.3 Maintaining underspecified variable nodes 
Often, i t w i l l be impossible to disambiguate between similar meanings of concepts. 
For instance, according to Wordnet, there are two similar meanings of lake which 
bo th refer to a pigment. Since L O L I T A is Wordnet compatible, both meanings 
are included in the semantic net. But the difference of meaning is so small that 
the choice between them is rarely determined. However the knowledge that the 
variable node is a pigment is sufficient for most purposes. Similarly, i t is often 
diff icul t to distinguish between the lead actor in a play or film and an expert, ace 
or whizz. 
Underspecified variable nodes provide a degree of robustness, by allowing L O L I T A 
to reason w i t h the information she analyses despite the eccentricities of the con-
ceptual ontology she uses. Eventually, however, they should prove useful tools to 
determine which conceptual distinctions prove unnecessary: i f L O L I T A has been 
repeatedly been unable to distinguish between the same groups of concepts, while 
analyzing large corpora, and this is due to lack of information in the text rather 
than to the failings of her algorithms or data, the distinction between concepts may 
be unnecessary. 
D.8.6.4 Node count 
The final example illustrates the reduction in structure that must be buil t in order 
to represent multiple forms of ambiguity: "A bishop visits every church near a 
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lake". The following structure expresses the ambiguity due to the words bishop (3 
senses), visits (4), lakes (3), churches (3), the prepositional attachment of near (to 
lake or to visiting) and the ambiguity of quantification (a bishop = an arbitrary 
bishop, or every bishop; and a lake = an arbitrary lake or every lake): 
Eo,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : VJ\fBishops] A / - s u b j e c t _ - / A : VMBishop2\ 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : synonym-• 
'Ei,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : VUsishops] A J - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : spec_; 
A J - o b j e c t . - / A : VUsishapi] 
E2,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : VAfBishop2] A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : size_; A / - o b j e c t - - / 0 : 1} 
E3,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : VN'Bishap2\ A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : size_; 
A / - o b j e c t _ - y l A : more_than_one} 
Ei,H): { A F V - s u b j e c t _ - F O : VMBishop2] A W - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : VJ^yiMs] 
A W - o b j e c t _ - 3 ! 0 : VAfchurches} 
E^,H): { A F V - s u b j e c t _ - F A : VMBishov2\ A W - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : VN^isUs] 
A V F - o b j e c t . - F O : VNchurches) 
E^,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - W O : E^\ A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 
ET,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - W O : E^\ A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 
E 8 , F ) : { A / - s u b j e c t _ - W O : £ '5; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 
EQ,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : [ £ ^ 6 , ^ 7 , ^ 8 ] ; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : xor_} 
E^Q,H): { A F - s u b j e c t _ - F A : VAfchurches] A V - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : i n . l o c ; 
A F - o b j e c t - - F A : pos i} 
Eu,H): {AFF-snhject--FFA: E^, A V - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : in_loc ; 
A W - o b j e c t _ - 3 ! A : pos i} 
Eu,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - W O : [ ^ s . ^ i i ] ; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : and.} 
E^s,H): { A F F - s u b j e c t _ - F F A : £4; A V - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : i s _ i n ; 
A W - o b j e c t - - 3 ! A : pos i} 
Eu,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - W O : [Ei,En]; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : and_} 
Ei5,H): { A 7 - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : [Ei(i,Ei2,Eu]; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : xor_} 
E^e^H): { A / - S U b j e C t _ - / 0 : VAfLakes] A/ -SUbjeCt_- /A: VMLake2\ 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : synonyin_} 
£0; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : and-} 
[Ei^Ez]; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : and-} 
Ei,E2]\ A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : and_} 
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iEn,H 
{E221H 
{E23,H 
{E241H 
iE2,,H 
{E26,H 
{E27,H 
{E2s,H 
{E29,H 
{E3o,H 
[EzuH 
{Es2,H 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : VMiakes; A J - a c t i o n - - / 0 : spec-; 
A / - o b j e c t - - 7 A : VNLakei] 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - 7 0 : VMLake2] A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : s ize-; 
A J - o b j e c t - - / 0 : 1} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : VMLake2\ A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : s ize . ; 
A / - o b j e c t - - y l A : more-than-one} 
{ A F V - s u b j e c t - - F O : VNLake2\ A W - a c t i o n - - / 0 : i n - l o c ; 
A W - o b j e c t _ - 3 ! A : P0S2} 
{ A F V - s u b j e c t - - F A : VNLake2\ A W - a c t i o n - - / 0 : i n - l o c ; 
A V F - o b j e c t - - F A : P0S2} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - W O : -E20; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : Fie; 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : and-} 
{ A 7 - s u b j e c t - - W 0 : F21; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [^17,^19]; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : and-} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t _ - W O : F21; A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [Fi7,Fi8]; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : and-} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - 7 0 : [^ 22,^ 23,^ 24]; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : x o r - } 
{ A V - s u b j e c t - - 3 ! A : [posi,pos2]; A V - a c t i o n - - / 0 : near^^; 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : Bishopsi ; A 7 - s u b j e c t - - / A : VAfBishops] 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : synonym-} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : Bishops2; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VJ\fBishops', 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : synonym-} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : Bishopss; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VAfsishops; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym-} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : v i s i t s i ; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VMyiHts] 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : synonym-} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : visitS2; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VMyisUs', 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym-} 
{ A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : v i s i t s a ; A7- sub jec t_ - /A : VMvisits\ 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym-} 
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{E33,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - J 0 : v i s i tS4; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VN'yisUs; 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym-} 
(£•34,7?): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : churchesi; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VNchurches\ 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym-} 
(F35,i7): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : churches2; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VUchurches, 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym-} 
(F36 , i f ) : { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : churchesa; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VAfchurches] 
A 7 - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym-} 
{E3T,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : LaJcesi; A / - s u b j e c t _ - / A : VJ\fLakes] 
A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : synonym-} 
{E38,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : Lakess; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VNiakes] 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : synonym-} 
iE3g,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : Lakesg; A / - s u b j e c t - - / A : VMiakes] 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : synonym-} 
[EiQ,H): { A / - s u b j e c t _ - / 0 : [F27,F28,F29]; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : xor_} 
[E^uH): { A / - s u b j e c t - - 7 0 : [F3o,F3i,F32,F33]; A / - a c t i o n - - / 0 : x o r . } 
{Ei2,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [F34,F35,F36]; A / - a c t i o n . - / 0 : x o r - } 
{E^3,H): { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [F37,F38,F39]; A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : x o r - } 
iEu,Hy. { A / - s u b j e c t - - / 0 : [E,,Ei,,E25,E4o,E4i,Ei2,E,d]; 
A / - a c t i o n _ - / 0 : and-} 
E4 of Eg is observational w i t h respect to VMBishop2 and VNchurches corresponding 
to the reading "Every Bishop visits every church near a lake" 
E5 of Ej defines VJ\fBishop2 as those who visit a church near a lake, corresponding 
to the reading "Every church near a lake is visited by a bishop". 
E5 of Es defines VJ^Bishop2 as the bishop who visits all churches near a lake. 
Only 52 nodes (44 events, 2 positions, and 6 vir tual nodes) are used, whereas wi th-
out packing, 23329 nodes would have been necessary to express every possibility. 
The number of readings is: 
"near" is replacing the set of events that would model it in the representation of location. 
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• 3 Quantification Ambiguity of a bishop 
• 3 Quantification Ambigui ty of a lake 
• 3 Meanings of bishop 
• 4 Meanings of visits 
• 3 Meanings of church 
• 3 Meanings of lake 
• 2 Possible prepositional attachments of near a lake 
making a tota l of 3 * 3 * 3 * 4 * 3 * 3 * 2 = 1944 readings. Each reading requires 12 
nodes: 
• 3 spec- or i n s t - or synonym- events f rom Bishops^, f rom churches^; and 
f rom L a k e S i i 
• 3 instances/specializations produced by the above events; 
• 2 i n - l o c events for churches and lakes; 
• 2 positions for the above 2 events; 
• 2 events: visi t ing and near. 
resulting in 1944 * 12 -h 1 = 23329 where the -1-1 stands for the top xor-event. 
D.8.7 Ambiguity: Conclusion 
A model of ambiguity based on the existing events defined in the network has 
been discussed. Because of its reliance on the existing notions of behef and textual 
references, the introduction of ambiguity does not require any changes to forms of 
processing which do not use information about ambiguity. Thus algorithms that do 
not use information about ambiguity, such as temporal reasoning are not required to 
cope w i t h the additional complication of processing information about ambiguity. 
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A poor representation of ambiguity, for instance such as alternative links, would 
require changes to all processing algorithms, because distinct mechanisms are used 
to express unambiguous and ambiguous statements. 
The computational efficiency of the representation is ensured by always maintaining 
a high degree of sharing while allowing alternative interpretations to be expressed. 
Using the b e l i e f - v a l u e event, the alternatives can be ranked, and the behaviour 
appropriate to LOLITA ' s beliefs be obtained. Clearly, the c e r t a i n t y _ v a l u e of an 
interpretation can also be modulated, depending on the extent the disambiguation 
algorithms used plausible or valid reasoning. This would allow L O L I T A to behave 
in the manner appropriate to the certainty she has in her interpretation. 
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